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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN:
A CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

This thesis is a case study of the political economy of Iran from
1963 to the present.

It analyzes the interactions of the political and

econom ic spheres, and the effects of those interactions on political
developm ent within Iran.

For this study, political developm ent is

viewed in terms of a system's capacity to respond to economic and
political demands placed upon it by the population.

Various theories

of political economy are reviewed in the first chapter, and their
applicability to Iran’s system is discussed throughout the work.

The

interaction between existing econom ic and political systems in Iran,
their transform ation over time, and the resulting changes in the
capacity of Iran's leadership to deliver econom ically and politically
are the focus of this study.
A historical analysis is employed to compare the politicoeconom ic approaches and degree of developm ent under the regim e
of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi Shah from 1963 to 1979, with the post
revolutionary theocratic regim e from 1979 to the present.

The

analysis focuses on the interaction of economic conditions, political
decisions, and global economic and political factors.

Overall, it is

argued that development has been lacking both as a result of
environm ental circum stances and of decisions made by Iran's
leaders.

The historical analysis is valuable because it provides a

basis from which to speculate on the future political economy and

developm ent of Iran.

For Iran, development depends on sustained

economic growth and adoption of a method of distribution in which
econom ic gaps are narrowed.

In addition, developm ent requires that

political demands of the population be addressed; this means
creating avenues for interest articulation and political participation
by the masses.

The current leadership is aggressively pursuing

economic growth; if they are successful, the political demands of the
population will increase and the stability of the country will depend
on successfully responding to these demands.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN
A CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
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INTRODUCTION

The focus of this thesis is an analysis of how economic
conditions, political decisions, and the environm ent (domestic and
global) have interacted to shape the political economy of modern
Iran, which in turn has affected the degree of developm ent in this
country.

Development is an ambiguous concept.

Scholars have been

theorizing for several decades in an attem pt to distinguish what
makes one country more "developed" than another country.

In the

first chapter of this thesis a conceptual and theoretical framework is
given in order to facilitate a better understanding of political
economy and political development.

A number of approaches to

political economy are reviewed and their applicability to Iran is
briefly examined.

Further examination of how Iran has used these

politico-econom ic methods is detailed as the paper progresses.

After

the review of political economy studies, a framework for political
development is provided.

For the purposes of this paper,

development is defined in terms of a state's ability to satisfy the
economic and political needs and demands of its population.

Having

provided the conceptual and theoretical fram ework for the paper,
the following chapters use this framework to analyze Iran’s political
economy from 1963 to the present.
Chapter two examines Iran from the first year of the reform
program of the Shah, known as the W hite Revolution to the
revolution of 1979.

The White Revolution’s main point of change was
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land reform.

The Shah's program of land reform was primarily

designed to decrease the power of landlords and to m odernize Iran's
agricultural sector, rather than to redistribute the lands to the
peasants.

The 1970's in Iran were characterized by a huge increase

in oil revenues, followed by a slump, and by the Shah's
modernization program.

The Shah made a num ber of poor economic

and political decisions, that combined with environm ental
circum stances, to make the 1979 revolution inevitable.
Chapter three exam ines post-revolutionary Iran, during
Ayatollah Khomeini's decade as the leader of this country.

This ten

year period was dom inated by an environm ent shaped by the
revolution, the war with Iraq, and declining oil revenues.

The

leadership was characterized by factionalism , but Khomeini
maintained his position as the final arbiter in the regim e until his
death in 1989.

The political and economic systems of the two

regim es were different in a number of ways, but there were
sim ilarities, too; in particular, it is demonstrated that both regimes
showed very little development in terms of satisfying the economic
and political demands of the population.

The Khomeini regime might

be characterized as more popular or more legitim ate in the eyes of
the m asses, than the Pahlavi regime, but both used repressive
methods to deter political opposition and the econom ic systems
under both declined rather than seeing growth.
The fourth and final chapter of this thesis examines Iran in the
two years since Khomeini's death, and speculates on the future
prospects for this county.

The pragmatic faction within the regime

has generally prevailed in the past two years, and policies have
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focused on postwar reconstruction.

The changes in the political

economy that are taking shape at the present time may allow for
further developm ent in Iran with practical planning and favorable
environm ental conditions.

Using this historical analysis of the

political economy of Iran, I have attempted to dem onstrate that
development in Iran is certainly possible, but that there has to be a
willingness on the part of the leadership for this developm ent to take
place.

In the long term, if steps are not taken to satisfy the economic

and political demands of the people, the kind of instability that led to
the 1979 revolution may be seen again.

4

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Since the 1960's, Iran has undergone a series of
transform ations in various areas, including agricultural, industrial,
economic, and political.

W hile these changes were generally

designed to improve the country, Iran remains a politically and
econom ically developing nation.

This thesis will analyze the

interrelationships of politics and economics and their effect on
political development in Iran.

After developing a conceptual and

theoretical framework, the thesis will examine the political economy
of Iran from the time of the White Revolution up to the present.
Much of the W estern analysis of Iran has been inaccurate,
particularly over the past two decades.

In the 1970's many Western

analysts believed Iran to be very stable, despite evidence to the
contrary.

Accounts of the revolution have often been oversimplified,

describing it as a revolt against modernization.

In addition, the

factionalism of the post-revolutionary years has been largely
m isunderstood.

In this historical analysis the developm ent of Iran

will be examined primarily in terms of the changes, or lack thereof,
in Iran's political economy; obviously there are elements other than
the political economy that factor into development, but due to
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lim itations this study will focus primarily on political and economic
v a ria b le s.
A conceptual and theoretical fram ework of m odernization and
political development and of political economy is necessary to
proceed with this study.

Numerous analysts have improperly

described the 1979 Revolution as a revolt against the m odernization
program s of the Shah, when in reality the overwhelming
W esternization that accom panied m odernization and the absence of
political developm ent were much more im portant factors than was
m odernization.

Since these three concepts overlap, they have often

been used improperly in analysis.

Political developm ent must be

distinguished from other connected concepts in order to analyze
Iran’s level of development.

In addition, a conceptual and theoretical

fram ework for political economy must also be employed in order to
exam ine development in terms of political economy.

Analyzing the

interaction of the political and economic spheres and the policies
chosen by the leadership of Iran will indicate the degree of
developm ent which Iran has achieved.
This thesis will show that the decisions which Iran's leaders
have made over the past three decades have affected that country's
developm ent.

An exam ination of the interaction between the

environm ent and the decisions made since the W hite Revolution
reveals the reasons for the Shah’s downfall, K hom eini’s rise to power,
and Iran’s general lack of development.

Chapter one of this thesis

gives a conceptual and theoretical framework for political
developm ent and political economy.

This framework will be used

throughout the thesis to analyze the changes in Iran's political
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economy and the effects this has on development.

Chapter two

examines Iran from the time of the adoption of the reform program,
known as the W hite Revolution, up to the 1979 Revolution.

In

particular, the economic and political environm ent of this time period
and the decisions made by the Shah's regim e will be analyzed,
especially in regard to their relationship with Iran's development.

In

chapter three the transition from the revolution to the Islamic
Republic, led by Khomeini, will be studied.

In particular, the

decisions made by Khomeini's regime will be examined in light of the
revolution, oil revenues and the war with Iraq.

Finally, chapter four

will look at Iran since Khomeini's death and will examine the
prospects for further developm ent in Iran.
To become a "modern, developed nation" has been an objective
of the various regimes in Iran throughout this century.

Reza Shah

adopted several of the same measures in Iran that Ataturk had used
to modernize Turkey, including attem pting to reduce the influence
the religious establishm ent had in politics.

In the early 1950's,

Iranian Prime M inister Muhammad M ossadeqh tried to gain
independence from Britain and the Soviet Union in order to
modernize and develop Iran.

Mohammad Reza Shah used the oil

money in the 1970's in his drive to make Iran one of the top five
powers in the world.

Finally, Khomeini offered an Islamic alternative

to the W estern model of development that the Shah had pursued.
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M od ern ization

and

P o litical

D evelop m ent

M odernization and political developm ent are "analytically
distinct but actually interrelated" processes, 1 which are related to
the political and economic systems of a nation.

According to Samuel

Huntington's summary of David Lerner's work, the principal aspects
of m odernization are "urbanization, industrialization, secularization,
dem ocratization, education, and

media participation."2 The study of

m odernization and political developm ent has been fraught with
conceptual ambiguity and W estern bias.

Throughout the nineteenth

and most of the twentieth centuries analysts saw W estern Europe as
providing the "linear map of man's progress from tradition to
m o d e rn ity ." 3

It was generally assumed that the advanced, liberal

democracies had arrived and that their past provided a map for
other countries to follow in their struggle to modernity.

As a result,

analysts often simply examined the histories of the "developed
nations" and told Third World nations to follow the same steps.

This

oversimplified advice did little to aid the nations in their search for
m o d e rn ity .
Over the years, many definitions of m odernization have been
offered.

In the late 1960's, Samuel P. Huntington stated that

m odernization requires both social m obilization (changes in the
1 James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, Politics in the Middle East,
Little, Brown and Company, 1979) 6.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, O rd er in Changing S ocieties,
Yale University Press, 1968) 32.

(Boston and Toronto:

(N ew Haven and London:

3 James S. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., C om parative P olitics: The Q uest f o r
Theory
(Lanham, M D and London: University Press o f America, Inc., 1981)
4 8 -4 9 .
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aspirations of individuals, groups and societies) and economic
developm ent (changes in capabilities).4

Once the process of

m odernization begins there is a fundam ental shift in values, attitudes
and expectations within society.

Huntington refers to this as

m odernization at the psychological level.

Traditional man expects

continuity in nature and society; he does not believe man can change
or control either one.

Modern man, however, accepts the possibility

and desirability of change.

This shift in values, attitudes and

expectations accom panies m odernization under all circum stances.5
There is a plethora of definitions of modernization in
developm ent literature.

Some analysts feel that Huntington's overall

conceptualization of m odernization has a conservative W estern bias
(namely his

focus on stability and participation).

move away

from this bias and to

In anattem pt to

further the understanding of this

phenomenon, James A. Bill and Carl Leiden state that "modernization
is most concisely defined as the process by which man increasingly
gains control over his environm ent."6

The technological and scientific

revolutions that many societies have undergone are im portant
aspects of m odernization, but this process is not limited to these
changes.

The increasing control man has over his natural and social

environm ents in m odernizing society has three dimensions:

1)

technological - the industrialization process; 2) organizational - the
differentiation and specialization of structures and functions; and, 3)
4 Huntington,

34.

5 Huntington,

32.

6 B ill and Leiden, 3.
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attitudinal - the cultural secularization or rationalization of society.7
These attitudinal changes are due to the changes in lifestyle that are
caused by the increasing capacity to change the environm ent.
M odernizing man develops a cause/effect (rational) orientation from
understanding the environm ent (an exam ple is modern m an’s
understanding that typhoons are caused by shifting ocean tides and
winds, rather than by a supernatural phenomena).
Another characteristic of modernization is that it is "a process
in which expectations necessarily race beyond their satisfaction."8
Once m odernization begins, the attitudinal changes that accompany it
produce expectations that society cannot imm ediately satisfy.

When

man comes to believe that government is a product of man rather
than God, expectations of government change.

The cause/effect

(rational) orientation that m odernizing man develops often results in
expectations of change in sociey, such as political participation.
is often where the issue of political development is raised.

This

However,

before addressing development, it is im portant to realize the extent
to which W estern bias has affected m odernization.
Much of the theorizing concerning m odernization and
development has been biased in that it has focused on W estern
systems as the final product of these processes.

However, not only

have the conceptualizations and theories regarding m odernization
been biased, but so too has the process of modernization.

The

adoption of W estern traits, norms and values has generally
7 Bill and Hardgrave, 63.
8 Bill and Leiden, 3.
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accompanied the process of modernization; this is often referred to as
"W esternization".

However, the developing countries of the world

want modernization while they do not want W esternization.

This is a

point that many W estern analysts have failed to recognize, including
those analysts that believed the Iranian Revolution to be a fight
against m odernization.

Many within the developing world believe

that while it is inevitable that their culture will change due to
m odernization, it is not inevitable that their's must become a
W esternized culture.

One Iranian w riter has referred to this

adoption of components of W estern culture as "W estoxication."
Consequently, it is very im portant to distinguish between
m odernization and W esternization.

The developing world wants to

gain more control over its environment, but it does not want to lose
its unique history and culture to the developed world.

An example

of this is the opposition to the W est that is accompanying the
growing nationalism in the developing world.

For quite some time

now, m odernization and political developm ent have been mired
down in W estern bias, and it has been difficult to separate the
former two from the latter.
As noted above, the two processes of modernization and
political developm ent are analytically distinct, but in practice are
interrelated.

According to Bill and Hardgrave "development is most

usefully understood in terms of a system's response capacity in
relationship to dem ands."9

The increasing control over the

environm ent and the consequent attitudinal changes that result from
9 Bill and Hardgrave, 67.
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the m odernization process produce demands on the system to which
it must respond.

Here the relationship between the two phenomena

is apparent.
M odernization has provided the thrust behind in c r e a s in g
demands on political systems throughout the world. To
effectively respond they m ust enhance their capacity to
m eet these demands — one way or another.10
The capacity to respond, not the method of response, is the key
element in Bill and Hardgrave's understanding of political
d e v e lo p m e n t.
The earlier

studies of political developm ent were

influenced by the work of Gabriel Almond and Bingham
Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach,

generally
Powell.

In

Almond and

Powell state - "When we speak of level of political development, we
really are dealing with three interrelated variables - role
differentiation, subsystem autonomy, and secularization.

There is a

tendency for these processes of change to vary together."11
According to the authors, developed systems are characterized first
by structural

differentiation which is the differentiation

of new

political functions and the developm ent of specialized structures to
perform these functions.

In filling the roles to perform these new

functions, developing societies begin to value achievem ent over
ascription.

In addition, increasing subsystem autonomy is a key

elem ent of developing systems.

Groups that function independently

10 B ill and Hardgrave, 67.
11 Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Pow ell, Jr., C om parative P o litic s: A
D e v e lo p m e n ta l A p p r o a c h ,
(Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company,
1966) 306.
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from the governm ent and are able to influence that governm ent are
a distinguishing component of developed systems according to the
authors.

Finally, while structural differentiation and subsystem

autonomy are the structural com ponents of developm ent, cultural
secularization is the attitudinal/cultural com ponent of developm ent.
The rationalization of

authority, or viewing governm ent asa product

of man, rather than as a creation of God, is necessary for
development according to Almond and Powell.
by these two scholars

was used for

The fram ework given

many years to measure the

political developm ent of nations until valid criticism m inim ized the
role of this framework.
There are several problems with Almond and Pow ell's work.
First, there is a W estern bias.

The reliance on subsystem autonomy

as a distinguishing component of political developm ent suggests that
all non-dem ocratic-pluralist systems are not developed.

In

examining a developing country like Iran, which is not likely to
adopt a W estern dem ocratic-pluralist system , this W estern bias
suggests that there is no hope of Iran developing.

In addition,

cultural secularization as a key elem ent of developm ent takes away
from the role that religion has played and may continue to play in
development.

For example, Catholicism in Latin Am erica and Islam

in the M iddle East, particularly Iran, may be im portant components
of political development.

A final criticism comes from Bill and

H ard g rav e:
W hat they (Almond and Powell) have done in focusing on
d ifferentiation and secularization is to define political
developm ent in term s of m odernization.
D evelopm ent
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defined in terms of the vehicles of capability rather than
in terms of capability itself necessarily leads to the rather
c lu m sy d istin c tio n betw een p o sitiv e and n e g a tiv e
developm ent ...12
Bill and Hardgrave's point here is that defining developm ent in terms
of the vehicles of capability necessarily limits and confuses one’s
understanding of political development.

Bill and Hardgrave’s

definition of development in terms of capacity to respond to
demands alleviates the problems that Almond and Powell encounter.
At the same time, Bill and Hardgrave’s definition is ambiguous.
Knowing the limitations of Almond and Pow ell’s work allows one to
apply some of their ideas to a developm ent framework without
encountering the same criticism .
A second work that furthered the study of political
development was Samuel Huntington's book Order in Changing
So cieties.

Huntington's focus for development is institutionalization.

Political m odernization involves the extension of political
consciousness to new social groups and the m obilization
of these groups into p o litics.
P o litical developm ent
involves the creation of political institutions sufficiently
adaptable, com plex, autonom ous, and coherent to absorb
and to order participation of these new groups and to
prom ote social and economic change in the society.13

W hile H untington’s focus is on institutions, he relies on certain
elements of Almond and Powell (although Huntington places these
elem ents under political m odernization rather than political
12 B ill and Hardgrave, 73.
13 Huntington, 266.
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developm ent).

Huntington says political m odernization includes

rationalization of authority and differentiation of new political
functions.

Huntington adds a new dimension to political

developm ent theory, defining institutions as "stable, valued,
recurring patterns of behavior," and institutionalization as "the
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and
s ta b ility ." 14

The focus on institutionalization as the key element of

developm ent is an im provem ent on Almond and Pow ell's framework,
since it focuses on general institution-building as a method of
developm ent rather than specifying dem ocratic-pluralism

as

necessary for development, but there are criticism s of Huntington,
too.
Huntington's focus on stability is problematic - political
development is not necessarily a stable process.

Critics of his work

contend that Huntington is too concerned with the status quo, making
his work overly conservative.

In addition, just as Bill and Hardgrave

criticized Almond and Powell for defining development in terms of
the "vehicles of capability", one could accuse Huntington of the same
mistake, since institutions can be considered the vehicles of
capability rather than the capability itself.

As such, specific

recom m endations for developm ent m ight include institutionbuilding, but institutions will not be considered necessary for
defining developm ent in this paper.

14 Huntington,

12.
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Bill and Hardgrave's ideas on response capacity have been
referred to, but have not been entirely explained.

According to the

a u th o rs ,
D e v e lo p m e n t
d em a n d s
an
in te g r a tiv e ,
re s p o n s iv e ,
adaptive, and innovative capacity. Capacity involves sheer
m ag n itu d e or scope in p o litic a l and g o v ern m en tal
p e rfo rm a n c e ;
r a t i o n a l i ty
in
a d m in is tr a tio n
and
effectiveness in the implementation of public policy.15

By defining political development in terms of capacity to respond to
dem ands, rather than structural differentiation and subsystem
autonom y or institutionalization, the authors have avoided the
criticism s of the previously discussed scholars; however, their
am biguity makes it practically impossible to produce an operational
definition and thus to determine the level of political development of
a particular country.

Viewing development in terms of response

capacity means that as a state develops it is able to deliver when the
populations makes demands.

Delivering involves satisfying economic

and political demands of the people.
According to Bill and Hardgrave, "Political development must
involve then both the will and the capacity to initiate, absorb, and
sustain

continuous

tran sfo rm atio n ."16 A key point here is the

inclusion of the system's ability to initiate transform ation, rather
than simply respond to it.

For Bill and Hardgrave political

developm ent is understood as the capacity of the political system not

15 B ill and Hardgrave, 73.
16 B ill and Hardgrave, 75.
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only to absorb and sustain change, but also to be able to introduce
and generate it.
In exam ining the m odernization and political developm ent of
Iran, this study will view political development as it is defined by
Bill and Hardgrave, focusing on the political and economic aspects of
the system 's capacity to initiate, absorb, and sustain transform ation.
Iran's system obviously lacked the capacity to absorb and sustain
transform ation in the late 1970's, or the revolution would not have
taken place.

Development in terms of response capacity means

having the capability to satisfy the economic and political demands
of the popultion.

The basic needs of a developing society include life

sustaining necessities such as food and shelter for the population.

In

addition, sustained economic growth can be considered necessary for
developm ent.

Economic growth provides the system with the ability

to initiate and absorb certain types of transform ation and to provide
the population with relative economic demands.

For example,

econom ic growth can help to meet the m aterial demands of the
population, which often increase as m odernization takes place.
Finally, development depends on the capacity of the system to
respond to the population's political demands and/or needs.

Often

these demands include avenues within the system for interest
articulation and political participation.

There is no specific form of

interest articulation or political participation that is necessary, as
long as the political demands of the population are satisfied.
Effective response capacity to political demands can be
som ewhat measured by exam ining the nature and strength of the
opposition to the regime.

If the opposition is violent and it is strong
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among the population, it would indicate that the regim e has not
delivered in a manner satisfactory to the people.

Political

developm ent viewed in term s of response capacity depends on the
environm ent within which the society functions, and on the decisions
of the governing body.

The environm ent and the decisions affecting

the political and economic spheres of a state often contribute to
determ ining the degree of developm ent of that state.
In the case study of Iran, the interrelated nature of
m odernization and political development and political economy is
apparent, particularly looking at the policies of the 1970's.

Just prior

to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, James Bill and Carl Leiden stated
that satisfying m aterial demands (in the M iddle East) may
tem porarily alleviate econom ic discontent, but eventually there
"must be an enduring capacity to satisfy continually and effectively
the social and political needs of all groups and classes in the
s o c ie ty ." 17

The Iranian Revolution was, at least in part, a response to

the regime's failure to satisfy the social and political needs of the
groups and classes in Iran. The interrelationship of the politics and
economics of Iran, and its effects upon the political development of
this country is the subject of this study.

P o litica l

E conom y

It is obvious that m odernization and political developm ent
involve numerous facets in society; for this study, the developm ent
17 B ill and Leiden, 15.

of Iran will be examined in terms of political economy.

W hile it has

been recognized for quite some time that the political and the
econom ic sphere are somehow interconnected, there is no single
accepted theory of political economy.
ambiguous.

The concept itself is

Some scholars, especially political scientists, underscore

the political basis of economic actions whereas others, particularly
economists, focus on the economic basis of political actions.

For

exam ple, according to Alan Richards and John W aterbury, political
economy examines the formulation of public policies that shape the
allocation of resources within societies and the political consequences
that flow therefrom .18

This conception of political economy is

politically based, whereas the M arxist conception views politics as
being determined by the economic system.
is a political superstructure that is entirely
economic substructure of society.

According to Marx, there
dependent on the

For the purposes of this paper

however, the definition of political economy must take into account
the interaction and interdependence of the econom ic and political
systems, both international and domestic.

According to Frieden and

Lake “international political economy is the study of the interplay of
economics and politics in the world arena."

In the most general

sense and for the purposes of this paper, "the economy can be
defined as the system of producing, distributing, and using wealth."
Politics

will be viewed as "the set of institutions and rules by which

18 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A P olitical Economy o f the M iddle East:
State, Class and Economic Developm ent (Boulder: W estview Press, 1990) 2.

19

social and economic interactions are governed."19 This focus on the
interdependence of the two areas is applicable not only at the
international level, but also at the domestic level.

In the case of Iran,

the nation’s dependence on oil sales on the international m arket
dem onstrates the high degree of interdependence of the two levels.
In this introductory chapter an evaluation of four major
approaches to the study of international political economy will be
presented as well as a brief summary of their applicability to Iran.
The four approaches that will be examined include liberalism ,
M arxist and dependency theories, economic nationalism and
economic internationalism .

Since this chapter can only briefly

exam ine these methods of studying political economy, further
reading in each might include: Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations (liberalism); Karl Marx,
Capital: A Critique o f Political Economy (Marxism); Andre Gunder
Frank, D ependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (dependency
theory); Friedrich List, The National System o f Political Economy
(economic nationalism ); and Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare
State: Economic Planning and its International Implications (economic
internationalism ).

Of these four, elements of liberalism , dependency

theories and economic nationalism will be most useful in the study of
Iran's political economy.
The first approach is liberalism.

Based primarily on the

writings of Adam Smith, liberalism develops from the assumption

19 Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake, In ternation al P o litic a l E conom y:
Perspective on G lobal P ow er and Wealth (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) 1.
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that individuals are actuated by their desire to better their condition
through m aterial gain.

Smith viewed individuals as rational, utility-

maximizing actors who are capable of making cost-benefit
c a lc u la tio n s.20

Smith argued, assuming perfect competition,

that

individuals acting in their own economic interest would, as a
collectivity, maximize collective well-being.

Consequently, Smith

placed prim ary emphasis on the “free and unfettered operation of
the m arket for social w ell-being.”21

Smith argued that there was an

invisible hand that would guide the market.

In its original

form ulation, liberalism stressed laissez-faire capitalism , the rights of
property, lim ited governm ent, and social Darw inism .22 It is
prim arily this liberal approach upon which the global m arket
econom y has been structured.
There are several criticism s of liberalism that must be taken
into account.

First, Smith in particular and liberalism in general,

focus on economic motives to the exclusion of others, including
culture and politics.

In addition, perfect competition may work in

theory but it is not realistic; thus, the social well-being that should
derive as a result of individuals seeking their own material gain in
competition with one another cannot be realized.

According to

Martin Carnoy, “ Smith never proves, or even argues that individuals

20 Frieden and Lake, 6.
21 Martin Carnoy, The State and P o litic a l Theory
U niversity Press, 1984)
24.

(Princeton: Princeton

22 R. Dan W alleri, "The Political Econom y Literature on North-South Relations:
A lternative A pproaches and Em pirical Evidence," I n te r n a tio n a l S tu d ie s
Q u a r te r ly 22 (Dec. 1978) 593.

2 1

seeking material gain in competition with one another is not a vice,
in the sense that it tends to injure others.”23 Consequently, one can
see that the m arket does not function as it should and this presents
problems for liberal theorists.

"For it means that the 'invisible hand'

does not work and that 'someone' has to take into his own hands the
task of guiding the economy towards certain specific norm ative
g o a ls ." 24

This means that the interference that liberalism so

vehemently opposes is needed if the economy is to function properly.
Regardless of criticism , liberalism has largely shaped the global
economy and is the basis of many of the developed countries'
econom ies.
R. Dan W alleri suggests that third world countries are on the
“periphery” of the global economy.

The liberal solution offered to

them has been further incorporation and integration into the global
economy through such policies as the prom otion of m anufactured
exports and im port substitution policies.25

These policies have been

tried however, and while they have helped some countries improve
their economic standing, those countries have generally rem ained in
the

“ sem i-periph ery”26

Iran, it can be argued, may be classified as

23 Camoy, 25.
24 Shigeto Tsuru, "Towards a New Political Economy," Economics in the Future:
Towards a New P aradigm Kurt Dopfer, ed., (Boulder: W estview Press, 1976) 109-

110 .
25 W alleri, 593.
26 Sem i-periphery is a term used by H ooshang Amirahmadi to describe
countries that are distinguished by their "expanding, but lim ited, hom e and
export markets, tech n ological dependency, and integration into the world
econom y.
H ooshang Amirahmadi, Revolution an d E conom ic Transition: The
Iranian E x perien ce (N ew York: State University o f N ew York Press, 1990)
1.
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either a peripheral or a sem i-peripheral country.

Liberalism helps

explain the world capitalist economy within which Iran must
operate; however, it cannot fully explain the political and economic
policies under which Iran has functioned since the W hite Revolution.
The second approach to be examined includes M arxist and
dependency theories.

Marx described society as consisting of a base

or substructure and a superstructure.

The econom ic system of

society is the substructure, whereas the superstructure consists of all
other social system s, including the cultural and political elements.
According to M artin Carnoy there are three fundam ental elements in
Marxism.

First, Marx viewed the material conditions of society as the

basis of its social structure and argued that the form of state emerges
from the relations of production.

Second, the state emerging from

the relations of production does not represent the common good, but
is the political expression of the class structure inherent in
production.

Finally, the state in bourgeois society is the repressive

arm of the bourgeoisie which keeps class antagonisms in check.27
One other im portant element of M arx’s argum ent is that in observing
the relations of production, Marx argued that the basis of the
capitalist economy is the exploitation of labor by capital.
Consequently, the relationship between these two classes is one of a
zero-sum

n atu re.28

Marx argued that eventually the exploitation of

labor would lead to class consciousness which would result in a social

27 Cam oy, 46-47.
28 Frieden and Lake, 8.
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revolution overthrowing the bourgeoisie.

This would be followed by

a transform ation of the system to socialism and then to communism.
M arxist theory has been criticized as determ inistic, dogmatic
and static.29

History has not yet borne out the theory of Marxism,

and in fact, the Soviet Union has arguably been an improper
application of Marxism since it went directly from a stage of
feudalism to one of socialism.

Marxism is partially appropriate for

an analysis of Iran because of the strong relationship it proposes
between the economic and political spheres.

However, the 1979

Revolution cannot be explained entirely in terms of class
consciousness and dialectical materialism ; indigenous cultural factors,
which Marxism ignores, have to be taken into account when
exam ining Iran's revolution.

Due to certain cultural aspects in Iran,

and particularly with respect to Islam, M arxism has not been
incorporated into Iran's political agenda, and is not likely to be.
M uslim people who strongly believe in God (Allah) cannot accept a
theory that is atheistic in nature.

In addition, the Islamic principle

that recognizes the right of private property is contradictory to
M arxist theory.

As a result of these problems and others, including

the fear of Soviet imperialism, which has carried the M arxist banner
since the Soviet Revolution, Iran has resisted com m unist movements
(with the exception of the Tudeh party which was very careful to
avoid any connection to Marxism, and which regained some support
during the 1979 Revolution).

Thus, Marxism is useful in this case

29 Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories o f Comparative P olitics: The Search f o r a
P a ra d ig m
(Boulder: W estview Press, 1981), 404.
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study due to the strong connections it purports between economic
and politics, but the political agenda which it proposes is viewed as
inappropriate for Iran.
Dependency theories, both M arxist and non-M arxist, have also
m ade im portant contributions to understanding the international
political economy (it should be noted that dependency arguments
cannot properly be termed "theories" since they do not provide
predictable generalizations; however, they are useful in describing
certain phenomena).

The main premise of dependency theories is

that "foreign penetration has created underdevelopm ent."30

This has

created a situation in which underdeveloped states have been
exploited by the more developed states.

Theotonio dos Santos

offered a description of dependency that was meant to describe the
position of Latin America, but which can be applied to other less
developed countries of the world;
By dependence we mean a situ atio n in w hich the
econom y of certain countries is conditioned by the
developm ent and expansion of another economy to which
the form er is subjected. The relation of interdependence
between two or more econom ies, and between these and
world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some
countries (the dom inant ones) can expand and can be
se lf-su stain in g , w hile other c o u n tries (the dependent
ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion,
which can have either a positive or a negative effect on
their im m ediate developm ent.3 1
30 Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein, eds., Latin Am erica: The Struggle
w ith D epen den cy an d B eyon d
(Cambridge: Schenkm an Publishing Company
Inc., 1974) 26.
31 Theotonio dos Santos, "The Structure o f Dependence," The A m erica n
E conom ic R eview LX (May, 1970) 231-36, as quoted in Chilcote and Edelstein, 26.
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Underdevelopm ent is understood to be created by and relative to the
developed countries, which at an earlier time may have been
undeveloped but were never u n d e r d e v e l o p e d .

Since developm ent is

understood here as a relative state, those countries that are now
considered developed were never underdeveloped because there
were no developed states to compare them to.

According to Ronald

Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein, it was the process of the expansion of
capitalism , through which now developed countries progressed,
which brought about the underdevelopm ent of many parts of Latin
America (and it can be argued many other parts of the Third
W o rld ).32 As capitalism expanded, parts of Latin America and many
other areas (including parts of the Middle East) were seen as
suppliers of raw m aterials and new markets for finished goods.
In order to explain inequality, dependency theories divide the
states of the world into two economic categories - the industrialized
capitalist developed states, considered the “core,” (or center) and the
developing states, which in turn are dom inated by the form er within
the international capitalist system.
the “periphery.”
theories.

These latter states are considered

There are several different types of dependency

These types include the M arxist-derived world-system

theory, the dependencia theories coming from Latin American
scholars, and the structural theory of im perialism , as argued in
particular by Johan Galtung.

In general, the theories are similar,

diverging mostly in regards to the solution to underdevelopm ent.

32 Chilcote and Edelstein, 27.
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Galtung describes the world economy in terms of core and periphery
and exam ines both external and internal im perialism .
Rather than focus on class formation, however, Galtung
concentrates on the exploitation contained in the patterns
of interaction that have arisen between the center and
periphery states as a consequence of class interests.33

He views developed nations (core) and the underdeveloped nations
(periphery) as each containing a core and a periphery, where the
elites within each nation formed their own core and the periphery
contained the masses.

Galtung argues that there are bonds between

the cores of the dependent countries and the cores of the developed
countries.

External imperialism is the exploitation of the

underdeveloped countries (periphery) by the developed countries
(core), whereas internal imperialism is the exploitation of masses
within a country (periphery) by that country’s elites (core).

This

typology is helpful in describing Iran, both prior to and after the
revolution.

The internal and external im perialism that has

dominated Iran will be examined in this study, as will it's effects on
developm ent in Iran.
W hile many dependency theorists agree regarding this
structural argument, there are differences as to whether the solution
lies in the elites of the underdeveloped nations reform ing them selves
and breaking the ties with the developed nations or if the solution is
socio-political revolution that overthrows the reigning leaders of the

33 Walleri, 609.
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underdeveloped countries and breaks the bonds of dependency with
the developed nations.
R egardless of the differen ces ... m ost dependency
theorists w ould probably argue that the particular form
in w hich cap italism has m olded the dom estic class
structures and external relations of the periphery states
precludes the possibility of genuine national developm ent
in the Third W orld within the context provided by the
present international order.34

W hile there are many criticism s of dependency theories,
especially since there is no single agreed-upon solution, the basic
elements of dependency arguments can be applied to Iran.
According to Hooshang Amirahmadi, by the time of the Iranian
revolution in 1979, Iran had experienced alm ost three decades of a
“dependent capitalist growth path.”

This sem i-peripheral country, as

Am irahm adi describes it, had pursued, rather unsuccessfully,
strategies of im port-substitution industrialization and export
prom otion throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s.35

Iran’s dependence

on oil sales for the largest share of its revenues made that country
dependent on the world capitalist economy in general and on the
world oil market in particular.

The m ajor economic boom years of

1973-74 brought huge revenues to Iran which were mainly spent on
m aterial and human expansion of the civilian and m ilitary
bureaucracies.

34 W alleri, 611.
33 Amirahmadi, 1.

This expansion brought several problem s including
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personnel shortages which resulted in sharp increases in wages, and
policies encouraging private accum ulation which brought increased
demand and thus shortages of producer and consum er goods, leading
to additional price increases.

In addition, the boom made Iran even

more dependent on the capitalist world m arket for the sale of its
single-com m odity export.

When the econom ic bust of 1976-77

arrived Iran was com pletely unprepared.

The boom had extended

the economy past its “m aterial, human, institutional and
infrastructural capacities.”

In 1975 the country was caught up in

deficit spending, and with the bust, the economy only w orsened.36
Even after the Revolution and the policies of the new regime, which
nationalized the oil industry, Iran rem ains a peripheral country that
is dependent on the world capitalist market.
The third approach in political economy studies that will be
evaluated and applied to Iran is economic nationalism.

This

approach concentrates on prom oting national econom ic growth and
development, prim arily through an active state role.

According to

Friedrich List, writing in Germany in 1885, the free trade approach
advocated by liberalism is only successful if all nations follow the
principles of free trade.

In addition, List states:

I saw clearly that free com petition between two nations
which are highly civilized can only be mutually beneficial
in case both of them are in a nearly equal position of
industrial developm ent, and that any nation which owing
to m isfortunes is behind others in industry, com m erce,
and navigation, w hile she n ev erth eless possesses the
m ental and m ate ria l m eans fo r d e v elo p in g th o se
36 Amirahmadi,

19-21.
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a cq u isitio n s, m ust first of all stren g th en her own
individual powers, in order to fit herself to enter into free
com petition with more advanced nations.37
Even though List was writing this in 1885, in response to England's
domination of world trade and Germany's poor economic position,
this line of argument has become the basis of economic nationalism.
According to R. Dan W alleri, List departed from the liberal
school in two significant ways.

First, List emphasized the role of the

state in prom oting economic growth and developm ent, rather than
relying on the self-regulating mechanism of the market.

He argued

that the state should elim inate internal barriers to trade, subsidize
the creation of infrastructure, and prom ote home industry and the
export of manufactures.

List believed this could be accomplished

through the utilization of protective tariffs in order for “infant
industries" to flourish and for the home government to collect
revenues to further develop the econom ic sphere.38

According to

List, under a system of perfectly free com petition with more
advanced industrial nations, a less developed nation "can never
attain to a perfectly developed m anufacturing power of its own, nor
to perfect national independence, without protective duties."39
Since the first publication of Friedrich List's book in 1885,
num erous refinem ents and criticism s of econom ic nationalism and its
policies have been added.

According to W alleri, economic

37 Friedrich List, The National System o f P o litical Economy
Augustus M. K elley Publishers, 1966) xxvii.
38 W alleri, 596.
39 List, 316.

(New York:
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nationalists seek to encourage dom estically owned industries by
prom oting m anufactured exports through im port substitution. "The
goal ... is to enhance national power, which is considered
incom patible with foreign control over key areas of the economy."40
George Macesich includes among the goals of economic nationalism:
"as much self-sufficiency as possible, public ownership and public
enterprise in key econom ic sectors, and/or intensive regulation and
control of private and domestic and foreign enterprise."41 T h e
specific policies that states adopt and their level of success obviously
varies with social, economic and political considerations. Coughlin,
Chrystal and W ood state that economic nationalism is based on
protectionist trade policies which have the specific goal of expanding
the dom estic production in protected industries, benefitting the
owners, workers, and suppliers of resources to those protected
industries.

Protectionist policies include tariffs, quotas, regulatory

barriers, subsidies and exchange controls.

These policies also benefit

the government im posing them in light of the additional revenues.
Those hurt by these policies, other than foreign interests, are the
domestic consumers who have less choice and are hurt by lack of
com petitive pricing, and the other domestic producers who are not
p ro te c te d .42
40 W alleri, 596.
41 George M acesich, Econom ic N ationalism
Publishers, 1985)
2.

an d S tability

(N ew York: Praeger

42 Cletus C. Coughlin, K. Alec Chrystal, and G eoffrey E. W ood, "Protectionist
Trade P olicies: A Survey o f Theory, Evidence, and Rationale," I n t e r n a t i o n a l
P o litic a l Economy: P erspectives on G lobal P o w er an d Wealth by Jeffry A.
Frieden and David A. Lake, eds., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) 25.
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There are numerous criticism s of economic nationalism and its
policies.

The policy of import substitution was quite popular in Latin

Am erica in the 1950's, although it was eventually unsuccessful.

In

order to induce industrialization, these countries restricted imports
of m anufactured goods through tariff protection.

There were at least

two undesirable consequences that resulted from these policies:
1) the countries restricted im ports to essential foodstuff and raw
m aterials, which gave luxury items the most protection - the policies
were meant to stimulate production for the home m arket, but the
luxury items produced were not in high demand in the developing
countries; 2) the firms that were developing behind the protective
tariffs were often too inefficient to compete on the world market and
thus had to remain protected.43 Eventually, the policies were
designated as unsuccessful and the countries abandoned them.
According to Melvyn Krauss, while protection is designed to give life
to "infant industries" it often sets an environm ent in which these
industries have no prospect of maturing and in which too many
people benefit from the protection to give it up. In addition to the
problem s above, Krauss criticizes protectionism due to wasted
resources, corruption of governm ent officials by the protected and
vise versa, lack of entrepreneurship and export stagnation.44
Finally, economic nationalism has also been criticized for

43 W alleri, 597.
44 M elvyn B. Krauss, D evelo pm en t Without Aid: G row th, P o ve rty and
G o v e r n m e n t (New York: McGraw Hill book Company, 1983) 11-12.
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concentrating on industrialization that is inappropriate and
unneeded, usually at the expense of agriculture.
In the case of Iran, particularly since the Revolution, economic
nationalist policies were adopted but have been very lim ited in their
success.

In the summer of 1979 the Provisional Revolutionary

Government (PRG) and the Revolutionary Council (RC) nationalized
banks, insurance companies and major industries, including the oil
industry which came under the National Iranian Oil Com pany.45
There were immediate constraints on the success of these policies
however.

In the years imm ediately following the Revolution there

was such factionalism within the leadership that it led to the
inability on the part of the leaders to “formulate a coherent economic
policy and regulate its relations with the domestic opposition and the
in tern ational

com m unity.”46

There were some significant changes in

the structure of the economy, including redistribution of resources
and redefinition of national priorities, but constraints such as
factionalism , the war with Iraq, and the limited control over the
production, export and price of oil due to the world market and OPEC,
left Iran in the position of a peripheral state dependent on the world
cap italist econom y.
The fourth and final approach in political economy is economic
internationalism .

Unlike the liberal and economic nationalist

positions which "rest on the assumption that the key to progress in
the Third World lies in a replication of the W estern experience,"
45

Amirahmadi, 23.

46

Amirahmadi, 8.

econom ic internationalism , demands a fundam ental transform ation
of the present international order.47

This view is generally criticized

as an unrealistic theory, but many scholars concerned with the Third
World feel that it is at least worthy of some merit.

Economic

internationalism believes the solution to inequality within and
between nations lies in the redistribution of resources on a global
level.

Economic

internationalism argues that “since there is no world

governm ent to intervene in the international market to correct the
uneven developm ent among nations, it is essential that international
institutions be created to deal with problems arising for the
periphery

sta te s.”48

It was with this argument in mind that the

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was
created in 1964 over the objections of the core nations in order to
deal with the plight of the Third World.
The major objective of UNCTAD has been to secure non
reciprocal tariff reductions by the core states on m anufactured
exports from the entire developing world.

This is viewed as an

alternative to direct aid programs (which have failed for various
reasons) and as a method of indirect redistribution.49

N onreciprocal

trade agreem ents are designed to allow periphery states to gain a
larger share of the world market, and consequently to stim ulate the
development of Third World economies.

However, due to several

factors, including the "unlikelihood that the center states will allow
47 W alleri, 599.
48 W alleri, 600.
49 W alleri, 601.
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such a broad and nonreciprocal liberalization in trade" and the lack
of unity among the developing nations, UNCTAD has not been as
successful as initially hoped.50
There are several criticism s of econom ic internationalism .
Some argue that it ignores the realities of the market.

In addition,

many (M arxists and dependency theorists) argue that in order to
elim inate the

mechanisms of neocolonialism between the center and

periphery states, a radical transform ation of the present
international economic order would be required; this would include a
massive redistribution of wealth.

Since this would obviously hurt

those in power it is likely that the powerful center states will oppose
this transform ation.

In regards to Iran, econom ic internationalism is

an approach that could aid in its economic development, but it is
unlikely that this solution will materialize.

Iran has often held an

anti-im perialist attitude, but its record of disagreem ent with other
developing nations is extensive; Iran has contributed to the disunity
in OPEC and has had problems with the other countries in the Gulf
area.

Consequently, Iran has contributed to the lack of unity that is

needed to force this redistribution.

Despite the efforts of UNCTAD

and other developm ental programs, the prospects for an
internationalist economic order to evolve are not good.
In examining the evolving political economy of Iran, all four of
the above approaches must be understood.

First, liberalism provides

the general fram ew ork for understanding the international capitalist
economy within which Iran must function.
50 Walleri, 602.

Second, dependency
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theories aid in understanding Iran's position as a peripheral country
in the world economy, particularly due to its status as a single
commodity exporter.

In addition, protective trade policies, as

espoused in economic nationalism , were adopted by the Iranian
governm ent in order to prom ote economic growth and development.
Finally, while economic internationalism is unlikely to see its
solutions implemented on a global scale it is im portant if only to
understand Iran's and other developing countries' efforts to dispel
the inequality between center and periphery states.

As following

chapters exam ine Iran’s developm ent, the role of these various
arguments and their applicability to Iran's political economy will be
d e m o n s tra te d .
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FROM REFORM TO REVOLUTION

This chapter examines Iran from the time of the reform
program adopted in 1963, referred to as the W hite Revolution, to the
revolution of 1979.

The chapter analyzes the interaction of the

environm ent and the decisions made by the regim e, and the effects
of that interaction on the political economy.

The Shah's regime

enacted a number of reforms in the 1960's in order to weaken the
power of political opponents and to modernize Iran.

These reforms

have been regarded by many scholars to be the beginning point of
the popular discontent that led to the 1979 Revolution.

Later, a more

intensive m odernization program was pursued follow ing the windfall
of oil revenues in the early 1970's.

At the same time, the Shah chose

not to pursue any corresponding changes in the political sphere.
Rising expectations were created as a result of m odernization, but
they met with economic decline and the absence of political
developm ent.

Eventually, this contributed to the overwhelm ing

popular discontent that led to the revolution.
Over the period of 1963 to 1977, the Iranian regime, led by
Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, made a number of poor political and
economic decisions.

In this period Iran grew more and more

dependent on the oil market and the international capitalist
economy.

The country's economy experienced astounding growth
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following the oil price increases in 1973, and at one point Iran's rate
of industrial growth was the highest in the w orld.1

However, despite

this economic windfall, the Iranian regime was either unable to or
chose not to address the needs of the Iranian people.

The Shah

em ployed various m easures, from reform to brutal repression, in his
attem pt to maintain his power and realize his vision for Iran, but by
1979 none of his actions had gone far enough to save his regime.

The

W hite

Revolution

On June 26, 1963 the Shah put his new reform program, the
"White Revolution", into effect.2 The White Revolution was a
program of reform aiming not at transform ation of the Iranian
society, but largely aimed at securing the Shah's position, and
underm ining

his opposition.3

In the early 1960's, the Shah was

being pressured by the United States to undertake some reform
m easures, since the U.S. believed that Iran would eventually fall into
com m unist hands, and the only way to postpone this was through
reform.

American John W. Bowling prepared a report for the

K ennedy adm inistration which recom mended the Shah adopt
fourteen points of reform , including land reform and relaxation of
political repression.
1 Nikki Keddi, The R oots o f Revolution: An Interpretive H istory o f M odern Iran
(N ew Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981)
162.
2 Homa Katouzian, The P o litical Economy o f M odern Iran: D espotism and
P s e u d o -M o d e rn is m , 1 9 2 6 -1 9 7 9
(N ew York and London: N ew York University
Press, 1981) 225.
3 As such, the use o f the term "revolution" is m isleading since it is
appropriately used to indicate a fundamental transform ation in society.
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The K ennedy adm inistration considered land reform an
effectiv e deterren t against com m unist expansion or an
agrarian revolution of the Chinese type and a prerequisite
for the success of any industrialization program .4
The Shah, feeling pressure from the United States, and seeing an
opportunity to m odernize Iran, while strengthening his position,
chose to adopt several points of reform.

Originally, the programme

included six points, although over several years more were added
until as many as eighteen were included.

Of these, probably the

most im portant point was land reform .
A program of redistribution of arable land was started by
Prime M inister Ali Amini and his m inister of agriculture, Hassan
Arsanjani.

Under Amini the first phase of redistribution successfully

distributed land to a significant proportion of the peasantry and
Amini became quite popular.

As a result, the Shah saw the prime

m inister as a threat and forced both Amini and Arsanjani to resign.5
According to Nikki Keddi, "the best estim ate is that something like 9
percent of Iran's peasants got land in this first phase," which is not
insignificant compared to later phases.

The reform was continued

after Am ini's rem oval, but it was unequal; some landlords
m aintained some of the best quality land whereas peasants received
varying amounts of generally lower quality land.6 The reform was
meant to underm ine the sem ifeudal forms of landow nership rather
4 M ohsen M ilani, The Making o f Iran's Islam ic Revolution: From M onarchy to
Islam ic R epu blic,
(Boulder and London: W estview Press, 1988) 80.
5 M ilani, 84-85.
6 Keddi, 162.

than to distribute land on a more egalitarian basis.

The landowners,

or khans, were seen as a bar to development and to central
governm ent control of the countryside.

The k h a n s were often tribal

leaders and had considerable influence over the peasants.

They

could be brutal, but they provided a support structure to the
agricultural system, including providing seed, irrigation, and medical
services to the peasants, that the governm ent did not replace in its
red istrib u tio n

schem e.

In the second and third phases of the land reform program,
reform s were much more conservative.

Once the central government

had underm ined the landlords' {khans) power, regularizing the
system was pursued, rather than redistribution.7 Phase Two of the
land reform program, beginning in 1965, set lim its on landowners,
but provided them with options, including purchasing the peasants'
rights of the use of land, assuming that the peasants were willing.
Phase Three was an attempt to elim inate the tenancy relations in
farming; it coincided with the governm ent's creating farm
corporations, to facilitate the mechanization of farming.

The peasants

were forced to transfer the use of their land perm anently to the farm
corporations in exchange for shares equivalent to the value of their
land and other farm assets.

The peasants saw this as a reversal,

reverting them back to their previous status of agricultural
la b o u r e r s .8

Thus, the peasants did not receive the benefits that they

7 Keddi, 162.
8 M.H. Pesaran, "Economic D evelopm ent and R evolutionary U pheavals in
Iran," in Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil, Haleh Afshar, ed. (Albany: State
University o f New York Press, 1985) 28.
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expected from land reform and the removal of the landlords was not
as extensive as planned.

In addition, the regime failed to fill the

organizational and physical vacuum created by the "half-hearted
rem oval of the landlords".9

The government did not provide the

necessary capital for the peasants who had acquired lands and did
not create a sufficient infrastructure in the rural regions to assist
new landow ners in managing the land.10

As a result, the agricultural

sector’s production declined drastically and Iran became a net
im porter of agricultural products.
A large part of the White Revolution was a drive towards
m odernization (viewed by the Shah as obtaining W estern
technology), both in agriculture and in industry.

In the later phases

of land reform W estern equipm ent and technology were brought into
Iran.

U nfortunately, according to Nikki Keddi, this equipm ent and

technology were inappropriate for Iran's soil and were im properly
u s e d .11

As a consequence of this and of the overall restructuring of

the agricultural economy Iran's agricultural system was badly
d a m a g ed .

During the second and third phases of land reform, very

few peasants could make a living off the land, so they migrated to
the cities.

This phenomenon and its consequences will be examined

la te r.
Muhammad Reza Shah also pursued a policy of settling the
nomads, concurrent with his land reform policy.
9 Pesaran, 29.
10 Milani, 86.
11 Keddi, 163.

The nomads were

4 1

not settled through force of arms but instead were deprived of their
livelihood.

Nomadism was not considered "modern" in regard to

economic and political considerations and as such was to be
elim inated.

"Land reform may never have had prim arily economic

goals; a major aim was to cut landlord power and bring peasants and
nomads under direct government control, and this was
a c c o m p lis h e d ." 12

Bringing nomads and peasants under government

control, and lessening the power of the landlords was designed to
strengthen the Shah and to modernize the rural areas of the country.
How ever, the restructuring eventually dem onstrated that the
traditional mode of production perform ed better than the 'm odern'
system

because:

both farm c o rp o ra tio n s and a g ri-b u sin e sse s are (at
d ifferen t lev els) purely u n in stitu tio n a l and a h isto rical
in ventions, transplanted into a given social fram ew ork
from the air.
Both these 'm odern' system s destroyed the
technical ch arac teristics and politico n o m ic relations of
Iranian agriculture, and replaced them w ith com pletely
alien and ill-adapted technological and institutional forms.
If it is clear why an attem pt to create traditional
Iranian-type village units of production in California would
fail absolutely, then it should be equally clear why the
u n c ritic a l a p p lic a tio n of C a lifo rn ia n in stitu tio n s and
technology to Iranian agriculture failed so m iserably.13

In his desire to make Iran into one of the most powerful states in the
world, the Shah chose inappropriate methods which damaged Iran
rather than strengthening it.
12 Keddi, 225.
13 Katouzian, 311.
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In addition to land reform there were five other original points
in the White Revolution.

The second most controversial point

following land reform was electoral reform.

This included granting

women the right to vote and to be elected to the M a j l i s

(other

reform s concerning women's rights would later be added, including
changing divorce laws).
reform.

The clergy in particular were opposed to this

In addition, there were points concerning the nationalization

of woods and forests, and the creation of a ’literacy corps'.

Finally,

other econom ic reform s included the denationalization of state
monopolies in order to finance the land reform programme and
company profit-sharing for industrial w orkers.14

W hile these points

were seemingly in the interest of the Iranian people, they were
pursued only if they were perceived to be capable of strengthening
the Shah's position, or at least not weakening it.
There was an early challenge to the W hite Revolution that
came from neither the National Front nor the T u d e h Party, 15 but
from the religious community.

This challenge was unsuccessful but

it provided the ulama with a learning experience that would be
invaluable in the 1979 revolution.

According to Homa Katouzian,

there were three religious tendencies that were part of the challenge.
The conservative branch was against the land reform, women's
rights', and against the potential power hegemony of the Shah.

The

anti-despotic group within the religious com m unity was not opposed

14 Katouzian, 225.
T hese two groups had been strong inthe early 1950's and were both still in
ex isten ce, although their pow er had been seriou sly reduced.
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to the spirit of the reforms, but was wary of the return of despotism
and secularism (as under Reza Shah).

The radical-dem ocratic

tendency consisted of advocates that identified with M usaddiq and
the Popular Movement; they were opposed to the 1953 coup, its
resulting dictatorship, and also to the threat of despotism .
Katouzian defines despotism as the monopoly of both absolute
and arbitrary power.

She states that it destroys any functional

distinction between the social classes, because it turns everyone into
an object of the state.16

As a result of this fear of despotism the

religious comm unity spearheaded a movement against the regime.
This movement gained momentum in the holy month of M u h a r r a m
and on 6 June 1963, massive riots broke out all over Iran.

The Shah

ordered troops to "shoot to kill" and the massacre continued for three
days.

There is no proper estim ate of the number killed, but the best

guess is that the country as a whole had to have lost a minimum of at
least two thousand.17 At the time of the uprising the Shah was in a
powerful position, both m ilitarily and politically, and was able to
quickly meet the challenge.

The uprising was not purely religious,

nor did it come from only a single religious tendency;

it was an

insurrection of the p e o p le against the s ta te , which happened to be
led by the clergy.

The common denominator was anti-despotism - as

it would be in the 1979 Revolution.

16 Katouzian, 227.
17 Katouzian, 227-28.
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M igration

to

Urban

Areas

As suggested previously, the second and third phases of land
reform did not provide adequately for many peasants; as a
consequence of the land reform policies and of growing urbanization,
many peasants migrated to the cities for jobs.

The m odernization

program the Shah was pursuing was bringing in industry and the job
market was broadening, especially in urban areas.

In fact, Iran

experienced a labor shortage; but the jobs available were m ostly for
skilled and semi-skilled labor.

The vast majority of the migrating

peasants had no training for these available jobs and consequently
m any w ere unem ployed.
Between 1962 and 1971, more than two million Iranians
migrated from towns to the cities.

Following 1973, eight percent of

the rural population left for cities each year.18

The increasing share

of the population that migrated to the cities is shown below.

Urban Share of Iran's Total Population
Y ear
P e rc e n ta g e
1956
31%
1966
38%
1975
45%
1980's (expected)
60%
The figures above are based upon
figures given by Charles I s s a w i . 1 ^
18 H ossein Bashiriyeh, The State and Revolution in
Canberra: Croom Helm Ltd., 1984) 88.

Iran, 1962-82

(London and

^ Charles Issaw i, "The Iranian Econom y 1925-1975:
Developm ent," in Iran Under the Pah lavis,
G eorge
CA: H oover Institution Press, 1978)
138.

Fifty Years o f Econom ic
L cnczow ski, ed.
(Stanford,

This m assive urban m igration contributed to num erous problem s
besides the previously mentioned unemploym ent.

A serious housing

shortage developed in the cities, particularly in Tehran.
housing prices and living costs skyrocketed.

In addition,

This m ust be considered

in addition to the loss of agricultural sufficiency that accompanied
the changes in technology and the land reform.
Some of the economic problems mentioned above were
tem porarily offset by the tremendous increase in oil revenues in the
early 1970’s.

The Shah used part of the revenues to alleviate some

material demands of the population.

In this same period the Shah

made a number of poor economic and political decisions.

These

decisions com bined with environm ental circum stances and
eventually led to the downfall of the Shah.

Economic Growth in Iran
According to Homa Katouzian, the Shah combined pseudo
m odernism , pseudonationalism and despotism .

His dream , pursued

by oil revenues and much to his detriment and the detrim ent of the
Iranian people, was:
to 'm odernize' the Iranian political economy by means of
investing in heavy industry, creating a consum er boom
through im port-substitution consum er durables which
would keep the well-to-do and the educated classes
quiet, destroying traditional forms of agriculture and the
nomadic way of life, which were both difficult to control
politically and a sign of social 'backwardness', and
importing the latest and most sophisticated technology so
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that all the world would admit ... that Iran was on the
road to becoming 'the Japan of the Middle East' ...20
This dream was partially realized, due prim arily to the incredible
econom ic opportunities afforded by oil wealth.

However, due to poor

econom ic and political decisions, combined with circumstances both
internal and external to Iran, the Shah's dream was not entirely
realized and in fact, in his pursuance of this dream, he managed to
lead his people to the point of no return, where the revolution
becam e inevitable.
Up to the 1970's oil wealth had increased gradually.

Then in

1973 oil prices quadrupled, due to OPEC, and this led to a sharp rise
in oil revenues for Iran.
Iran's Oil Revenues
$ 1.1 billion
1970I
$ 2.4 billion
1972
$17.4 billion
1974
$20.0 billion(estimated)
1975
The figures above are based upon figures given
by Charles Issaw i.21

As the figures above demonstrate, Iran's oil revenues in 1974 were
more than seven times that of 1972.

The result of this tremendous

increase in oil revenues was explosive growth in Iran's economy.

In

1973-74 the real gross national income grew by 34 percent and in
1974-75, it grew by 42 percent.22

20 Katouzian, 237-38.
21 Issawi, 137.
22 Issawi, 137.

This incredible growth afforded
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Iran great economic opportunities, but it also resulted in severe
im balances in the economy.
For a short period in the 1970's Iran experienced the highest
rate o f industrial growth in the world.23

Per capita income rose from

$180 per year in 1972, to $1,521 per year in 1974/75. 24
Im mediately following the 1973 oil boom, the Shah adjusted the total
expenditure for the Fifth Plan (1973-78) to $120 billion, $100 billion
of which was to come from oil revenues.

Compared to the Fourth

Plan's actual total expenditure of $10 billion, this adjustm ent was
astronomical.

The Shah dictated this revision of the plan despite

warnings from econom ists;25 the oil market declined drastically a
few years later, and the Fifth Plan was characterized by deficit
sp e n d in g .
During the 1970's, the Shah decided that the oil revenues be
spent on a wide array of projects (the number of projects and the
amount of spending exceeded the revenues by the latter part of the
decade).

These included expenditures on the infrastructure,

education, ventures abroad, subsidies to various industrial projects,
welfare projects, and heavy m ilitary outlays.26 The table below,
adapted from Massoud Karshenas, gives an indication of the
expenditures of the regim e between 1970 and 1976.

23 Keddi, 162.
24

N orriss H etherington, 363.

25

Bashiriyeh, 86.

26 Gail Cook Johnson, H igh-Level M an pow er in Iran: From H idden Conflict to
C risis
(N ew York: Praeger Publishers, 1980) 96-7.

48

C om position o f central governm ent
1977.
(Percentages) 27

consum ption

expenditure

1970

1970-

1976

G eneral exp en d itu re
General administration
Military expenditure

68.9
30.9
38.0

68.1
19.6
48.5

S p e c ific expenditure
Education
Health
Social welfare
Agriculture
Transport and communication
M iscellaneous

31.1
14.6
4.2
1.1
2.5
3.3
5.3

3.1.8
12.2
4.5
1.7
6.6
1.1
9.1

100.0
(135.2)

100.0
(1 1 7 0 .0 )

Tpttd ,
(bn Rials)

As can be seen from the table above, in the specific expenditure
category, agriculture and
m o s t.28

the m iscellaneous category benefitted the

Overall however, military expenditures increased the most

dram atically, from 38.0 percent to 48.5 percent of the central
governm ent consum ption

expenditure between

1970 and

1976.

Iran's military expenditures rose drastically over the years
the Shah’s reign.

of

According to Mohsen M ilani, defense expenditures

rose from $77 million in 1970 to more than $7.8 billion in 1978.

In

1973 Nixon promised the Shah he could purchase Am erica's most
sophisticated weaponry, with the exception of nuclear w eapons.29
27 M assoud Karshenas, Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran
Cambridge University Press, 1990)
195.

(Cambridge:

28 Agriculture expenditures m ainly consisted o f food su bsid ies, and the
m iscella n eou s category included art and culture, p hysical education,
m anpow er, urban and rural develop m en t, public u tilitie s, com m erce, m ining
and h o u sin g, environm ental and regional d evelop m en t.
29 M ilani, 166.

W estern eagerness to sell billions of dollars of
m ilitary
equipm ent to Iran each
year w as rein fo rced by the
economic drain on the W est caused by the OPEC price rise;
arm s
p u rc h a se s
seem ed
a fin e w ay
to
re c y c le
p e tro d o lla rs .30
The m ilitary expenditures allowed Am erican m ilitary suppliers like
Grumman, Lockheed and W estinghouse to take over key positions in
Iran's

econom y,31 and Iran became nearly totally dependent on

petroleum as its source of foreign exchange.

The economic growth

that Iran experienced at this time was advantageous to some
Iranians, but it could have been more beneficial to the population in
general had economic policy been better planned.
The astronom ical econom ic growth and the m odernization
scheme of the regim e brought numerous jobs into Iran.

The Fifth

Plan anticipated a serious labor shortage, especially at the
professional, skilled and semi-skilled levels.

Jobs were mainly in

industry, mining, construction and the service industry.

Efforts were

made to increase female employm ent and to upgrade the labor force
through expanded education and vocational training.32 However,

in

general the Iranian population lacked the training for the kind of
jobs that were being created.

As a result, a large number of

foreigners were hired to work in Iran, particularly in the developing
industrial sector of the economy.

30 Keddi, 176.
31 Keddi, 176.
32 Issawi, 140.

Foreigners, particularly
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W esterners, were paid much more than Iranians, and were given
benefits that citizens did not receive and could not afford.

This

would later lead to growing resentm ent of foreigners in Iran and
would be an issue in the 1979 Revolution.
A great amount of Iran's oil wealth was put towards
industrialization.

rapid

Presented with great oil wealth and with domestic

demand for consum er products as a result of these revenues, the
Shah chose not to take the slower path of economic growth based on
labor-intensive industry.

Instead, industrial expansion was guided

toward developing the capital-intensive oil industry first, and
industries specializing in the m anufacturing of consum er durables
s e c o n d .33 The oil industry was developed first because it was
believed that revenues would continue to increase and that this
increase could be put toward continued m odernization.

Higher

incom es and subsidized prices, resulting from increased oil revenues,
led to increased consumption - while the population grew at a 3
percent rate, the demand for consum er goods rose by 12 percent
a n n u a lly .34

In response to this demand, not only was

industrialization aimed at producing consumer goods, but a policy of
trade liberalization was also adopted.

In 1974, the government

introduced a wide liberalization on imports; the most popular
im ports included food products, textiles, refrigerators, gas cookers,
water heaters, furniture item, television sets, radios, and

33 Johnson, 95-6.
34

Bashiriyeh,

101.
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a u to m o b ile s .35 Many of the trade restrictions and high-rate tariffs
adopted in the 1960's were lifted and/or reduced and certain
exchange controls were removed in 1974.36

Problems resulted from

both the rapid industrialization and the liberalization of trade,
including state m aldistribution.

Income gaps widened throughout

the country, including between the rich and poor, and between the
city and the countryside.
The rapid growth of non-oil exports was a major goal of Iran's
trade policy, but the "government's export-prom otion activities were
inadequate and ineffective."37

Iran’s economic foundation narrowed

instead of broadening; this meant that if and when problems
developed in the oil export sector, Iran would be unable to rely on
other areas to balance those problems out.

In the 1970's oil strength

and rising prices were uppermost in the Shah's mind.

The

governm ent's concern with this internal balance overshadow ed the
goals of export promotion.

The share of the oil and gas sectors in the

total governm ent revenues rose from 55 percent in the Fourth Plan
to approximately 78 percent in the Fifth Plan, and their share in total
current foreign exchange rose from 76 percent in the form er plan
years to 85 percent in the latter.38

This open door to trade and its

consequent sharp rise in imports, along with rapid industrialization,
led to dependency.
35 Kavoussi, 458.
3(> Bashiriyeh,

87.

37 Kavoussi, 459.
38 Pesaran, 33.

Iran became dependent on the single-com m odity export of oil
(particularly for foreign exchange), and on the international capitalist
economy, especially for imports.

In turn, the increase of imports

added to the huge bottlenecks the country was experiencing.39 In
addition, the country also became increasingly dependent on foreign
technology and expertise; the growing foreign presence and the high
wages paid to foreigners added to the problems of housing scarcity
and increasing costs of living that Iran experienced at this time.
Dependence on foreign trade and skill allowed for exploitation.

For

example, the Shah signed an agreement with the United States which
stated that if an American committed a crime on Iranian soil, it was
up to the US, not Iran, to punish that crime.

The lack of any serious

efforts at non-oil export expansion or im port substitution in Iran's
industrialization played a large role in this increasing dependence.

It

is probable that if either one of these policies had been successfully
pursued, Iran’s economy would not have fluctuated with the
changing oil market.

Diversifying the economic foundation through

increm ental steps would have meant slower m odernization, but it
would have also allowed Iran to train its citizens, thus reducing
reliance on foreign workers, and to broaden its revenue base beyond
dependence on petrodollars.

Eventually, Iran was characterized by

overw helm ing dependency, inflation, exaggerated incom e inequality,
and unbalanced growth.

39 For exam ple, the storage and transportation o f food items that needed
refrigeration was inadequate and consequently food rotted before it reached
the Iranian consum er.
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Econom ic

Problems

A relationship of dependency was developed between Iran and
the West, especially the United States.

According to Galtung's theory

of structural dependency, the international sphere is characterized
by core/periphery relations, in which developed states function as
the core and developing states are considered the periphery.

In

addition, within states there is a core/periphery relationship
between the elite and the masses.

Galtung's theory is quite useful in

examining Iran during the 1970's.

Iran was dependent on the sale of

oil revenues on the international capitalist m arket and on the W est
for a variety of imports, including food and interm ediate goods for its
industries.

By the time the oil market slowed down in the mid-

1970's, Iran was already tied to the West.

In order to continue the

m odernization program that the Shah envisioned, it was necessary to
sign trade agreements with the West, especially the U.S., wherein
Iran agreed to recycle its petrodollars by buying a large amount of
W estern goods in exchange for loans and special deals.
At the same time, there was also a core/periphery relationship
within Iran.

The Shah and the rest of the elite within the state made

up the core, while the non-elite made up the periphery.

Iran thus fit

Galtung's model of internal imperialism ; the state-society
relationship was one in which the society was subordinate to the
state.

The state controlled the economic sector to a high degree

through state capitalism , and the distribution of wealth was also
controlled by the state.

The results of this structural dependency

(both internal and external) were exploitation and uneven
development.

Iran, as a part of the periphery in the international
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scheme, was exploited by W est.40

In addition, despite the Shah's

vision of a "modern" Iran, the country rem ained underdeveloped,
and internally was characterized by uneven developm ent.

The rural

areas were left far behind the urban sectors, and the lower and
middle classes were not incorporated into the political structure.
Iran's dependency on the superpowers and its uneven internal
growth were

two of the factors leading

Asdiscussed above, the oil boom

to the revolution.
led the Shah to direct

revenues to be spent on a wide array of projects.

The Fifth Plan

assumed more oil money would be incoming each year.

In 1974-75

oil revenues dropped sharply and the governm ent faced a deficit of
$1.7 billion.41

At the same time, higher incomes and subsidized

prices resulted in increased consumption and demand.

W here the

population grew by a 3% rate, the demand for consumer goods rose
by 12% annually, and consequently inflation rose rapidly.

Com parative Inflation
O fficial
C om pound

93.8%

Annual Ave.

18.0%

Figures. 1973-77
K av h an
200%
50%

The above figures
were obtained
from H ossein B ash iriyeh .4 2

40 Iran imported goods that were inoperable and was still forced to pay for
them, and often had dom estic policy dictated by the U .S. governm ent.
41

Bashiriyeh,

101.

42

Bashiriyeh,

101.
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Despite the wide discrepancy, the above figures dem onstrate the
high inflation rate Iran experienced in these years.
surpassed wage increases.

Price increases

The cost of living index shot up - in

1973/74 it went up by 11.2%, in 1974/75 it went by 15.5%, and it
continued to climb in following years.43

Accompanying the inflation

and the resulting increases in the cost of living were widening
income gaps.
Income gaps widened in all major dimensions in Iran,
particularly after 1974.

According to Nikki Keddi, the gaps between

the top and bottom of the income ladder,

between the city and the

countryside, within the city and within the countryside, all widened.
Iran still had money, but primarily the rich were subsidized.44
Looking at the figures for the shares of national consumption in the
year 1976, it is seen that the top 10% of the Iranian population
enjoyed more than one-third of the county's consum ption.
Conversely, the lowest 10% of the population only accounted for 2-3%
of the country's consum ption.45

During the 1960-70's, the poor in

Iran did not get necessarily poorer, but the vast increase in the
wealth of the rich and the conspicuous consumption of the elite was
seen all around.

Overall, the poor may have gained materially in

these years, but they perceived themselves as becoming worse off in

43 Issawi, 137.
44 Keddi, 174.
45 Norriss S. Hetherington, "Industrialization and R evolution in Iran: Forced
Progress o f Unmet Expectations," M iddle E ast Journal, Vol. 36, no. 3, (Summer
1982) 364-65.
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relation to others.

This, along with little upward mobility led to

increasing vocal discontent.
The poor were not the only ones left behind by the elitist social
order that rem ained despite the Shah's am bitious m odernization
plan; the expanding middle class was also frustrated due to the lack
of any serious political reform.

Limited upward mobility and little

prospect for economic improvement in the lower and middle classes
was prevalent.

According to Gail Cook Johnson, the continued

backwardness of both public and private institutions resulted in the
failure of industrialization because it did not integrate the emerging
educated m iddle and working classes.46

Actually, it is better to

characterize this not as the failure of industrialization, but to view it
in terms of m odernizing society without concurrently working
towards political development.

The Shah wanted all the technology

and expertise that could be brought in from the West, and he also
even wanted some of the W estern social characteristics, but he did
not want any change in the political order that would result in a
lessening of his power.
The Shah believed that he could make Iran one of the top five
powers in the world by the twenty-first century.

He increased the

educational standards and the literacy rate of Iran over the 1960's
and 1970's.

The number of universities was increased and the

quality of education was improved.

More people received a

university education, although it was still a small portion of the
population, and this led to the expansion of the professional middle
4 6 Johnson, 95.
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c la ss .47

W hile improvements in education, especially W estern style

education, were viewed by the Shah as indispensable to
m odernization, he failed to realize that these same educational
improvements would lead to discontent among the middle class.
Students came out of the universities expecting good jobs, assuming
the education they received was adequate for placem ent.

However,

the vast majority educated in Iran were limited to the lowest
m anagerial positions, which underutilized their skills, while the
foreign-educated, unless they were very w ell-connected, also did not
find rew arding career paths.48
The professional middle class was not only frustrated by the
limited opportunities in the job market; it was also disappointed by
the lack of political participation allowed it.

The emerging middle

class was given little if any decision-making authority, despite its'
increasing expertise.

The Shah was not willing to co-opt these people

into the political structure.

Mobilization was encouraged, but

participation in actual political decision-m aking was very lim ited.
The m odernization of Iranian society and expanding education
brought expectations of political development that the Shah was not
willing to fulfill.

In fact, the majority of the Shah's opponents that

were im prisoned and/or executed between
class p rofessionals.49

1972-76 were middle

Iranian politics came to be dominated by

47 It must be noted that as with many developing nations, ascriptive rather
than m eritorious standards were used for recruitment to positions o f authority.
48 Johnson, 98.
49

H etherington,

364.
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repression rather than co-optation.

This was a major factor that

contributed to the revolutionary environm ent in Iran in the latter
years of the 1970's.

The revolution, it can be argued, was primarily

motivated by the intelligentsia of the middle class who wanted
fundam ental change, but could not realize it without turning to the
clergy to motivate the masses.
The Shah further alienated the population by changing Iran
from a two-party system (M a r d o m
party system (R a s t a k h i z ).

and Iran Novin), to a single

In the mid-1970's the economic crisis

(mainly a result of the sharp drop in oil revenues) affected the
foundations of the regim e and prompted the em ergence of a short
lived political phenomena, wherein a new single political party, the
R a s t a k h i z or National Resurgence Party, was imposed on Iran in an
attem pt at mass m obilization, particularly of the lower classes.

The

apparent motivation was to check the growth of "industrial
feudalism", the signs of working class unrest, and the inadequacy of
the ruling party to incorporate diverse interests and needs.

W hat

em erged was a populist attem pt, based on some redistributive
m easures, but which did not make adequate changes.50 The new
party had no notable economic impact, but did carry potential for
political conflict.

The

Revolution
By 1977, the econom ic recession, inflation, urban overcrowding,

governm ent policies hurting the bazaari classes (repression of small
50

B ashiriyeh, 90-91.
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businesses), glaring incom e gaps, conspicuous W estern-style
consum ption by the elite, a large foreign presence (and influence),
and lack of political freedom and participation were all widely felt
throughout Iran.

In response to spreading econom ic discontent and

to soften growing international criticism of his regime, the Shah
appointed Jam shid Am uzegar to the position of Prim e M inister and
initiated a liberalization program.

Amuzegar initiated a deflationary

program that resulted in an increase in unemployment.

According to

Nikki Keddi, this increase in unemployment and other elements of
the econom ic recession that Iran experienced in the late 1970's came
after the expectations of the Iranians had been raised, and this
created a classic pre-revolutionary situation.51
Other authors offer variations on this prim arily economic
"theory" of revolutions.52

Gail Cook Johnson states that the

government had to convince the populace to accept the fact of slower
growth and to lower their heightened expectations; the governm ent's
repressive m easures and policies that m aintained unbalanced growth
led to social revolution.53 In addition, Hossein Bashiriyeh offers the
Davies theory of revolution, which is also an economic theory.

This

theory argues that the combination of rapid econom ic growth
followed by sudden economic decline drives the population into a
revolutionary "state of mind".

Bashiriyeh states that this generation

51 Keddi, 177.
52 T hese lack validity as theories since the unidim ensional focus on econom ics
cannot account for other factors that have been essential to revolutions.
53 Johnson, 97.
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of economic discontent on a mass scale, in addition to the emergence
of some conflict of interest between the state and the upper class, the
revolutionary m obilisation of the m asses, the occurrence of political
alliance between diverse

forces of opposition and wavering of the

regim e's foreign support

all combined to produce the revolution.54

Here, Bashiriyeh moves beyond the unidim ensional economic
argum ent and provides a more com plete understanding of the causes
of the revolution.
Another argum ent

that has been applied to the Iranian

Revolution is that it was

modernizing too quickly and

that the

Iranian people and the clergy did not want to modernize.
The "anti-m odernization" thesis, how ever, is extrem ely
m isleading and fails to explain why the
rev o lu tio n
occurred in the late 1970's rath er than in the two
previous decades when the Shah initiated and accelerated
his program of econom ic m odernization.
It also fails to
explain why a num ber of leading m ujtahids tacitly
co o p erated w ith the P ahlavi reg im e u ntil the late
1 9 7 0 's.55
M odernization, defined in terms of man developing his abilities to
control the environment, was not the cause of the revolution.

The

W esternization and the absence of political developm ent in terms
ofsatisfying demands were more instrum ental factors in the building
of the revolutionary fervor.

54

Bashiriyeh, 84.

55 James A. B ill, "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran," M id dle
J o u rn a l, Vol. 36, no. 1 (Winter 1982) 26.
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According to Mohsen M ilani, the Iranian revolution was a
complex phenom ena that involved numerous factors.

Some of the

primary factors leading to the revolution, according to Milani
in clu d ed :
1) political repression and the failure to build institutions
2) organizational and m obilizational capabilities of discontented
g ro u p s
3) Davies theory that revolutions occur when a period of
prolonged economic development is followed by a sharp
reversal, which generates relative deprivation and
u nfulfilled

expectations

4) the weakening of the link between dependent nation (Iran)
and its main foreign supporter (U.S.)
5) the broad coalition forged among the opposition forces,
which united divergent groups
6) the ideology of Shi'ism, which justified the struggle against
the Pahlavis, united groups and promised a bright future,
and
7) failure of the Shah's regim e to repress the opposition56
Milani has examined the Iranian Revolution in detail, and suggests
that the complexity of this revolution has been underestim ated.

He

suggests that the revolution occurred partially as a result of the
modernization strategy of the Shah.
a pervasive dualism

The modernizing of Iran created

in the economy and the culture, because it was

incapable of destroying the traditional sector.
56 Milani, 30.

In addition, it was
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characterized by uneven developm ent of the econom ic and political
systems - the form er was modernized without changing the nature of
the latter.

Finally, the modernization drive had a narrow base of

support and lacked a solid, supporting ideology.57 The Shah
continued in his push to modernize, alienating a large portion of the
population, while at the same time he failed to effectively counter
the opposition.

He considered the nationalistic and communistic

tendencies to be his greatest threat so he sought to secure the
support of the lower classes through economic growth and
concessions.
This strategy was based on the Pollyanna belief that the
lower classes and the conservative ulam a were an effective
deterrent against the m enace of the interm ediary groups,
The regim e was thus unprepared to cope with the
threats of the traditional forces believing, as it mistakenly
did, that they were destined to be crushed beneath the
w heels of progress.
C onsequently, the Shah's entire
intelligence netw ork allocated m ost of its resources to
com bating com m unism and nationalism of the M ossadeq
type, thus giving the Islam ic forces ample opportunity to
expand and m obilize.58

By the time of the revolution, Iran had experienced incredible
economic growth, which was followed by a rapid decline as a result
of the bust in the oil market in 1976-77.

The Shah had already

overspent, despite warnings from economic advisors, because he had
counted on increasing revenues.

57 M ilani, 127.
58 M ilani, 122.

The expectations (economic, social
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and political) of the Iranian people had been heightened, and then
the regim e was unable to meet those expectations.

Instead,

repressive tactics were increasingly employed (there are suggestions
that the Shah's secret police force, SAVAK, sometimes acted without
his consent).

Tensions mounted and certain events became turning

points that made the revolution inevitable.
The strength of the opposition increased with these events.
They included the peaceful rally in Qom, organized by the ulama
because of a newspaper attack on Khomeini; this later resulted in
bloody confrontations between governm ent forces and ulama
supporters in seven cities after the police violently put down the
first rally.

Another event which aided in the building of the

opposition was the Tabriz uprising.

A comm em oration of martyrs

was planned to take place in Tabriz but the governm ent ordered
police to block people from entering the mosques.

Some protestors

were killed and hundreds more were arrested; in response, protests
in other cities sprung up and more people were killed.

Consequently,

the forty-day com m em orations to the honor the dead became
increasingly more politically potent.59
A third critical event in the development of the revolution was
the burning of the Cinema Rex in Abadan in August, 1978.

More

than four hundred people who had been locked in the theater were
killed.

The masses believed the government set the fire to discredit

its opponents.

59 M ilani, 191.

The entire country was ignited by hatred and the
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governm ent was forced into a defensive position.60

Finally, on 7

Septem ber 1978, dem onstrators refused to obey the curfew set by
the government and the police opened fire on the crowd.

In what

has become known as Black Friday, there was no certain death count
- the governm ent stated there were 86 dead, but unofficial estimates
are as high as 3,000.61

Soon after these events, strikes and more

dem onstrations erupted all over the country. By the Autumn of 1978
it should have been apparent that there was more than an uprising
going on in Iran, there was a revolution.
The political and economic decisions of the Shah’s regime
com bined with a variety of environm ental circum stances contributed
to the revolution.

The land reform program of the 1960's alienated a

portion of the population, in addition to destroying the agricultural
economy.

It also caused a large number of peasants to migrate to the

urban areas, where employm ent was difficult to find.
the m igrating population became urban slum dwellers.

In large part
The June

1963 uprising, which was organized by the ulama, was staged to
protest

a number of the reform programs of the W hite Revolution.

The uprising was brutally repressed, but it provided the ulama with
a lesson that would prove to be valuable in the 1979 revolution.

The

W hite Revolution has been taken as the starting point of the
discontent and frustration that was to lead to the 1979 revolution.
The 1970's saw a continuation of some of the reforms started
in the previous decade.
60 Katouzian, 344-45.
61 M ilani, 193.

This decade also saw a tremendous increase
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in oil revenues for Iran, followed by a slump in the oil market.

The

quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 brought revenues into Iran that the
Shah spent on a wide array of projects.
industrialization were pursued.

M odernization and

The Shah believed that the oil

money would continue to increase and that he could make Iran one
of the top five powers in the world using this projected revenue.

The

Shah ignored economic advisors who told him to choose a strategy
that would allow for slow sustained growth, and instead he opted to
pursue a path focused on oil wealth and m ilitary strength.

The year

1976 witnessed the beginning of the oil slump that severely
damaged Iran's economy.

Iran had gone into deficit spending and

the Shah was unable and/or unwilling to make the economic and
political changes necessary to save his regime.
willing to compromise it was too late.

By the time he was

A multigroup coalition had

formed in opposition to the Shah's regime.
The coalition was formed by a number of groups, including the
T u d e h comm unist party, the liberal nationalist groups that had
evolved from the National Front Party of the 1950's, the IslamicM arxist guerrilla group known as the M ujahedin, and the ulama who
were divided into at least two groups, one being the fundam entalists
who followed the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The groups other than the

clergy did not have the organizational skills necessary to unite the
masses against the regime to overthrow it.

W hat united all these

groups was the hatred of the Shah and the desire to unseat him.
unifying factor was enough to bring about a revolution, but what
followed was disagreem ent over how the new system should

This
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function.

Each group had its own ideas for the new government, but

eventually Khomeini and the fundam entalists overcam e the others.
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TH E KHOM EINI DECADE
This chapter examines Iran in the first decade of the post
revolution period.

The political economy of this country changed

in many ways, but it was not entirely transformed.

The monarchy

was changed to a theocratic system, and the new regime focused
on ideology to the exclusion of practically everything else for
quite some time.

Positions were obtained in the regime through

loyalty to the revolution and Islam, rather than technical
expertise or skill.
transform ed.

The economic system was also somewhat

Usury was determined to be unlawful and

num erous industries were nationalized.

However, the nature of

state capitalism that had existed under the Shah had meant a high
degree of state control of the economy, and the nationalization
program under Khomeini meant sim ilar control.

Private property

remained intact, despite the ideas of some of the more radical
elem ents in the new regime, and promised land reform was very
limited.

The political economy of the new regime (and thus the

developm ent), while perceived by many as very different than
that of the Shah, in fact, contained a number of similarities.
Despite high hopes coming out of the revolution, political
developm ent did not progress as quickly as many had hoped.
Throughout the first decade of the post-revolutionary period the
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leadership had difficulty providing basic necessities for the
masses.

There were housing shortages and many staple food

items, such as rice and sugar, were rationed.

As will be seen in

this chapter, econom ic growth was practically stagnant and the
leadership often resorted to the use of repressive measures
against any opposition.

Higher positions in the regime were

generally available only to those who held clerical positions and
had proved their loyalty to the revolution.

Participation for the

m asses was lim ited to voting in elections that generally offered
very little choice.

In the beginning, Khomeini and the rest of the

ulama offered Islam as an ideology that prom ised utopia.
H ow ever,
K hom eini's early prom ise - that subm ission to God
would create a ju st society at home, em pow er Iran to
defeat ex tern al oppressors and reu n ite the Islam ic
world in a new power bloc - was largely unfulfilled.1
If political development is viewed as the capacity to respond to
the needs and demands of the people, the worsening economic
conditions and the political repression em ployed during
Khom eini's reign would indicate that the leaders did not deliver
and thus political development did not progress at the pace that
many expected.

The decisions of the leadership of Iran and the

environm ent within which the leadership functioned largely
shaped the political economy and the consequent political

1 Robin Wright, In the Name o f God: the Khomeini D ecade, New York :
Sim on and Schuster, 1989, 207.
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developm ent.

This chapter exam ines that environm ent and the

those decisions and their effects on development.

The

Political

Environm ent

The mass dem onstrations, strikes by industrial and oil
workers, bazaaris, civil servants and bank employees had the
maximum disruptive effect on the Shah's regime.

By December,

1978, the crisis-ridden regime was close to the point of collapse
and in January 1979,
m ost m ajor econom ic sectors had come to a com plete
halt; oil exports had practically stopped, the banking
system was non-functional, only a few large industries
rem ain ed o p e ra tiv e , ch an n els of d istrib u tio n w ere
clogged, and services had dropped significantly.2
The multiclass coalition that had come together to overthrow the
Pahlavi regime finally forced the Shah and his family out of Iran
in late January, 1979.
The revolution was in part a rejection of existing models of
development and a search for a different, "indigenous" path of
d e v e lo p m e n t.
The e x istin g so c ialist and c a p ita lis t m odels w ere
dism issed for their in appropriateness in building an
Islam ic so ciety , w here concerns for trad itio n s and
culture are to be integrated into the political econom y.
M oreover, as noted by President H ashem i R afsanjani,
"W estern capitalism " is "unjust and exploitative," while
"E astern com m unism " "kills p riv ate in itiativ es" and

2 H ooshang Amirahm adi, R evolution an d E conom ic Transition: The Iranian
E x p e r i e n c e (Albany, N ew York: State University o f New York Press, 1990)
90.
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"in stig a tes antagonism
p o p u lace."3

betw een

the

state

and

the

Not only was the revolution a rejection of capitalist and socialist
models of development, it also involved a rejection of the
despotism of the Shah, economic frustration and opposition to the
emphasis on W esternization of the regime.

The final choice of an

Islam ic system of developm ent was not unanim ously endorsed by
the various members of the coalition, but it emerged as the
dom inant option, m ostly due to Khom eini's popularity and the
fundam entalists' growing power.

The Islamic model was also

appealing because it "demanded national independence, respect,
and equal treatm ent in the world system ."4 The primary problem
of using Islam as a model of development is that it, like any other
model, cannot give all the specifics needed for development, nor
can it promise success.

Islam does not give a comprehensive

framework for political and economic systems and their
functioning.

The Quran provides certain rules and guidelines and

the lives of the Prophet and his followers are taken as examples,
but there are still wide areas of ambiguity and ideological dispute.
C onsequently, disagreem ents regarding political, econom ic and
social issues arose following the establishm ent of the Islamic
Republic, many of which are yet to be resolved.
The period im m ediately follow ing the revolution and the
Shah's departure from Iran was marked by a struggle for political

3 Amirahmadi,

114.

4 Amirahmadi, 29.

power.

The Shah had appointed Shahpour Bakhtiar, a form er

member of the National Front, as Prime M inister in late December,
1978.

Bakhtiar hoped to establish a social democracy sim ilar to

some in W estern Europe, but by the time he came to the position
he lacked a popular support base (he had been deserted by his
form er colleagues of the National Front), and the struggle between
his governm ent and the fundam entalists (the revolutionary clergy
following Khom eini) ended with the m ilitary command
w ithdraw ing their support from Bakhtiar and consequently
removing the last basis of Bakhtiar's power. 5
Upon Khomeini's return to Iran on February 1, 1979, he
declared Bakhtiar's government illegal and "promised to quickly
announce the form ation of a provisional revolutionary
governm ent to prepare the ground for the establishm ent of an
Islam ic republic."6

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was one of the

primary figures in the revolution.
the Shah since the early 1960's.

Khomeini had been a critic of
In June 1963, Khomeini had

attacked the Shah in a passionate oratory, claim ing that the
regime was opposed to Islam and to the existence of the religious
class.

Khomeini was arrested and spent ten months in jail.7 His

continual criticism eventually led to his exile from Iran, where he
was able to vocalize his opposition to the Shah even more.
6 Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion o f P ow er (N ew York: St. Martin's Press,
1980) 48.
6 M ohsen M ilani, The Making o f Iran's Revolution: From M onarchy to
Islam ic R ep u blic (Boulder and London: W estview Press, 1988) 230.
7 Wright, 50-51.
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Eventually, Khomeini was recognized as probably the most
tenacious opposition to the Shah.
As discontent grew stronger in the late 1970's, Khomeini
encouraged revolt from his exile in Iraq, and then from France.
Tapes of Khom eini's speeches speaking out against the monarchy
were shipped from France to Iran, and played at Friday prayer
meetings.

Khomeini was identified by many within the traditional

lower and middle classes as a humble and pious clergyman.

Other

groups in the coalition against the Shah, especially the liberal
nationalists, believed that Khomeini would serve the purpose of
rallying the masses to revolt, and then he would return to his
existence as a simple religious teacher, probably in Qom.

There

were a num ber of factors that allowed Khomeini to take over the
revolution.

He represented strong, charism atic leadership,

juxtaposed to the Shah's indecisiveness.

His genuine charism a

came from his impassioned eloquence and his absolute sense of
righteousness.

Khomeini was a great communicator; he appealed

to the masses on a level they understood.

In addition, he

employed an ideological framework that dated back thirteen
centuries.

These factors gave the revolution legitimacy and

forcefulness that the other groups of the coalition were unable to
p ro v id e .8
It is perhaps the extraordinarily sim plistic approach of
Khom eini that helped to make his ideas so attractive.
All that was needed, he stated, was "conviction and
ethical solutions'; it is only then that the country could
8 Wright, 58-59.
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achieve "prosperity and mental exaltation and solve its
social problem s."9
Contrary to the ideas of the other groups within the coalition,
Khomeini did not return to his simple life as a religious teacher.
Instead, he became the leader of Iran for more than a decade.

For

years he had written of Vilayat-i faqih, or "leadership of the
jurisprudent."

This neo-platonic theory proposes that an Islamic

republic be established, in which the ulama (clerical
establishm ent) is considered the proper body to interpret laws
and guide society, and that the most learned ayatollah should be
the final voice in this republic.

When the revolution ended and

the country was left to choose its leadership, Khomeini's charisma
combined with the organizational abilities of the ulama created a
constitutional theocracy in Iran that has lasted far longer than
m any believed possible.
Apart from Khom eini's leadership abilities and charism a,
one of the most important factors in the ulama's gaining of power
after the revolution was its organizational abilities.

Unlike the

other groups in the coalition against the Shah, the ulama had a
built in network from which to rally the masses.

The clergy had

continual contact with the masses through the mosques and were
able to influence the masses because of the centrality of religion.
Khom eini's fundam entalist network prim arily consisted of his
religious students that had become clergymen with their own
mosques throughout the country.

During his exile Khomeini

9 Haleh Afshar, "The Iranian Theocracy," Iran: A R evolution in Turmoil,
Haleh Afshar, ed. (Albany, N ew York: State University o f N ew York Press,
1985) 225.

m aintained contact with a number of these students and during
the revolutionary buildup he sent m essages to these m ujtahids
who in turn relayed them to their congregations at Friday prayer
m eetings.

Shi'ism as a centuries-old ideology had a stronger hold

over the people than the slim offerings of the other groups in the
coalition.

The clergy became the power broker during and after

the revolution because of its ideological connection to the masses
and its organizational network.

The other groups did not offer a

strong alternative nor did they have the link to the masses.
However, the triumph of the fundam entalists was not simply
realized with Khomeini's return to Iran, but was a slow process
that took nearly two years.
W ithin a short time of his return Khomeini asked Mehdi
Bazargan to head the provisional revolutionary governm ent (PRG)
until a new constitution could be drawn up and elections could be
held.

At the same time, paralegal organizations created by the

fundam entalists during the revolution were increasing their
power.

The formation of the PRG and the continuing existence of

the paralegal organizations of the fundam entalists (such as the
Revolutionary Guard, the k o m ite h s and the Islamic Republic
Party) created a dualism of power in Iran.

Milani refers to the

paralegal organizations of the fundam entalists as a "state within a
state."

Immediately following the revolution there was a struggle

for power between the fundam entalists, the Islam ic liberal
nationalists and the secular liberal nationalists; soon, however, the
fundam entalists defeated the nationalists and by 1983 the
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fundam entalists had secured pow er.10

According to Milani, the

consolidation of power by the fundam entalists occurred over four
years, in six discernable stages:
1) the fundam entalists created a state within a state through
the paralegal organizations, which weakened the pow er
of the PRG
2) the constitutional basis for a theocracy was laid
3) the new constitution was passed (defeating the orthodox
ulama and the secular nationalists)
4) the fundam entalists defeated the Islam ic nationalists
5) the Cultural Revolution was launched and the M ojahedin's
violent threat was neutralized, and
6) Consolidation of power was completed and Islamization of
the society was continued.11
These six stages were not system atically planned by the
fundam entalists in their search for power, but were adopted as
the need arose.
The paralegal organizations of the fundam entalists
developed into strong institutions over time.

The power struggle

between the PRG and the Revolutionary Council, formed by
Khomeini and the fundam entalists, developed into a struggle
between President Abol Hasan Bani Sadr (who became president
with Khom eini's support following Bazargan's resignation) against
the Islamic Republic Party (IRP).
10 M ilani, 240.
11 M ilani, 240.

The IRP and other paralegal
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organizations consolidated their pow er and becam e governm ental
institutions within a short period of time.

Neither Bazargan nor

Bani Sadr had the popular support base to neutralize the paralegal
organizations and to strengthen their own governm ental
in stitu tio n s .
During this same time period a constitutional basis for a
theocracy was created.

In March 1979, a referendum was held

which asked voters - "Do you favor an Islamic Republic or a
monarchy?"

No other choices, such as a social democracy, were

given, and the government claimed 98.2 percent of the more than
15.7 million votes were cast for an Islamic Republic.

The result

was that May 1, 1979, was declared the first day of the
"Government of Allah on Earth."

The PRG drafted a constitution

and elections were held for an Assembly of Experts (AOE) to
revise the constitution.

The fundam entalists won many seats in

the AOE and thus gained a great deal of strength.

The AOE was

given three months to revise the constitution, which in the end
turned out to be a very different version than the one submitted
by the PR G .12
The final draft of the constitution consisted of 12 chapters
and 175 articles.

The constitution abolished m onarchy and

created a unique presidential system.

In addition, the constitution

revolved around the concept of the Vilayat-i fa q ih
of the jurisprudent."

The position of the f a q i h

or "leadership

(jurisprudent

leader) is understood to have unlim ited power, no term length
12 Milani, 2 6 1 -6 2 .
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lim itations and the divine authority to rule, which means he may
intervene in the affairs of any branch of the government.

The

constitution recognized Khomeini as the faqih and designated that
his replacem ent would be either a single individual or a three to
five member council.

In addition, the constitution adopted an

official foreign policy of nonalignment.
The constitution not only covered the structure of
governm ent and the foreign policy, it also incorporated an Islamic
vision of social justice.

In general terms the constitution promised

to achieve independence, uproot poverty and fulfill human needs.
More specifically, the goals of the constitution included: securing
basic needs for all, including housing, food and health care;
securing full employm ent for all; providing opportunities for selfim provem ent of individuals; preventing profiteering

from the

labor of others; prohibiting m onopolistic, speculative and usurious
dealings; forbidding extravagance in econom ic m atters; learning
from experts in science and technology; preventing foreign
econom ic dependence; and achieving self-sufficiency in production
of food and industrial products.13

In addition, Article 44 of the

constitution divides the economic system into three sectors public, private and cooperative.

The constitution was written in

the Summer and early Fall of 1979, and disputes arose
im m ediately, particularly regarding the Vilayat-i faqih.

13 Amirahmadi,

114.

Despite
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the disagreem ents a referendum was held and the Constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Iran was adopted on 3 December 1979.14
Following the adoption of the constitution, the new
governm ent concentrated on defeating its rem aining opponents.
Early on the regime used purges to "Islamize"

the state.

Purges

were used to clean out the armed forces (2,000-4,000 men were
purged, mostly due to suspected coup plots), the National Front
(also suspected of coup plots) and the state bureaucracy.15

In

addition to elim inating these threats, the regim e also concentrated
on possibly the worst threat to the regime, the left-wing guerrilla
group known as the Mojahedin.
The M ojahedin is an opposition group which developed a
three-phase strategy to overthrow the Khomeini regime.

The

M ojahedin first intended to destabilize the regim e through
elim inating key figures and exposing the regim e's vulnerability.16
Second, the group chose to directly confront the regime through
dem onstrations and strikes, hoping to m obilize the masses.
Finally, the M ojahedin believed that mass uprisings would come
about as a result of the first two steps and that these would bring
the government toppling down.

The elim ination of key figures

and the demonstrations took place, but the third step did not

14 Amirahmadi,

114.

15 M ilani, 288.
16 Hundreds o f o fficia ls and guardsmen were killed in assassinations and
bom bings in this first phase.
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m aterialize.

The governm ent met the opposition with executions,

violent suppression and terror for more than eighteen m onths.17
Because of their m iscalculation, the M ojahedin's violent
encounter with the Islamic Republic produced the exact
opposite of what they had hoped to realize: It proved
the invulnerability of the Islamic Republic to guerrilla
warfare, exposed the weakness of the opposition in
general and the M ojahedin in particular, invigorated the
Islam ic Republic's security system , and further
solidified the fundam entalists' p o sition.18
The governm ent responded to the M ojahedin and other
opposition with violence and suppression.

The violence and terror

reached a peak in 1981/82, and then at the end of the latter year,
it began to wane.

Influenced by some of the more moderate

elements within the regime, Khomeini issued a declaration to curb
the worst excesses of the revolutionary organizations responsible
for the violence against the opposition.

The declaration banned

entering homes, making arrests, conducting searches, and
confiscating property without legal authorization.

The

revolutionary organizations were reigned in, but their authority
was by no means taken aw ay.19

The revolutionary organizations

were some of the primary support bases of the regime, and
Khomeini was not about to alienate them.

17 Shaul Bakhash, The Reign o f the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic
R e v o lu tio n (N ew York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990) 228.
18 Milani, 299.
19 Bakhash, The Reign o f the Ayatollahs, 229.
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The final step in the fundam entalist clergy's struggle was
the consolidation of power.

After Bazargan resigned as head of

the provisional government, Aboul Hasan Bani Sadr was elected as
the first president, primarily because he was backed by Khomeini.
His term lasted less than a year and then Khomeini accepted his
resignation (there had been disagreem ents between the two,
particularly over the American hostage situation).

Following Bani

Sadr's resignation, the Islamic Republic Party was able to gain
strength, particularly during the elections of October, 1981.
Islamic Republic Party candidate, Ali Khamenei, was elected
president and other IRP candidates won the Prime M inister and
Interior M inister seats.

Many appointed positions were also

replaced with IRP men, even down to the township and district
le v e ls.20
C onsolidation of pow er, in stitu tio n b u ilding, and
Islam ization of the society by the fundam entalists in the
first four years of the Islam ic R epublic proceeded
s im u lta n e o u s ly
w ith
th e
e lim in a tio n
of
th e ir
o p p o n e n ts .21
The consolidation of power by the fundam entalists was not
entirely a smooth path, however.

Opposition groups, particularly

the M ojahedin, managed to inflict serious wounds to the regim e,
especially through assassination of key figures, and the
fundam entalists them selves were divided over a num ber of
issues.

The factionalism that developed among the

20 Bakhash, The R e ig n o f the A y a to lla h s ,
21 M ilani, 304.
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fundam entalists has presented obstacles to forming policy since
the Islamic Republic was created, and is still problem atic over a
decade later.
One of the key elements to understanding the political
economy of Iran during the Khomeini years is the international
environm ent and Iran's foreign policy within that environm ent.
In the first years of the regime, the foreign policy pursued was
based on m ilitant Islam, nationalism , regional am bitions, the war
with Iraq and the slogan of "Neither East nor West."

Iran was

trying to establish independence and to pursue a policy of
nonalignm ent as far as the superpowers were concerned.

In

actual policy Iran attem pted to export the revolution, particularly
to other Persian Gulf countries, to establish and m aintain distance
from the superpowers, and to better relations with the Third
World and Europe.22

The

American

Hostage

Crisis

One of the most im portant events in the Islamic Republic's
foreign policy was the American hostage crisis.

On 4 November

1979, looking for a pretext to force the Shah out of the U.S. and to
oust the liberals (Bazargan and the PRG) from the revolutionary
governm ent, a previously unknown group calling itself the
Students Following the Line of the Imam (SFLI), occupied the
A m e ric an

22 B akhash, The R e ig n o f the A y a to lla h s , 2 17.
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Embassy in Tehran and held 52 American's hostage.
were held for more than a year.

The hostages

The U.S. reactions over this time

period included a failed rescue attem pt and more successful
economic sanctions against Iran.

The U.S. froze Iranian assets in

the U.S. valued at almost $12 billion, it imposed trade embargoes
against Iran which W estern Europe and Japan also imposed, and it
m anipulated the international oil m arket through Saudi leverage.
Iran was still quite dependent on the capitalist world economy in
general (for food items and industrial inputs) and on oil
production and sales in particular, and consequently the U.S.
economic sanctions were very damaging to Iran.

Both Bazargan

and Bani Sadr tried to convince Khomeini to allow them to take
over the hostages and to resolve the situation, but Khomeini
refused and declared that it would have to wait until the M a j l i s
(parliam ent) was elected and could resolve the conflict.

This

particular dispute weakened both Bazargan and Bani Sadr, and
was a primary cause of both of them leaving office.
After the Ma j l i s elections and more than a year of the
hostages being held, the situation was finally resolved by the
Algerian Accord.

In exchange for the release of the hostages the

U.S. agreed to not intervene in Iran's internal affairs and to
prevent the hostages and their fam ilies from bringing lawsuits
against the Iranian government.

The U.S. also promised

cooperation with the Islamic governm ent in bringing lawsuits in
U.S. courts to extradite the Pahlavi family's wealth.

Finally, the

U.S. released frozen Iranian assets; $7.98 billion was transferred
to Iran's escrow account in the Bank of England, while $3.67
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billion was transferred to New York Federal Reserve to cover
Iran's debts to American banks.23
The results of the hostage crisis and its resolution for Iran
were both advantageous and damaging.

The accord was entirely

negotiated by the more radical elements within the Iranian
regim e which gave ammunition to the more m oderate elements in
their power struggle.

In addition, the hostage situation was

disadvantageous to Iran and its government because the U.S.
sanctions badly damaged the country's economy and it hurt
relations with countries other than the U.S..

The taking of the

hostages made it difficult for the new regime to get any support at
the international level, especially when Iraq attacked Iran in
1980.

Conversely, the hostage crisis also held advantages for the

new Iranian regime.

The fundam entalists were able to weaken

the provisional government during the crisis and were able to
consolidate their own power.

Also, the new regim e was perceived

internally as capable of hum iliating a superpower, especially after
the failed U.S. rescue attempt, and consequently its image and
power was strengthened.

The U.S. hostage situation is only one

dram atic exam ple of how intertwined foreign and dom estic policy
are in Iran.

The factionalism that developed in the regime is

interrelated with both these policies and they all affect one
another in policy-m aking and power struggles.

23 M ilani, 2 8 9 .
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F actionalism

and

Economic

Policy

W hile the fundam entalists were able to elim inate the
opposition and to consolidate their own power, the individuals
within this group were not entirely in agreement on a num ber of
issues.

Factions developed regarding particular issues and

individuals shifted between categories depending on where they
stood regarding single issues.
Alm ost imm ediately after the Revolution, a d i s l o c a t i o n ,
or n o n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,
developed betw een the
lead ersh ip and its ideology, leading to id eo lo g ical
factionalism within the state.
This dislocation occurred
when the core m iddle-class leadership faction tried to
present a m i d d l e - c l a s s interpretation of the c r o s s - c l a s s
and universal Islam.
O thers w ithin the pow er bloc,
how ever, disagreed and forw arded alternative radical
( l o w e r - c la s s )
and
c o n s e r v a t iv e
( u p p e r - c la s s )
p e rs p e c tiv e s .24
Am irahm adi's description of the factionalism that developed is
open to criticism ; especially problem atic are his classifications
according to socioeconomic standing and his failure to point out
that individuals did not always stay within one category, such as
radical, but shifted according to the issue.

However, he is correct

in pointing out that there are three main factions that have
developed and rivaled for power in Iran since the revolution.
Various labels have been applied to these factions, some
more accurate than others.

One of the factions has been referred

to as the conservatives or hoj ati -yes.

The conservatives believe in

less governm ent intervention in the economy, free enterprise, the

24

A m irahm adi, 98.
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sanctity of private property and in m oderation in the export of
the Islamic Revolution and in foreign policy.25

The core support

for the h o j at i - y e s are wealthy m erchants, landlords and some
high-ranking clergy.

The conservatives also oppose public

planning, state ownership and state m anagem ent of the economy.
They are against cooperatives and planned industrialization.
Conservatives favor the developm ent of agriculture and the
expansion of services.

This faction opposes land reform, the

increase of direct taxes, limits on the private sector and policies
against profiteering.

However, while this group is in favor of a

more open economy (the conservatives do not seem to want many
changes from the economy operated under the Shah), it can also
be quite culturally impermissive and ideologically strict.26
Ironically, the conservatives have been referred to as
liberals in some of the literature (this may be because they are in
favor of liberal economic policies, i.e. free trade, which are
conservative in the sense that they are a continuation of the
status quo from the Shah's regime).

In addition, some writers

refer to this faction as non-interventionist.

N on-interventionists

believe that the unregulated "Islamic" m arket economy, relying on
the private sector, is best for economic growth.

Government

intervention should only be a last resort and should only be

25 Milani, 305.
26 Amirahmadi,

118-21.
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te m p o ra ry .26

Regardless of what title is applied, this faction

experienced its peak of pow er imm ediately follow ing the
revolution, from 1979-81.

During the leadership terms of

Bazargan and Bani Sadr, the conservatives (or /to /a ri-y e s/lib e ra ls)
were able to block some of the major socioeconomic reforms, that
others tried to pass.

Even after their most powerful period during

the first two years of the new regime, the conservatives were able
to m aintain some strength in the governm ent, particularly
through positions in the Council of Guardians.
The second faction that developed in the Islamic Republic
has typically been referred to as the radicals, or the m a k t a b i s .
The radicals favor centralized economic planning, nationalization
of m ajor industries, lim its on private property, aggressive export
of the Islamic Revolution, and minimal relations with the United
States.

Their arguments generally focus on social justice and

redistribution of wealth.

Their support comes prim arily from the

lower and lower-m iddle classes, along with many of the
rev o lu tio nary

o rg an izatio n s.28 The radicals, or mak t abi s , advocate

public ownership and m anagem ent of large enterprises and
nationalization of foreign trade.

However, they are not entirely

against free m arkets or small private holdings.
The radicals advocate major land, tax, and socioeconomic reforms.
In addition, they are sym pathetic to agriculture, for consum ption
26 A li Rahnema and Farhad Nomani, The Secular M iracle: Religion, P o litics
an d Economic Policy in Iran (London and N ew Jersey: Zed B ooks Ltd, 1990)
256.
28 M ilan i, 305.
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not export, and are opposed to the expansion of the service sector
of the economy.

Radicals have been characterized by their goal of

self-reliance and their confrontational foreign policy, particularly
in regards to the U.S. and the war with Iraq.29
After weakening the conservatives in 1981, the radicals
becam e the dom inant faction within the regim e and m aintained
their strong position until 1984/1985.
powerful in the Ma j l i s

They were particularly

(Iranian parliam ent).

The radicals pursued

the war with Iraq, refusing to consider a cease-fire or resolution
until Saddam Hussein of Iraq was removed as the president of
that country.

In domestic policy, the radicals tried to push

through land and tax reforms, but the laws were often struck
down by the more conservative Council of Guardians, a council
responsible for ensuring that laws did not violate the principles of
Islam.

The constitution, which was adopted in 1980, had several

articles that justified socioeconomic reform s and land reform.
Ma j l i s

The

pushed through a Law for the Transfer and Revival of

Land but Khomeini suspended it due to the upheaval that was
caused by suggestion of any land reform.

In addition, the radicals

tried to increase direct taxation and tried to persuade the
w ealthier individuals in Iran that they should voluntarily pay
more in religious taxes.

However, the tax system in Iran lacks a

strong collection history and very little was changed by the
radicals.

In their years in power, the radicals were more

influential in foreign policy and cultural issues than they were in
29

A m irahm adi,
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the economic sector.

The radicals had the misfortune of being in

pow er when Iran experienced some hard tim es, particularly
setbacks in the war, and as a result they were blamed for many of
Iran's problem s and their power was weakened.
The third and final faction is often called the pragm atist or
moderate faction.

This group falls in between the other two and it

is led by the current president of the republic, Hashemi
Rafsanjani.

The pragm atists seek to find a compromise between a

laissez-faire and a state interventionist economy.

The

pragm atists/m oderates advocate a mixed approach to the
economic system.

They believe in a controlled market economy,

guided and regulated by state planning and limited public
ow nership and m anagem ent, with a com plem entary role played
by privately organized cooperatives.

The pragm atists find their

support base among a wide range of classes and institutions.

The

newer m iddle-class, the technocrats and a number of the religious
"intelligentsia" are supportive of the m oderate faction.30 The
pragm atists defend oil-led industrialization as the proper basis for
rapid economic growth and advocate controlled free trade and
guarded openness to the international economy.

They are

generally less ideological than the other two factions and more
flexible in their interpretation of Islamic law.
The pragm atists began to gain power through Khom eini's
support in 1984-85 and have generally been the dom inant faction
since that time.
30

A m irahm adi,

The setbacks in the war with Iraq and the
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economic problem s that Iran was facing at that time under the
radicals convinced Khomeini to support the pragm atists in their
policies.

The pragm atists believed that Iran had to procure

weapons and parts for its Am erican-built systems
to continue its fight against Iraq.

if it was going

It was the pragm atist faction

that was responsible for the arm s-for-hostages deal, which
tem porarily renewed Iran's
supplier.

relationship with the U.S. as its arms

In addition, the pragm atists have tried to turn the

economy around and move it toward rapid growth, focusing on a
strategy of im proving trade relations, especially with other
developing nations, Europe and Japan.

The postwar proclam ations

by Khomeini supported the policies of the m oderates, particularly
his endorsem ent of factionalism and his call for a limited market
economy and controlled free international trade.31 The
pragm atists have managed to stay strong since the cease-fire with
Iraq and since Khomeini's death, but their power may suffer the
same deterioration that the other factions faced.

It all depends on

the circum stances of the time.
W hereas radicals are unfortunate to have held power
during a period of general economic decline,
conservatives are having a difficult time defending a
more or less a la Shah model that failed to benefit the
m ajority. Under these circum stances, the centrists
(pragm atists) are finding it easier to defend a mixed
a p p ro a c h .32
31 One o f the only exceptions to Khomeini's pragmatic leanings at the end
o f his rule, w as the Rushdie incident, in which he declared that Salman
Rushdie's book S ata n ic V erses was blasphem ous and that the author should
be assassinated for his anti-Islam ic w riting.
32 Amirahmadi,

124.
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Most of the members of the three factions that hold
positions within the regime come from traditional middle class
backgrounds.

However, the ideological conflicts within this middle

class leadership are often m istaken for interclass political
c o n flic ts.33

In addition, it is difficult to label an individual as

belonging to a specific faction, since individuals shift depending on
the issue.

For example, a person may be regarded as a radical

when the issue of private property is raised, but he may be
considered a pragm atist in regard to openness to the
international economy and foreign relations.

As with any country

adjusting to life after a revolution, there are questions of how to
best approach the political and economic systems.

In Iran, the

shift in political power among the factions can generally be
identified with periods of economic changes.
As follow ing sections will demonstrate, there was a general
decline in the economy, especially after 1984 when the recession
began.

As a result, those in power, the radicals, were hurt

politically, and the power shifted to others, the pragm atists:
This new mood of pragmatism did not imply political
liberalization, a deemphasis on Islamic orthodoxy, or
greater tolerance for political opposition ... Rather, the
new mood suggested a desire by the religious leaders to
restore econom ic and adm inistrative order and a
readiness on their part to allow the technocrats to look
after the economy, while the clerics retained power,

33

A m irahm adi,

118.
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controlled politics, saw after ideology, and made basic
d e c isio n s.34
The political economy of Iran following the revolution up until
Khomeini's death was affected by a number of factors and
underwent various political, economic and social changes.
However, it is im portant to understand that up until his death
Khomeini was the final arbiter in the republic, due to his charisma
and his position as f a qi h.

Apart from Khomeini, other factors that

have affected the political economy of Iran include the dispute
over land reform , the economic structure and policies adopted, oil
policy and the war with Iraq.

Land

Reform
Land reform has been a particularly divisive issue in the

Islamic Republic.

With the revolution and the breakdown of civil

authority follow ing the revolution, land seizures began to take
place in the countryside.

The three groups which initiated these

seizures include the revolutionary governm ent and its
organizations, the landlords and the peasants.
peasants seized land early on:

M ostly the

"They were spurred on by the

breakdown of authority and the absence of landlords, and
Khomaini's call on the farmers to plant extensively in the first
year of the Islamic Republic."35 The seizures led to extensive
battles within the governm ent over the sanctity of private

34 Bakhash, The Reign o f the A yatollahs, 231.
35 Bakhash, The Reign o f the A yatollahs, 197.
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property versus the social justice of redistribution of wealth.

In

general, two governm ent institutions represented the two sides of
land reform: the Majlis generally argued for land reform and
redistribution, whereas the Council of Guardians struck down
reform m easures in favor of the right to private property.
In September, 1979, the provisional governm ent received
approval of the Revolutionary Council for a Law for the Transfer
and Revival of Land.

The bill was very limited in nature, and

basically left the private sector untouched.

Then in 1980, the

constitution was approved, including articles providing legal
justification for more extensive land reform.

Following this, a

huge dispute broke out and Khomeini ended up suspending the
land reform bill and the articles on land reform .36

The suspension

resulted in havoc across the countryside, since seizures and
distribution had already begun.
Then again in December 1982, another land reform measure
was approved by the M a j l i s , only to be struck down a short time
later.

The measure did not aim at redistribution, but at ensuring

more extensive leasing under forms of contract, such as
sharecropping, rental and partnerships.

Landlords were allowed

to hold up to three times (in some cases four times) the size of an
average family farm and were allowed to lease the rest of their
holdings, giving children of landlords priority.

However, in

January, 1983, the Council of Guardians struck down this measure

36 Bakhash, The R e ig n o f the A y a to lla h s , 2 00.
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for violating Islamic and constitutional principles.37 Land reform
attempts continued to go back and forth in the government,
leaving a legacy of disputes.
The doctrinal and constitu tio n al disputes over
land and property rem ained unresolved.
B ecause of
u n a u th o riz e d
se iz u re s,
law s a p p ro v e d
and
then
suspended, very large am ounts of land rem ained in
d isp u te betw een landow ners and v illa g e rs, p riv ate
citizens and the governm ent.38
The ideological dispute revolves around the question of
whether Islam weighs more in favor of private property or social
justice (m eaning redistribution of property and other wealth).
Islam recognizes both, but the government of Iran has not been
able to find an acceptable balance between these two.
it is difficult to find this balance in most societies.

In practice,

Khomeini, as

the f a q i h , had the power to make a final decision on the matter
but he chose instead to vacillate between the two sides, never
satisfactorily deciding the matter.

Had he made a decision, there

is no certainty that his choice would not have weakened his power
and led to instability in Iran.
the part of the Maj l i s,

but

There were many reform efforts

on

almost all of them were defeated by the

Council of Guardians.
One exception to this pattern is the Tem porary Cultivation
Law of 1986.

In October of that year, the Maj l i s approved a bill to

transfer ow nership of so-called "tem porary cultivation

37 Bakhash, The Reign o f the A yatollahs, 209-10.
38 Bakhash, The Reign o f the Ayatollahs, 211.
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agricultural land" from owners to cultivators who had actually
been working the land.

The land seizures that followed the

revolution created w idespread disorder and landlord-peasant
disputes.

In order to deal with these problem s the Supreme

Judicial Council issued a decree in 1980, leaving the cultivation of
disputed lands in the hands of those who had cultivated the land
the previous year.

This arrangem ent was renewed each year and

the land was referred to as temporary cultivation land.

By 1986,

the regim e had to face the pressure of settling the status of these
lands, so they passed the temporary cultivation law.
In its final form , the law provided that ow nership of
agricultural land throughout the country, which as of
M arch 20, 1981, was in the hands of the non-ow ner
cu ltiv ators, w ould be transferred perm anently to the
cultivators, provided they were landless or land-poor,
lacked an adequate source of incom e oth er than
agriculture, and were resident in the locality.39
The law was by no means aimed at a comprehensive
redistribution of land; rather, it was passed to settle the status of
the particular lands that fell under the category of temporary
cultivation lands.

In fact, landowners were still allowed to keep

some land if they were

considered "needy" (sometimes this

amounted up to three times the amount of land considered
necessary for maintaining a rural fam ily).40

Nevertheless, the law

39 Shaul Bakhash, "The Politics o f Land, Law, and Social Justice in Iran, "
M iddle E ast Journal 43 (Spring, 1989) 190.
40 Bakhash, "The Politics o f Land, Law, and Social Justice in Iran," 191.
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still revived the whole argument of private property versus social
justice, which in all probability could only have been resolved by
Khomeini, but was not.
Khom eini, it turned out had spoken in favor both of
social ju stice and of a strict interpretation of Islam ic
law.
He had denigrated the large landow ners as
exploiters of the peasantry and also w arned against
unlaw ful attacks on private property, had approved the
1980 land reform law and then suspended it, had sided
at times with the Council of Guardians and the narrow
interpreters and at other times with the M ajlis and the
broad interpreters on m atters of property and Islam ic
law ...
Khom eini's rulings and views, in other words,
although
considered authoritative, lent them selves to
varying in te rp retatio n s.41
Khomeini was cryptic not only when it came to land reform,
but also regarding other issues.

His support of the political

factions varied, as did his stand on economic questions, such as
the degree of state versus private control that Iran should adopt.
In describing Khom eini’s political style it has been said that he
would "go with the wind."

When a controversy arose in the

republic, Khomeini would usually wait to see which side would
emerge as stronger and then would go with that side.

W hile he

can be criticized for not taking more decisive stands on certain
matters, it may be that his choice not to step in and personally
resolve problem atic questions may have contributed to his power;
whereas if he had taken one side of a controversial matter, he
may have been weakened.

If he had made a number of

41 Bakhash, "The P o litic s o f Land, Law , and S ocial Justice in Iran," 198.
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unpopular decisions, rather than avoiding conflict, he might have
weakened his own position.

T he E conom y of the IR I
The economy of Iran, during the ten years that Khomeini
guided the country, was characterized by both dependency on the
international capitalist economy, and by an active state role and
policies that suggest economic nationalism.

As will be further

exam ined later, Iran has been unable to fully break its
dependency and become entirely self-reliant, as was hoped in the
beginning of the new republic.

Iran is highly dependent on its oil

sales on the capitalist world market for foreign currency, which it
depends on for the imports it desperately needs, the most
important of which is food.

One example of Iran's dependence on

the world oil market is seen in the years following 1984, when the
world experienced an oil

glut and

Iran's economy was hurt

and the recession which the country

entering was intensified.
was still insisting that it

oil prices declined rapidly;
was

At the same time, the new government
was possible for Iran to become self-

reliant and was adopting policies that were protectionist in nature;
thus, the rhetoric and the policies were suggestive of economic
nationalism .

The economy of the Islamic Republic was affected by

a num ber of factors during its first ten years, including the
econom y inherited from the previous regim e, the structure and
policies that the new governm ent adopted, the international
environm ent, oil production and price, and the war with Iraq.
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The revolutionary governm ent inherited some staggering
economic problems from the Shah’s regim e.

Months of strikes had

reduced the governm ent's revenues (i.e. oil exports, customs
duties, etc.).

By the time the provisional government came to

power, the treasury was nearly empty and the governm ent ended
up having to print money in order to survive.

In addition, the

banking system was near collapse, due to massive w ithdrawals,
huge capital flight, and many outstanding loans which would
never be repaid.

The departure of nearly all the foreign

technicians m eant num erous incom plete projects were abandoned.
Finally, the Shah and his government had drawn up a $47 billion
budget for 1979-80, with a projected deficit of $15 billion; Iran
had already begun to accumulate a deficit before the new
government even had a chance to take over.42
Conversely, there were some econom ic advantages inherited.
The oil industry, despite months of strikes, was still relatively
intact.

In addition,

hostage crisis)

foreign exchange reserves (prior

to the

were not insignificant, totalling $13billion.43

Finally, the foreign debt which the new governm ent inherited was
relatively small.

However, these advantages were not enough to

outweigh the problems the economy was facing:
The crisis w as, ... , sym ptom atic of an econom y
characterized by deep dependency on oil and im ports,
lopsided developm ent across its social, sectoral, and
spatial com ponents, disarticulated relationship betw een
42 Bakhash, The

Reign o f the Ayatollahs,

175-77.

43 Bakhash, The

Reign o f the Ayatollahs, 177.
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its consum ption and production system s and am ong
econom ic sectors, and asym m etrical integration with the
capitalist world system .44
The clergymen coming to power were adept at m obilizing the
masses, but they had very little experience in dealing with
national econom ic problems.
In addition to these problems, Iran also had a poor export to
im port ratio.

According to W orld Bank figures, between 1973 and

1983, Iran had "an average yearly negative rate of exports of
about 17 percent and an average positive rate of imports of about
3.5 percent."45
trade for Iran.

These figures represent a deterioration in terms of
The ten year span overlaps both regim es, so the

poor record cannot be blamed solely upon the IRI.

The poor trade

ratio indicates that Iran is dependent on imports which it has not
balanced out through exporting its own goods.
As exam ined previously, factionalism developed within the
regim e alm ost imm ediately after the Shah was overthrown; this
factionalism was primarily caused by differences of opinion
regarding the economic system.

Recalling the descriptions of the

radicals as opposed to the conservatives, the main difference
between these two is their position concerning the role of the
state in the economy.

Factionalism has prevented any consistency

in economic policies and has blocked the formation of any
comprehensive development strategy.

As a result, this has had a

44 Amirahmadi, 21.
45 Shahrough Akhavi, "Institutionalizing the N ew
H i s t o r y 86 (February 1987) 56.

Order in Iran," C u r r e n t
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negative im pact on the economic perform ance of the country.
Lacking specific goals and strategies for the economic
developm ent of the nation, the Islamic Republic leadership has
focused on solving immediate problems.

Looking to Islam and the

Quran, the leaders have found some guidelines, but the Quran is
not an economic treatise and it is subject to a wide variety of
interpretations.

This has led to a lack of unified positions and

frequent policy reversals.

Khomeini himself, the final interpreter,

was consistently vague in his interpretations regarding economic
matters.

In order to properly analyze the economic perform ance

of the IRI, it is important to examine the structure and policies
adopted since 1979.
The initial goals of the new government were econom ic selfreliance, a restructuring of consum ption patterns and realizing
social ju stice.46

The structure of the economic system was divided

into three sectors by the Constitution of the IRI.
public sector.

The first is the

Included in the public sector (meaning state

controlled) are all major industries, foreign trade, major mines,
banking, insurance, power production, dams and m ajor watercarrying networks, radio, television, postal, telegraph and
telephone services, and air/sea/land/railroad transport.
second sector is the private sector of the economy.

The

Portions of

agriculture, anim al husbandry, industry, trade and services which
supplement the activities of the other sectors are included here.
The final area is the cooperative sector.
46

A m irahm adi,

163.

This includes cooperative
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(private and public) companies and organizations in both rural
and urban areas.47

These three sectors were designed to

com plem ent one another and lead to economic growth, but instead
there have been political and ideological conflicts and practical
difficulties concerning the divisions.
The policies adopted by the regime have varied.

Overall,

the policies seem to fall under the heading of economic
nationalism.

Economic nationalism is a strategy in which the state

plays an active role in promoting domestic economic growth and
development.

A major component of the policies of economic

nationalism is protectionism .

Economic nationalism advocates an

entirely different position from liberalism - whereas the form er
encourages state control and regulation the latter demands the
least governm ent intervention possible.
The new regime in Iran adopted several policies increasing
the state's role in the economy, particularly during the period
when the radicals were the dom inant faction.
the governm ent took over large sectors of the econom y
through n atio n alizatio n and ex p ro p ria tio n , inclu d in g
b a n k in g ,
in s u ra n c e ,
m a jo r
in d u s try ,
la rg e -s c a le
agriculture and construction, and an im portant part of
foreign trade.
It also involved itself in the dom estic
distribution of goods. As a result, the econom ic role of
the state was greatly sw ollen and that of the private
sector greatly dim inished by the revolution.48

47

Amirahm adi,

114-15.

48 Bakhash, The Reign o f the A yatollahs, 166.
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The nationalization of large sectors, control of domestic
distribution of goods, lim itations on imports and subsidizing
certain industries and goods are all indicators of an active state
role in the economy and thus of economic nationalism.

A further

analysis of the policies adopted and of their effectiveness will
indicate that the leadership of Iran did not go all the way in
adopting economic nationalism as part of its strategy for economic
development, and that some of the policies it chose were
inappropriate for the nation.
The new governm ent nationalized banking, insurance and
most of the industry within the country.

Industry that fell within

one of three categories was brought under the ownership and
m anagem ent of the state:

(1) "heavy" industry - metals,

autom obile assem bly, chem icals, shipbuilding, aircraft
m anufacture and mining; (2) industries owned by fifty specifically
named individuals and one family, who allegedly acquired their
wealth through influence with the Shah's regime; and, (3)
industries facing economic difficulty, whose liabilities exceeded
their net assets.49

In addition, large amounts of property were

expropriated illegally by revolutionary organizations that evolved
into governm ent institutions, such as the Foundation for the
D isin h erited .
The leadership not only took ownership of large sectors of
the economy, it also placed controls over various areas.

Foreign

trade was brought under strict control, and debate raged over
49 B akhash, The R e ig n o f the A y a to lla h s ,

1 7 9 -8 0 .
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whether it should have been nationalized.

In addition, price

controls were placed upon num erous areas.50

Sometimes the

governm ent would subsidize certain producers/m erchants to
balance out the price controls, but often there were no subsidies.
The new regim e was not entirely consistent with the policies it
chose.

Protectionism is generally geared toward "infant

industries" in order for them to develop and flourish, so that they
may be com petitive on the world market.

However, Iran did not

adopt a com prehensive policy for protecting specific industries
and expanding its exports.

The leadership seems to have decided

that state controls would be the best thing for the economy, but
then they did not move far beyond this decision in addressing
econom ic growth and developm ent.
The governm ent plays a strong role in distribution,
production, export and import of goods.

"According to one Iranian

economist, some 68 percent of the total labor force worked for the
public sector in 1983."51

As with many other developing nations

this is an indication of the weak private sector.

Sim ilar indicators

of government control can be seen by looking at other figures.

For

example, nationalization and expropriation by the end of 1982,
resulted in the Iran National Industries Organization controlling
between 500 and 600 industries, and employing m ore than
150,000 people.

The Foundation for the Disinherited, an arm of

50 Patrick Clawson, "Islamic Iran's Econom ic P olitics and Prospects," M i d d l e
E ast Journal 42 (Summer 1988) 379-80.
51 Milani, 308.
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the government, shows similar figures.

During the same time

period, it was in charge of:
1) 200-300 factories
2) 100 construction com panies
3) 150-200 com m ercial firms
4) 91 poultry, livestock and agricultural enterprises,and
5) 90,000 em ployees5 2
The degree of state control over economic sectors is extensive, but
the state has not played the role of the intelligent entrepreneur.
It has controlled the economy, but it has not helped it grow
sig n ifican tly .
N ot only has the state controlled various industries, it has
also

limited foreign trade, in order to avoid foreign debt.

The

figures for civilian non-oil im ports, between 1981 and 1986 are
given below:
Year_____________________________Civilian Non-Oil Imports
1981 (early)
$16 billion
1981-82
less than $10 billion
1982-83
$11.8 billion
1983-84
$18.1 billion
1984-85
$13.6 billion
1985-86____________________________________ $12.4 billion
The above figures were taken from Patrick Clawson's article
entitled "Islamic Iran's Economic Politics and Prospects."5 5

As indicated by the figures above, imports were significantly
decreased between 1981 and 1983, then they were increased for
52 Bakhash, The Reign o f the A ya tollah s, 184.
53 Clawson, 381-82.
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one year, then decreased again.

The marked increase in 1983-84

is due to the improved standing in the war with Iraq at that time
and the improvements in the oil market.

Neither factor could be

sustained for very long however, and consequently, im ports were
restricted in the following years.

Iran is a country that is quite

dependent on imports; it does not produce a sufficient amount of
food to feed its population and its industries are dependent on
im ports for raw m aterials and interm ediate goods.

Thus, the

restrictions on imports were successful in avoiding foreign debt,
but at the same time, they were damaging to industrial growth.
In addition to nationalizing various econom ic endeavors,
expropriating certain properties, and controlling or limiting
numerous areas of the economy, the new governm ent of Iran also
started subsidizing the costs of basic needs item s, especially food,
in order to mitigate rapidly rising prices and declining real
income.

Inflation had risen so high that many families were

spending a majority of their income on food alone.

The

governm ent found itself in the position of spending practically all
its incom e on current needs and very little on development of
projects aimed at modernization and economic growth.

"By the

end of 1987, the share of current expenditures rose to 82 percent
of the general budget, while that of developm ent expenditures
declined to 18 percent, an extremely unhealthy budgetary
a llo c a tio n ." 54

Annual budgets have been adopted instead of

national planning and leaders have generally lim ited them selves
54

A m irahm adi,

166.

105

to coping with im m ediate problems, without looking to future
d e v e lo p m e n t.
The active state role of the new regime was adopted, at least
in part, in order to prom ote economic growth and development.
The initial goals of the regime included self-reliance and
achievement of social justice.

In order to achieve these goals, the

new leaders chose many strategies rem iniscent of economic
nationalism .

However, they did not entirely adopt economic

nationalism .

Factionalism has prevailed in the Islamic Republic,

and as such, a m ixture of approaches has been adopted for the
political economy, rather than a single com prehensive approach.
If economic nationalism had been fully adopted there is no
evidence that it would have been any more successful than the
mixed approach that was inadvertently taken.

The general idea of

economic nationalism and protectionism is to subsidize the
creation of an infrastructure
the export of manufactures.

and to

prom ote home industry and

This is designed to allow "infant

industries" to flourish and to increase dom estic economic growth.
The Islamic Republic seems to have
nationalism suggests, but it

the same goals as economic

does not have a com prehensive plan

for reaching these goals (nor does economic nationalism lay out
the exact strategies a state must choose in order to be successful).
The new leaders wanted to expand exports beyond oil, but this
did not materialize.

They limited imports in order to reduce

foreign debt, but they were unable to substitute domestic
products in place of the limited imports.

In addition, the

dom estically produced goods and imports m aintained were often
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consum er products rather than durable goods.

Finally, the goal of

enhancing national power, which is considered incom patible with
foreign control over important areas of the economy, was inherent
in the slogans and philosophy of the IRI, but it encountered
practical difficulties.

The factionalism which has dominated the

political economy of Iran has meant differing economic
philosophies have competed for dominance, but no single
approach has won.
This mixture of approaches has led to mixed results.
According to Shaul Bakhash, the result of nationalization was not
so much redistribution of wealth and increase of economic
opportunity, but rather, the fattening of the "already overfed
leviathan - the governm ent."55

The economy has sustained severe

damage over the years, but at the same time, the regime has
lasted for more than a decade, surviving the poor economy and
the war with Iraq, without any serious threats to its authority.

In

fact, the factionalism within the regim e has been more
troublesome than most outside attempts to gain power.

One of the

m ost im portant controversial issues within the regim e revolves
around the degree to which the state should control the economy.
Just as land reform brought up the question of social justice
(intervention) versus private property, so do other econom ic
sectors raise the issue of social justice and state intervention
versus free enterprise and nonintervention in the econom y.
During his rule, Khomeini made proclam ations regarding the
55 Bakhash, The R e ig n o f the A y a to ll a h s , 184.
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economy, but these did not provide the other leaders with a final
solution.
K hom aini's intervention did not resolve the issue of the
relationship between the private and public sectors or
the underlying question of how social ju stice is to be
achieved under an Islam ic republic.
The proponents of
private enterprise and state control, private property
and d is trib u tiv e ju s tic e , and n arro w and b ro ad
interpretations of Islam ic law confronted one another
o v e r v irtu a lly e v ery
m ajo r p iec e o f e co n o m ic
le g isla tio n .56
Final answers to these debates may never be found.

W ithin and

outside of Iran, people will debate the merits of various policies
regarding state intervention in the economy.

The m ixture of

approaches has resulted in mixed perform ance, which has various
in d ic ato rs.
Of the indicators used to judge the economic standing of a
nation, probably the most used is Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Gross Domestic Product is the market value of all goods and
services produced in final form by residents of a nation.

The GDP

of Iran has been fluctuating since 1976, generally falling into
three periods.

From 1977 to 80, there was a sharp decline in GDP,

followed by strong growth from 1981 to 83, then another sharp
decline from 1984 to 87.

The strong growth during the period of

1981 to 83 is mostly due to the improved oil m arket and the
increased revenues Iran experienced during this time.

O ver the

entire period of 1979-87, the GDP of Iran registered an annual
56 B akhash, The R e ig n o f the A y a to lla h s , 2 4 8 .
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growth rate of -0.7 percent.57

The negative growth rate has

m eant financial problems for the general population, and for the
m iddle-class in particular.

The table below gives figures for gross

dom estic product between 1977 and 1984.
Gross D om estic Product in constant 1974 prices (b illion s o f rials)
1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

A g r ic u lt u r e

340.9

3 5 2 .6

356.3

362.9

4 0 4 .0

4 3 6 .0

4 2 9 .0

4 4 6 .7

Oil and gas

1,363

9 2 9 .8

7 6 7 .6

330.5

2 7 3 .6

5 2 6 .8

531.1

4 5 2 .5

I n d u s t r ie s

645.6

5 5 3 .9

5 1 1 .9

520.2

5 3 4 .5

5 9 0 .7

683.1

705.1

S e r v ic e s

1,753

1,620

1,560

1,475

1,504

1,546

1,833

1,871

GDP

3,922

3 ,2 6 6

3 ,0 7 0

2,568

2 ,6 3 9

3 ,0 4 0

3,417

3,421

Per capita GDP
(1000 rials)

112.9

91.3

83.25

67.53

67.31

7 5 .1 7

81.98

80.0
...........5

As the chart indicates, there was a large decrease in oil and gas
and in the industrial sector between 1977 and 1981, which then
experienced a slow increase.

In addition, the service sector saw a

decline, but then in 1983/84 made a strong recovery.

Overall, the

GDP and the per capita GDP showed a similar decrease in the
im m ediate post-revolution years and then som ew hat increased;
however, none of the increased figures were enough to match the
1977 pre-revolution figures.

According to Am irahm adi's

exam ination of Iran's GDP, "Per capita GDP has declined by 47
percent (in 1974 prices) between 1979 and 1987, at an average

57

Amirahmadi,

133-37.

5 * Rahnema and Nomani, 280. The above chart is a m odified version o f that
g iv en by Rahnema and Nom ani.
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rate of 5.2 percent per year."59

This decline has reduced the

purchasing pow er of the middle and lower classes, and has
blurred the line between them.

According to some scholars, Iran

has become a two-class society consisting of the rich and the poor,
with the m iddle-class having virtually blended into the lowerclass.

The poor performance in the GDP is an indicator of the

declining econom ic power of the country.
In addition to GDP, the Gross Domestic Expenditure (GDE) has
also declined in post-revolutionary Iran.

The average annual GDE

showed a 15.9 percent decline (at fixed 1974 prices) during the
1979-86 period, when compared to the figure for the 1976-78
period.

In addition, the overall GDE indicator averaged an annual

growth rate of -0.3 percent for the 1979-86 period.60

This is even

more significant when inflation over the years is taken into
account (meaning prices are higher, so the same expenditure
amount buys fewer goods).

The decline in both production and

expenditure are general indicators of decreasing economic
capability.

An examination of the expenditures on consum ption as

opposed to productive investm ents dem onstrates more clearly the
declining econom ic performance of Iran.

In 1985, the percentage

of GDE that went to c ons umpt i on was 71.8 percent (as compared
to 64 percent in 1976).

In 1985, the percentage of GDE that went

to i n v e s t me n t was 18.5 percent (as compared to 31 percent in

59 Amirahmadi,

194.

60 Amirahmadi,

155.
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1 9 7 6 ).61

W hile figures for other developing and developed

countries are sim ilar, this nevertheless represents a definite
decline in Iran’s investment since the previous decade, and due to
Iran’s reconstruction needs increased investm ent is one of the
highest priorities.
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (GDFCF) is the
investm ent in dom estic capital generally geared toward
infrastructure and production.

GDFCF includes among other

things, investm ent in m achinery, construction, m anufacturing and
mining.

As the figures discussed above, regarding consumption

and investm ent suggest, the drop in gross domestic fixed capital
form ation (GDFCF) has been disproportionately higher than the
drop in GDE, meaning a higher share of GDE is going to
consumption and largely nonproductive savings.
shown a growth rate of

The GDE has

-0.3 percent for the 1979-86 period,

whereas the GDFCF has demonstrated a -8.5 percent growth
ra te .62 W hat this indicates, is that the drop in the GDFCF is
disproportionately higher because the share of expenditures being
made into investm ent and production are declining at an even
faster rate than GDE is declining.

Both the public and the private

sectors have decreased investm ent, particularly in construction
6 1 Amirahmadi, 156.
The figures for Iran’s investm ent versus consum ption
are sim ilar to those o f other countries.
According to statistics from the
Europa W orld Year Book, consum ption and investm ent figures for several
countries for 1985/86 are:
Argentina - consum ption 86 percent,
investm ent 13 percent; Egypt - consum ption 83 percent, investm ent 15
percent; France - consum ption 80 percent, investm ent 19 percent; and
Japan - consum ption 70 percent, investm ent 28 percent.
^2 A m irahm adi,

154.
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and machinery, especially since the beginning of the recession in
1984.

This decline in investm ent and increase in consumption

dem onstrates an unhealthy budget that is not planning for future
econom ic growth.
The decline in the post-revolutionary GDFCF is due to a
num ber of factors (which are also partially responsible for the
lack of significant growth in Iran's overall economy).

Included

among these factors are the declining oil revenues, the war with
Iraq, private capital flight, the establishm ent of revolutionary
institutions (increased public spending and increased
consum ption), the lower profit rates and longer turnover times in
productive sectors (which has deterred many from investing in
productive areas), and the unsettled political environm ent.63

In

sum m arizing the econom ic difficulties which Iran faced after the
revolution, Shaul Bakhash wrote:
The governm ent's econom ic problem s were exacerbated
by the w ar w ith Iraq, an in flated and in efficien t
g o v ern m en t secto r, the ero sio n of p riv a te secto r
confidence, the drop in both private and public sector
investm ent, and a steep decline in oil revenues.64
The economy of Iran, as has been demonstrated through this
discussion on its structure, policies and perform ance, has not
achieved the goals set out by the post-revolutionary leaders; selfreliance and social justice do not yet characterize Iran.

W hile self-

reliance was an often mentioned goal of the republic in the early

63 Amirahmadi,
64

B akhash, 2 4 5 .

161.
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years, with the pragm atic faction gaining power, the focus has
been shifted to self-sufficiency, rather than self-reliance.

One of

the primary blocs to achieving significant economic growth (and
thus working closer towards self-sufficiency and social justice) has
been the declining oil market.

Iran has been very dependent on

oil revenues and consequently has suffered from the world oil
glut and policies in OPEC that have maintained low oil prices.

Oil

and

P ost-R evolutionary

Iran

Early in the post-revolutionary period the new regim e
adopted a new oil policy.

The leaders terminated the oil

consortium 's control of Iranian oil production, export, and
m arketing.

They then transferred control of these areas to the

National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which was combined with
other oil and gas related publicly owned companies and came
under the control of the new Ministry of Oil.

The goals of the new

policies were to reduce the level of oil exports and prolong the life
of the country's oil reserves, gradually reducing Iran's
dependence on oil exports.

During the revolution the oil industry

had symbolized foreign control of Iran;

the revolutionaries had

opposed foreign control through oil, and had promised economic
independence for Iran.
this

The new oil policy was meant to realize

independence.
Soon however, obstacles to the new oil policy mounted.

The

recession from 1977, continued through 1980, and the dom estic
political struggles barred plans for the rejuvenation of the
economy. The Iraqi invasion caused heavy damage to all sectors of
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the economy; the Iraqis destroyed m ajor refineries, which m eant
decreased

exports and decreased state revenues.

The state could

not prune

the defense budget as much as it had intended to, due

to the Iraqi invasion, and consequently could not apply that
money to other sectors of the economy.

In addition, the new

leaders dem onstrated an inability to prom ote non-oil exports
(such as natural gas and copper) and to collect taxes (which was
historically the case in Iran).

Finally, the most form idable

constraints

were found in the world oil m arkets and within

O P E C .65

The Saudis, through U.S. manipulation, managed to reduce

world oil prices and later, to flood the market.

Within OPEC they

barred Iran’s demands for higher oil prices, and outside they sold
over their quota.

As a result of all these factors, Iran's oil

production and revenues were dam aged.
Iran's oil revenues have fluctuated since the revolution, but
overall there has been a general decline.

Following the revolution

and the start of the war with Iraq, Iran's oil revenues sank to
their low est value in post-revolutionary Iran (1980).

Then in

1982-83, Iran experienced a strong recovery, prim arily due to
Iran's improved standing in the war and an improved world oil
market.

Figures vary between $20 and $23 billion for this year.

However, in 1983-84, there was a sharp decline in prices on the
oil market, and Iran could not offset this, despite increasing her
exports.

The year 1984 marked the beginning of a recession for

Iran, which was largely due to the decline in oil revenues.
65

A m irahm adi,

174.
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1983-84, oil revenues fell $3.7 billion below projected earnings,
and in 1984-85, they fell $6 billion below projected earnings.
Finally, in 1986, Iran experienced a very sharp decline in its oil
revenues.

The predicted revenue was $15 billion, whereas the

actual revenue was less than $6 billion.66
Iran’s Oil Revenues
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

(^billions')

$20
$16.7
$14
$ 5.8
$10.7

67

Finally, in 1987, Iran experienced a slight recovery, as can be seen
from the above figure.

According to Shahrough Akhavi, Iran's oil

revenues were damaged due to the oil market becom ing softer
and to the drop in oil prices, especially after 1983; prices dropped
from the 1979 high of $34 per barrel to $14 per barrel in
February, 1987.

Worse for Iran, the quantities it has been able to

produce and sell have declined sharply due to the war - from
more than two million barrels per day in 1982, down to less than
800,000 barrels per day in late 1986.68

The recovery that began

in 1987 has brought hope, but revenues continue to fluctuate, and
Iran has not been able to reduce its dependence on oil enough to
fully recover its economy without a strong increase in oil
re v e n u e s .
66 Bakhash, 245.
67

Amirahmadi, 2 2 4-25.

68 Akhavi, 55.

Figures adapted from Amirahm adi’s statistics.

Iran's dependence on oil has been evident for well over two
decades.

The Shah's regime failed to diversify econom ically and

thus allowed Iran to develop a greater dependency on oil
revenues and the international oil market they were subject to.
Despite the promises of the revolution, this situation changed very
little.

W hen the post-revolutionary leaders cam e to power they

opted for a policy of g r a d u a lly reducing this dependence;
however, the previously discussed obstacles blocked this policy.
Modern sectors of the Iranian economy are all dependent on
earnings from oil.

According to Amirahmadi, “Some 90 percent of

the state’s foreign exchange earnings come from crude oil exports
that pay for various kinds of Iran’s ever-increasing industrial and
food im ports.”69

Most of the raw materials, and many

interm ediate products of Iranian industry m ust be im ported,
which is im possible without the foreign exchange earnings from
oil revenues.

In addition to foreign exchange, the single

commodity of oil also provides a high percentage of the total
public income.

In 1983-85, oil revenues were responsible for

48.2 percent of the total governm ent revenues.70 This is
significantly high considering the tax increases and the amount of
public ownership and m anagem ent that the new regim e had
established by this time.
The constraints on Iran's control of its production, export
and price of its oil are largely determined by changes in the world
69 Amirahmadi, 70.
70 Rahnema and Nomani, 287.
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m arket economy (international oil market) and within OPEC.
Unlike the early 1970's, when OPEC was unified in its goals and
strategies, Iran is unable to lead the other OPEC powers to reduce
their exports and increase their prices; Iran is unable to use oil as
a tool of its policy.

The superpowers, especially the US, have

m anipulated the oil m arkets (m ostly through Saudi leverage), and
have retaliated against Iran for demanding changes at the
international level.

Since Iran holds a valuable product and is

dependent on the export of that product, a situation is created in
which the superpowers have been able to exploit Iran.

This was

particularly true in the 1970's, and is still evident in post
revolutionary Iran.

The declining oil prices might have been

advantageous for the new leaders in their attem pts to reduce
dependency on oil, but they lacked a planned shift for the
economy and the eruption of the war threw the economy into
such turmoil that reducing dependence became less of a priority.

Oil Exports
(per capita basis)
1972-73
1977-78
1986-87

$130
$650
$110

Considering inflation
(1986 prices)
$450
$1,050
$110
7i

As dem onstrated by the figures above, Iran's oil revenues
(considered here on a per capita basis) declined significantly
between 1977-78 and 1986-87; the 1986-87 level is even lower
71 C law son , 3 7 2 -7 3 .
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than the level in 1972-73, before the boom in oil prices.
Considering inflation, the decline is even more shocking.

In 1986

prices, Iran's oil exports on a per capita basis were almost ten
times more in 1977-78 than they were in 1986-87.

These few

figures give a general overview of the decline in oil revenues that
Iran has suffered.
Declining oil revenues have resulted in a declining share of
the oil sector in Iran's GDP.

The average annual contribution of oil

to the the GDP over the 1979-87 period has dropped by 56
percent when com pared to the 1976-78 period.
N oticeable changes have also occurred
com position of GDP as exem plified by
decline in the share of the oil sector
im provem ents in those of agriculture,
se rv ic e s.72

in the sectoral
the significant
and consequent
industries, and

The improvements in the agricultural and industrial share of GDP
are more a reflection of the decline in oil than any significant
increase in actual production in these sectors.

Services, however,

have shown an increase that is more than proportional to the
decline in oil.73

The service sector, private and public, traditional

and modern, has grown to be the largest economic sector in the
Islamic Republic.

72 Amirahmadi,

“In 1984, it accounted for about 55 per cent of

138-39.

73 This shift to a more service- oriented econom y is unhealthy for Iran.
Service econom ies are generally less able to provide for needs than
industrial econ om ies, and are dependent on foreign imports.
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the constant Gross Domestic Product and about 45 per cent of the
labour force, compared with 31 per cent in 1977.”74
The decline in oil revenues combined with Iran's continuing
dependency on these revenues has been dam aging to Iran's
economy.

The continuing dependency on oil is problem atic, but

this dependency does not seem to fall into the same category of
structural dependency that the Shah's regime did.

Galtung's

structural m odel of dependency, which argues that dependency
creates both internal and external im perialism , was applicable
during the Shah's reign.

However, in post-revolutionary Iran,

while external im perialism can still be dem onstrated, despite
efforts to cut exploitative ties to the outside, internal im perialism
is not as apparent as it was in the 1970's.

The internal core

periphery relationship in post-revolutionary Iran shows less
evidence of core ties to the outside and of core exploitation of the
masses.

The masses were Khomeini's base of support and as such

were not in the same position as they were under the Shah.
Unlike the obvious economic gap between the elite and the masses
under the Shah’s regim e, the post-revolutionary leadership has
generally m aintained a lifestyle that does not dem onstrate the
same conspicuous consum ption and exploitation of the masses.
Despite this difference in the internal situation, Iran rem ains a
peripheral country that is dependent on oil exports and the
capitalist world market.

If Iran's leaders expect to change this

they will have to increase their own production capabilities in
74 R ahnem a and N om an i, 2 7 9 .

non-oil sectors so as to reduce imports, and expand their exports
beyond the single commodity of oil.

This diversification would

allow Iran to become more self-reliant and would reduce Iran's
openness to exploitation , since it would take more than
m anipulation of the oil market to damage Iran's economy.

The

improvem ent in oil revenues in 1987, and the end of the war in
1988 may open new possibilities for this to happen.

The

em ergence of pragm atism in various sectors may lead to
im proved policy form ation that may stim ulate econom ic growth
and allow for significant development (at least in terms of
delivering economically).

One stumbling block to growth and

developm ent that has been evident in the post-revolutionary
years, other than oil, has been the war with Iraq.

Iran's war

policy has changed as has its policies in other areas.
In fact, the pattern that has emerged in nearly every
aspect of Iranian policy - foreign and dom estic - has
been e x trem e rh e to ric in p u b lic p ro n o u n c e m e n ts
balanced by calculated flexibility and utter realism in
practice, at least in those areas regarded as critical to
survival. The war in particular has imposed a sense of
realism and practical lim itations.75

The Economics o f the Iran-Iraq

War

The Iran-Iraq war resulted in a variety of damage to Iran,
including vast human, infrastructural and econom ic loss.

The war

affected Iran, especially causing political and econom ic changes.

75 Gary Sick, "Iran's Quest for superpower Status, F oreig n
(spring 1987) 700-701.
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On 22 Septem ber 1980, Iraq attacked Iran, probably believing
that the new regim e would be unable to organize and withstand
the attack.

Iran surprised Iraq, and many others, however, by not

only surviving the initial attack, but pulling together and
retaliating.

In the first years of the war, m ilitary expenditures

were gradually increased.

In 1980, Iran spent $7.7 billion on

military expenditures, then $8.5 billion in 1981, and $9.6 billion in
1 9 8 2 .76

The war fluctuated over the years - early on, Iraq was

stronger, then in 1982, Iran dom inated, and after that there were
short term shifts, but generally it was a stalemate.

In 1984/85,

Iran made the arm s-for-hostages deal, hoping to gain the
advantage, but the U.S. aided Iraq after the news of the deal was
leaked.

By 1988, Iran could no longer continue the war and was

forced to accept the UN cease-fire.
The economic costs of the war to Iran have turned out to be
astronom ical.

Num erous different figures have been published

regarding the war, and war-related activities, but many are
within close range of one another.

From 1979/80 to 1983/84, the

IRI's m ilitary imports were stable at approxim ately $2 billion per
a n n u m .77

"By 1983-84, the war and war-related activities were

absorbing alm ost one-third of the budget."78

Official figures of

7(> Amirahmadi, 42.
77 According to Patrick Clawson (p374), this is significantly less than the
Shah’s arms imports o f $4.1 billion during the 1977-78 period, but the lesser
figure must be considered relative to the stockpile o f m ilitary imports that
had been established by the Shah.
78 Bakhash, The Reign o f the Ayatollahs, 245.
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war costs often were less than this, but these figures often left out
many of the war-related costs that were part of the budget.
According to R.K. Ramazani, the costs of the war have been
estim ated at $5 billion per year up to 1985; this represents onethird of all government expenditures at that time.

In addition,

Ramazani, estim ates that by 1985, there was a total of $150
billion in war dam ages.79

A quote from the Iranian m inister of

Planning and Budget suggests the extent of the war expenditures
up to 1986:
the w ar expenditures rose from 18 p ercen t o f the
general budget in 1359 (1980) ... to 32 percent in 1365
(1986) and 34 percent in this year's (1987) budget bill,
... These figures ... are only a portion of the actual war
ex penditures as other resources of execu tiv e bodies
[were] also deployed for requirem ents of the fronts, not
stated in any official figures or statistics.80
According to Amirahmadi, the war actually accounted for 41
percent of the general budget and 52 percent of the governm ent's
operating expenditures in 1987.81

Considering these figures, it is

difficult to believe that in the years before this, the war only
accounted for one-third of the budget and expenditures.
The total costs of the war, over the eight years that it was
fought, are difficult to estimate.

Damage was done to so many

sectors that it is uncertain if the entire costs can be counted.

79 R.K. Ramazani, “Iran Burying the Hatchet,”
1985) 61.
80 Amirahmadi,

164-65.

81 Amirahmadi,

165.

F oreig n

P o l i c y 60 (Fall

122

Estim ates have been made however, and some must be presented
if an analysis of the effect of the war on Iran's political economy is
to be made.

Between September 1980 and December 1986, the

costs of damage to Iran's infrastructure alone were estim ated to
be $369 billion; this figure does not include oil revenue lost, but
does include material damages to the oil sector.

An estim ate of

the total economic costs during the same time period, including oil
revenue and GNP losses, is $542 billion.82

However, official

Iranian governm ent figures "estimated that the economic cost of
the war's first five years was $309 billion."83

Comparing the

figure given by Kamran Mofid for the first six years of the war
and the official figure for the first five years, there is a large
discrepancy ($233 billion); this discrepancy is more than would be
suspected for the one year difference.

It is likely that there was

some underestim ation on the part of the Iranian governm ent,
which may not have included some losses to oil and the GNP.
Others have estim ated the war costs for the entire eight
years.

Amirahmadi has based his estim ates prim arily on Iranian

official figures, and has discussed where these figures are both
under and overestim ated, and has tried to balance them out.
Am irahm adi's estim ate for the damage inflicted on Iran's
economy by the war, from beginning to end amounts to $592
billion.

This includes $210 billion of damage which was inflicted

on m achinery, buildings, equipm ent, m aterials, and sim ilar
82 Kamran M ofid, “After the G ulf War,” World. Today 45 (March 1989) 49.
83 Clawson, 373.

Compare this to Iran’s GNP for 1985 o f $176.6 billion.
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national

w ealth. In this total estim ate, both direct and indirect

costs are counted.

Considering the direct costs to be 35.5 percent

of the total, Amirahmadi has concluded that this am ount is greater
than 19 years of oil revenue, at the 1987 earning level.84
reconstruction costs that Iran is facing are astronom ical.

The
However,

economic changes are not the only challenges that Iran had to face
as a result of the war - there were also political changes.
One of the most dramatic changes in Iran, due to the war,
was the arm s-for-hostages deal with the U.S.

Iran desperately

needed weapons and parts for its US-built weapons systems.

The

pragm atists within the Iranian regim e, with Khom eini's support,
negotiated a deal with the United States, in which Iran received
intelligence briefings on both Iraq and the USSR, in addition to
1,500 TOW missiles and components for its U .S.-built Hawk air
defense

system .85

Some of the radicals leaked the news of the

deal with the US, partially hoping that they could later use this to
unseat the pragm atists.

However, with K hom eini’s intervention

the pragm atists were able to maintain their power.

Khom eini's

version of the arms deal stated that those hostile to Iran
h ave ap p aren tly com e back today and p rese n te d
them selves m eekly and hum bly at the door of the
nation wishing to establish relations ...
Right now, all
big countries are com peting to establish relations with
I r a n .86
84 Amirahmadi, 64.
85 Sick, 703.
86 Sick, 704.
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The arms deal did not cause dramatic changes in the Iranian
leadership, but it had the potential to have done so if Khomeini
had not stepped in.
Another cost of the fighting was a war-sick population that
lost hundreds of thousands of its people and was growing weary.
In April 1985, anti-governm ent dem onstrations broke out in a
section of Tehran and quickly spread to other areas.
first

This was the

popular m anifestation of unrest in many years - it

dem onstrated a sim m ering resentm ent among the masses.
Ordinary people were dem onstrating against the governm ent and
the war.

The governm ent contained the dem onstrations quickly,

but the signs of war fatigue and resentm ent rem ained.87 The
factionalism within the regim e was apparent at this time and the
radicals had already lost a substantial amount of power to the
pragm atists.

The radicals were unfortunate to have dom inated

the political scene when the war was going poorly and their
policies left no room for negotiation.
In the Summer of 1988, Iran accepted the U.N. Security
Council cease-fire.

There were a number of reasons for accepting

at this time:
1)

the Iranian population was war-sick,

2)

the costs of the war (possibly as much as$592 billion)
had severely damaged Iran's econom y, and

3)

Iran was extremely isolated in the international arena.88

87 Bakhash, The Reign o f the A yatollahs, 240-41.
88 Iran’s international isolation is best demonstrated by the USS V i n c e n n e s
incident.
An Iranian civilian aircraft carrying more than 2 0 0 people was
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The cease-fire stipulations did not favor Iran, but the leadership
accepted despite this.

Khomeini stated that agreeing to the cease

fire was like drinking a cup of poison, but that it was necessary.
H indsight suggests that Iran should have accepted the Arab peace
plan of 1982, but at the time the leaders believed that the war
against Iraq could be won.

The cease-fire of 1988 brought the

end of eight years of fighting and the possibility of rebuilding the
Islam ic Republic.
During Khomeini's more than ten years as the leader of Iran,
the country underwent several major changes.

The constitutional

structure of the state was changed from a monarchy to a republic.
The ruling elites were no longer the monarch and his loyalists, but
rather, the clergy.

There was a significant transfer of ownership

of property and wealth from the private to the public sector.

And,

the state extended its role into virtually every sphere of public
and even private life.89

In addition, the country withstood a war

with Iraq and declining oil revenues.

Despite social and economic

problem s and the political opposition and factionalism , the IRI
lasted more than a decade under Khomeini’s leadership, and
rem ains relatively stable two years after his death.

shot down by the US ship, the USS V in c e n n e s - the United Nations refused
to the condemn the US for its actions.
89 Shaul Bakhash, “After the G ulf War,” W orld

Today 45 (March 1989) 46.
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A d ditional

Econom ic

C hallenges

The war with Iraq, the declining oil revenues, the attempts
at land reform and other socio-economic reform s, and the political
factionalism all presented challenges to the IRI.

In addition to

these there are other econom ic problems that Iran's post
revolutionary leadership has had to face.

According to Ramazani,

the economic ills which Iran has had to face include pervasive
black-m arketeering and corruption, the exodus of half of all
Iranian physicians (leaving 15,000 doctors for more than 40
million people), an unofficial inflation rate of 35 percent, and
dw indling foreign reserves.90

These are not the extent of

problem s the leadership has faced.
Inflation began before the revolution and continued into the
post-revolutionary period.

Inflation has been m ost devastating to

the poorer section of the country - many families spend as much
as 40-45 percent of their income on food alone.91

In 1987, there

was a sudden jump in prices, especially in food, health, household
item s and education, necessities that the poor are finding
im possible to afford.

The government has tried to control

inflation through increasing taxes, rationing goods, cutting
expenditures, placing im ports under governm ent control, and
subsidizing prices, but none of these have been successful.92
Inflation has caused prices to soar, while salaries have remained
90 Ramazani, 61.
91

Amirahmadi,

173.

92 Amirahmadi,

182.
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low.

The buying power of the middle-class has been decreased so

much, some analysts claim that Iran has become a two-class
country of rich and poor.
In addition to inflation, Iran has also suffered from a shift in
the sectoral composition of its GDP.

The expansion of the services

sector has only partially compensated for the relative decline in
oil.

In the 1979-87 period, the service sector showed an annual

growth rate of 0.2 percent.

The service share of GDP increased

from 45 percent before the revolution to 54 percent in the post
revolutionary

years.93

This trend is considered harmful because

it diverts scarce resources away from the more productive sectors
of the economy.

In addition, services pay lower wages than do

more productive sectors, so the workers suffer.
W hile the service sector increased its actual output, the
industrial sector showed an increase in its share of the GDP, also.
The slight jum p in the industrial sector of the GDP
reflects the decline in the share of the oil sector rather
than a real increase in industrial value added, which has
rem ain ed sluggish th ro u g h o u t the p o stre v o lu tio n ary
years, with the exception of the 1982-83 period.94
The 1979-87 period saw an average growth rate of only 0.06
percent per year, experiencing a significant contraction from
1984-87, as a result of the continuing decline in rates of capacity
utilization and capital form ation.

93

Amirahmadi,

139.

94 Amirahmadi,

144.

In fact, the industrial sector
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suffered not only from these problems, but also from Iran's
industrial dependence "on the world capitalist econom y for over
57 percent of their raw materials and 63 percent of their spare
p a rts ." 95

The slow growth of the industrial sector has done very

little to aid the GNP, and has done even less for the employment
problem s Iran is facing.
The labor force of Iran has increased rapidly, while the
em ploym ent opportunities have

decreased.

U nem ploym ent Rate in Iran
1976
10%
1984
18.7%
14.1% 95
1986

The above figures are official government figures.

As can be seen,

the year 1986 is shown to have a decreased unemploym ent
figures, compared to 1984.

However, unofficial statistics place the

1986 unemploym ent rate at 28.6 percent, and indicate that there
is also a sizable underem ployed population.97

The population of

Iran has grown at such a rapid pace and planning has been so
lacking, that em ploym ent opportunities have quickly fallen
behind.

In 1986, 11.1 million people, or 23.3 percent of the 49.8

million persons in Iran, were employed.

This means that 2 out of

9 people were employed and were supporting the rest of the

95

Amirahmadi,

144.

96 Amirahmadi,

187.

97 Amirahmadi,

188.
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p o p u la tio n .98

These staggering figures must be changed if Iran is

going to recover economically.
Besides the problems of lacking a strong industrial base,
diverting resources to nonproductive sectors, especially services,
inflation and a high unemployment rate, Iran also faces obstacles
such as a lack of skilled labor, a suffering educational system,
inadequate healthcare and housing, and an uneven distribution of
wealth.

As of Spring 1986, governm ent released data reported

that 20 percent of the population received half (50 percent) of the
country's national income, while the remaining 80 percent is left
to divide the residual 50 percent of income.99

Ironically, many of

those who expected the most change from the revolution are the
same ones who have become poorer since the revolution,
including the urban poor, farm laborers, construction and industry
workers, and governm ent employees.

Mohsen M ilani argues that

Iran is a stronger state since the revolution, particularly because
of the support from the lower classes and the lower-m iddle
c la s s e s .100

This may be a valid argument, but it might not be the

case in the future if Iran's leaders fail to forge a path of economic
g ro w th .
Despite all the economic problems, the political opposition
and factionalism , the war, and the state intervention into citizens’

98 Rahnema and Nomani, 273.
99 Shahrough Akhavi, “E lite Factionalism in the IRI,” M iddle
41 (Spring 1987) 198.
100 M ilani, 307.
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private lives, Khomeini and the IRI survived much longer than
many experts believed possible.

A primary reason for this

survival was Khomeini's charismatic leadership.

He was

supported by the masses, and was the final arbiter in the regime.
He designed the theory of Velayat-e fa q ih , or "leadership of the
jurisprudent," around which the 1979 constitution revolves.

In

addition, Khomeini spoke of international relations in terms of the
oppressors and the oppressed.

He demanded independence for

Iran, and changes at the international level that threatened the
superpowers, especially the United States. The IRI has been based
on an active state role in the economic sphere, including
nationalization of many industries and greatly increased
regulation of the private sector.101

Khomeini's economic leanings

seemed to be toward redistribution and social justice, although he
avoided taking a controversial stand in regards to this and other
problem atic issues.

Many believed that his death would bring

serious turmoil to the IRI, and possibly even mean the end to rule
by the clergy.

Khomeini's death on 3 June 1989, however, was

followed by a relatively smooth and rapid transition of power.
Since then, the leadership of the IRI has remained quite stable
and has focused its energies on economic reconstruction.

101 A s suggested previously, the degree o f state control and regulation has
been a subject o f intense debate in the IRI.
An acceptable balance between
the private and public sectors, between free enterprise and state
ow nership/m anagem ent has not yet been found.

13 1

POST-KHOMEINI IRAN AND BEYOND

The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died on June 3, 1989,

a little

over a decade since he had trium phantly returned to Iran from exile.
For years it had been predicted that his death would bring an
upheaval in Iran that could possibly mean the crumbling of the
Islamic Republic.

In fact, Khomeini's death seemed even more

damaging at the time because just three months earlier he had
uncerem oniously rem oved his chosen successor, A yatollah Hussain
Ali Montazeri.

Contrary to the predictions however, a new successor

was chosen quickly and the transition was quite smooth.
This chapter begins with a review of previous chapters and
then: 1) examines the political economy and the developm ent of Iran
in the two years since Khomeini's death, and; 2) speculates on future
prospects.

This thesis has analyzed how the environm ent (domestic

and external) and decisions have interacted to shape the political
economy of Iran, which in turn has affected the degree of
development of this country.

For example, chapter two viewed Iran

during the 1960s and 1970s, which were partially characterized by a
huge increase in oil revenues, then a decline and and by the Shah's
m odernization program.

This chapter analyzed the political and

economic factors that led to the 1979 revolution.

In chapter three

Iran was examined in view of an environm ent shaped by the
revolution, the war with Iraq, and declining oil revenues; this
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environm ent affected the decisions made by the regim e, which was
characterized by factionalism , but which Khomeini dom inated.
Developm ent in the sense of delivering econom ically and politically
was not

realized to a large degree in either of these two periods.

This chapter looks at Iran since Khomeini's death.

The current

environm ent is different in that the war with Iraq is over and oil
revenues have increased somewhat.

The pragm atic or m oderate

faction, led by President Rafsanjani, has generally prevailed in the
past two years, and policies have focused on postwar reconstruction.
Practical economic decisions are taking priority over ideological
fervor and the changes in the political economy that are taking shape
at the present time may allow for further developm ent in Iran.
The past two chapters have offered that Iran's political
economy has been characterized largely by dependency.
dependency,

This

particularly on its single commodity export of oil and

on a variety of imports for survival, has allowed outside powers to
exploit Iran (especially the U.S. in the 1970's) and has been
detrim ental to the country's development.

Despite the efforts and

promises of the revolutionaries, the Islamic Republic was unable to
break the ties and become self-reliant.
different forms and degrees.

Dependency occurs in

Due to the increasing international

interaction practically all countries are dependent on the
international capitalist market for sale of their own products and for
purchasing needed goods.

However, while m ost developed countries,

such as the United States,W estern Europe and Japan, have enough
power within the international system to make it practically
im possible to exploit their dependency on the international market,
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many developing countries are not strong enough to protect
them selves from exploitation.

Their dependency, especially in the

case of prim arily single-com m odity export countries, makes it easy
for developed countries to hurt them econom ically; and due to the
overlap of the two sectors, being capable of hurting a country
econom ically, means having the capabilty to hurt a country
politically.

Exploitation by developed countries has often been for

the purpose of finding raw m aterials or broadening markets.

During

the Cold War, developing countries were also used as pawns between
the US and the USSR.

Finally, developing countries are sometimes

damaged econom ically at the international level when they demand
changes at the international level, such as global redistribution or
increased power for the Third W orld.

Dependency may be

characterized as a phenomena to which all countries are subject, but
developing countries are more easily damaged by their dependency
than are developed states.
However, the nature of dependency can be changed, and
therefore its detrimental effects can be reduced.

In Iran's case, the

foreign loans and aid that it is seeking, if used wisely, can help
reconstruct the country and build a solid econom ic foundation that
will allow Iran to become more independent.

In turn, the regime, if

it so chooses , can provide for the development needs of the
population.

Only careful planning and proper strategies on the part

of the government can move the country toward a more developed
status; even with these, there are an undiscernible num ber of
variables that can intervene and set back even the m ost carefully
laid developm ent plans.
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The

Khomeini

Legacy

Since 1986 there has been a general m ovem ent towards
pragm atism in Iranian policy.

The moderates led by Rafsanjani

gained more power, deem phasizing ideology and arguing that the
very survival of the revolution depended on repairing the country.
In 1988 the cease-fire with Iraq was accepted and the governm ent
worked to lessen its international isolation.

Khomeini called for a

lim ited m arket economy and controlled free international trade.

He

also stated that Iran should seek relations with all other nations,
excepting the United States, Israel and South Africa.

However, later

in that same year Salman Rushdie’s book, Satanic Verses, caught the
attention of M uslims throughout the M iddle East, including Khomeini,
who called for the author's assassination for his blasphemy.

This

incident imm ediately led to a reversal of the trend toward
com prom ise and

m oderation.1

Iran's relations with Britain and most

of the W estern world were severed as a result of Khomeini's death
sentence for Rushdie, and some econom ic sanctions were adopted.
Khomeini's death less than a year later did not lead to a revocation of
the death sentence, but since then relations between Iran and the
W est have im proved.
According to journalist Robin W right, Khomeini failed at critical
junctures and left a legacy of problems for his country.

Despite his

absolute authority as the f a q i h , Khom eini's "vacillation and delicate
balancing of Iran's political factions often resulted in policy paralysis
1 Miron Rezun, "The Internal Struggle,the Rushdie A ffair, and the Prospects
for the Future," Iran at the Crossroads: G loba l Relations in a Turbulent D ecade,
Miron Rezun, ed. (Boulder: W estview Press, 1990) 213.
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on key issues rather than reform ."2

In addition, Khomeini's self-

righteousness and inflexibility cost Iran the loss of international
acceptability, which was desperately needed in the latter years of
the war with Iraq.

Khomeini's personal and political grudge against

Saddam Hussein prevented any m ediation of the unw innable war
between Iran and Iraq, and cost tens of thousands of lives.
Economically, he failed his own constituency, the m os ta z a fin

(the

disinherited), who were even more impoverished at the time of his
death than they had been under the Shah.

Finally, he left the Islamic

Republic very vulnerable by leaving the position of his successor as
f a q i h com pletely open.3

Despite the problems that existed at the

time of his death and the difficult legacy he left behind, the Islamic
Republic has survived more than two years since Khom eini's death
and has surprised many with its stability.
The Islamic Republic has undergone a number of changes since
Khomeini's death.

The political environm ent is still characterized by

factionalism , but the pragm atists have greatly strengthened their
position in the past two years.

Their focus on repairing the damage

that Iran has sustained and building the economy has appealed to
the m asses.

The economy has somewhat improved and long-term

planning is now being considered rather than simply responding to
immediate economic problems as was the case in the past.

An

im portant strategy in developing the economy is im proving trade

2 Robin Wright, In the Name o f God: The Khomeini Decade
and Schuster, 1989) 207.
3 Wright, 207-8.

(N ew York: Simon
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relations with the developed world and lessening Iran's isolation.
The decisions of the current adm inistration and the environm ent
within which those decisions have been made is the primary subject
of this chapter.

The

P olitical

Environm ent

C ontrary to the expected conflict, there was an unexpectedly
quick choice of successor to Khomeini.

Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei

was chosen to be the next f a q i h or supreme leader of Iran, despite
his lack of certain qualifications.

Khamenei has proven to be a less

controversial figure than Khomeini was, and he has continually
supported the moderates in their policies.

The m oderates have also

gained strength through recent elections and constitutional
a m e n d m e n ts .
On 28 July 1989, Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
was elected to the office of president and a number of constitutional
amendments were approved.

The 1979 constitution had been a

reaction to royal autocracy and despotism, and thus focused on
distribution of authority and divided powers.

The 1989 constitution

represented a reaction to the problems created by this division and
distribution. It provided for greater centralization and concentration
of authority.

The 1979 constitution had allowed suprem e leadership

to be exercised by a council of three to five jurists.

The 1989

am endm ents revised this and stated that supreme leadership could
be exercised only by a single individual.

The amendments also

downgraded the qualification for the f a q i h .

These amendments

allowed a cleric of less eminent scholarly standing to hold the office
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of supreme jurisprudent and thus alm ost im plied a separation
between spiritual and political leadership of the community. 4
For a decade Iran's clerical leaders had insisted that the
legitim acy o f the state derived from d ivine m andate
granted not only to the com m unity of Islam ic jurists but
specifically to the supreme jurist of the age, in light of his
superior learning, grace, and sanctity.
Thus, the postKhomaini period seems likely to be characterized not only
by leadership by clerics of dim inished scholarly authority,
but also by a dim inution of the basis of legitim acy on
which the Islamic Republic was founded.5
The supreme leader's powers were further defined to set general
policies and decide issues which cannot be resolved in ordinary
ways; this was meant to end the debate over issues such as trade,
investm ent, social justice and general econom ic policy.6 T h e
downgraded qualifications for the f a q i h and the strengthening of the
m oderate faction has m eant a greater degree of commitment to
practical considerations in policy-making.

In addition to these

changes, the constitutional amendments also strengthened the office
of the president, centralizing his authority and elim inating the office
of prime minister, which has aided President Rafsanjani in building
his power.
The political environm ent since Khom eini's death has rem ained
characterized by factionalism between two cam ps, the radicals and
the pragm atists, the latter of which has proven the stronger of the
4 Shaul Bakhash, The Reign o f the Ayatollahs: Iran an d the Islamic Revolution
(N ew York: Basic Books, Inc., Pubs, 1990) 284.
5 Bakhash, 294.
6 Bakhash, 285-94.
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two.

President Rafsanjani, who is the leader of the moderate faction,

was a loyal student and supported of Khomeini for years.

He began

strengthening his political position several years before Khom eini's
death.

He was the Speaker of the Majlis for several years and was

partially responsible for procuring weapons during the arm s-forhostages deal.

He has acted as the leader of the pragmatic faction

since it first gained power in the mid-1980s, and has since become
one of the most powerful men in Iran.

In order to repair the

damaged economy, Rafsanjani has sought to im prove relations with
the developed states, especially W estern Europe and Japan, and has
even broached the subject of renewing relations with the United
States.

His primary focus thus far in his presidency has been

reconstruction and econom ic growth.
Since Khomeini's death, the moderates have tried to finalize a
peace settlem ent with Iraq and to begin postw ar reconstruction.

The

total damage inflicted on Iran by the war from beginning to end in
economic terms has been approximated to be $592 billion.7
According to various Iranian officials the direct costs of
reconstruction are now being estimated at more than $600 billion,
and President Rafsanjani has declared that additional expenses bring
the total cost to one trillion dollars.8

There is a possibility that these

figures have been somewhat inflated in order to get more money for
reconstruction, but there is no doubt that the reconstruction will be

7 H ooshang Amirahm adi, Revolution an d E con om ic Transition: The Iranian
E x p e r i e n c e (New York: State University o f New York Press, 1990) 64.
8 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 45, 11 Jan 1991, 2.
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incredibly expensive, especially since the governm ent hopes to see a
great deal of econom ic growth through reconstruction.9
President Rafsanjani has been able to push many of his policies
through and to strengthen his faction in the past two years.

The

October 1990 elections for the Assembly of Experts were notable
because the m oderates controlled the selection process.

As a result

they were able to axe most of the radical candidates from the
b a llo t.10

The Assembly has the power to replace the person holding

the position of f a q i h , which is currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Khamenei

has supported Rafsanjani and the policies of the

moderates for the past two years and consequently, he could be in
danger if radicals were to control the Assembly.

The Majlis is also

dom inated by m oderates, although the radicals do hold some seats.
The moderates seem to be unified by the need to get the Iranian
economy into gear and the fear that the revolution will be destroyed
if the regime "cannot stop the ever-rising inflation and create jo b s."11
The regime is doing what it believes will boost the economy, but the
economic environm ent in Iran at this time is problem atic, and there
are no easy solutions.
The

Econom ic

E nvironm ent

As discussed in chapter three the Iranian economy was in poor
shape at the time of Khomeini's death.
9 The moderates favor oil-led
industrialization for econom ic growth, w hich the
radicals oppose
since they view this as remaining tied to the West for oil sales
and they b eliev e this w ill inhibit any m oves toward self-relian cy.
10 International

Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 37, 16 Nov 1990, 2.

11 International

Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 39, 30 Nov 1990,1.
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Iran's per capita incom e fell from 114,000 rials in 1978 to
55,500 in 1988, or from $US 1,425 to $US 688, according to
official sources using 1974 fixed prices. The reason for this
decline lies partially with its 3.4 percent population growth
rate, one of the highest in the w orld.12
This decline is also due to the war and the decline in oil revenues,
and to the lack of policies aimed at economic growth adopted by the
Khomeini regime.

The acute economic problems that Iran is facing

also include an inflation rate as high as 60 percent and a 25 percent
unem ploym ent r a te ,13 meaning out of the 12 million person labor
force in Iran, 4 million are unem ployed.14

In addition, not only is

unem ploym ent high, but the sectoral com position of em ploym ent is
poor.

During the past decade it has moved in favor of the service

industry, which is characterized by less productive activities and
low-paying jobs.

The effect is depressed production and per capita

income, which continues to produce more problems in the economy.
So long as the stru ctu re of the econom y rem ain s
unchanged, the postw ar reconstruction rem ains dorm ant,
population control policies are lacking, the developm ent
budget rem ains low, and inflation is unacceptably high,
little can be done to rem edy unem ploym ent and the
structural im balance in em ploym ent.15
The economic problems Iran is facing have been somewhat offset by
increased oil revenues due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and they
12 D ilip Hiro, "Iran in the 1990's," Middle East Insight

7 (1990) 44-46, 45.

13 Hiro, 44.
14 Masoud K avoossi, "Labor Relations in Iran: The Islam ic Challenge," M i d d l e
E ast Insight 7(1990) 71-75, 72.
^

A m irahm adi,

1 9 2-93 .
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may be further reduced if Iran is able to obtain the loans it is
currently

seeking.

The August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq brought political
and economic gains to Iran.

W ithin two weeks of the invasion Iraq

conceded practically all of Iran's territorial and political demands.

In

addition, the first few months after the invasion saw increased oil
revenues for Iran, which helped pull the governm ent out of the
budget deficit.

Oil revenues for 1990 amounted to more than $15

billion and the same level was targeted for 1991.16

The pragm atists,

especially President Rafsanjani and Foreign M inister Velayati
m aneuvered Iran's position during the build-up and the war,
choosing their actions in terms of what would best benefit their
reconstruction efforts.

Iran rem ained neutral despite the radicals'

calls to join Iraq in its fight against the West.

The pragmatists were

also alarmed at the huge W estern military presence but they chose
to stay out of the fighting for several reasons:
1) The eight year war with Iraq had left thousands dead
2) Iran hoped to replace Iraq as the dom inant power in the
Gulf region.
3) Reconstruction depends on aid from the West, which would
certainly not have been forthcoming if Iran had joined Iraq.
As a result of its neutral position, Iran has seen a number of
b e n e fits.

C hristian Science Monitor, 16 May 1991, 8 col. 2. This is a significant
increase over the oil revenues o f the m id-1980's when Iran hit a low point o f
$5.8 billion in 1986.
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The diplom atic relations that had been broken with many
nations due to the Rushdie affair were reestablished during the Gulf
war.

The European Community lifted all its economic sanctions

against Iran and the United States lifted its ban on US-based
companies buying Iranian oil.

In addition, Britain and Iran resumed

ties despite the lack of a resolution to the Rushdie incident.

Finally,

there is renewed interest by the West to aid and invest in Iran.

The

French agreed to help rebuild Kharg Island (Iran's main oil shipping
terminal which was badly damaged in the war with Iraq), and France
has signed a contract allowing Iran to assemble Peugeot automobiles
in T eh ran.17

The pragm atists are hoping that this renewed interest

by the W est continues to grow and that reconstruction funds will
quickly follow.
The current Five Year Plan expects resumption of work on oil
refineries, petrochem icals, steel production, construction m aterials,
m otor vehicles and consum er goods plants.

"Sharp differences,

however, emerged within the leadership on what roles the domestic
private sector and foreign capital and expertise were allowed in this
e n d e a v o r." 18

The radical faction argues that no foreign capital or

expertise is needed since they would increase Iran's dependency and
would impede the country's movement toward self-sufficiency.

This

faction also maintains that the private sector's role need not be
increased.

The pragm atic faction believes, however, that domestic

resources are not enough for reconstruction and that foreign
17 New York Times, 10 Dec 1990, sec. A, 8.
18 Bakhash, 278.
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assistance is needed.

In addition, this faction argues that

encouragem ent of the

dom estic private sector is necessary for Iran's

economic growth.

"Their goal is to transform this highly centralized,

heavily subsidized and stagnant system into a vibrant, decentralized,
free-m arket econom y."19
a lim ited m arket and

Prior to his death, Khomeini had called for

controlled free international trade, and he had

allowed Rafsanjani to pursue econom ic

relations with various

countries, including the Soviet Union.
Since his death, the moderate faction has been able to push a
num ber of their policies through the Majlis.

Various changes have

been made in the Plan since October 1990.
To allow an influx of foreign capital, the Rafsanjani
adm inistration decided last October (1990) to allow Iranian
firm s to sign ag reem en ts d irec tly w ith n o n -Iran ian
com panies. This applies to both private and public sectors,
and has opened up imm ense possibilities for Iranian joint
ventures with W estern firm s.20
Then in November 1990, the government, in an effort to promote
non-oil exports, announced that it would free private firms to import
various raw m aterials and spare parts with foreign exchange they
earn from their own exports, rather than relying on the government
for foreign exchange.

In addition, in May 1991, the government

announced that it plans to sell an estimated $80 million worth of
shares in state owned industries by the end of the current Iranian
year (March 1992).

The sales to the private sector are aimed at

19 N ew York Times, 9 April 1991, sec.A , 10.
20 Hiro, 45.
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encouraging greater industrial investm ent and productivity.

This is a

serious reversal from the early years of the Islamic Republic when
nationalization of industries was the goal of the regime.

Finally,

some regulations are being changed in order to allow more foreign
investm ent in Iranian industry.

The current Five Year Plan calls for

as much as $3 billion of foreign investment in heavy industries and
allows foreign investors to own up to 49 percent of the shares in an
Iranian

industry.21

These reforms are aimed at boosting the

economy and helping Iran rebuild itself.
In addition to these reform s the governm ent has also moved to
borrow money from abroad for reconstruction.

In Novem ber 1990,

the M ajlis authorized the Islamic Republic to borrow $17.5 billion
from abroad over the next five years for reconstruction and
developm ent programs.

The surge in oil revenues due to the August

1990 invasion of Kuwait helped bring last year's oilrevenues
percent from the

previous year.

up 30

Oil exports for 1990-91 amounted

to$16.5 billion and this income has helped Iran out of its $2 billion
d e fic it.22

However, it will take more than increased oil revenues to

fully finance Iran's reconstruction.

Borrowing from foreigners is

very controversial, largely due to the historical experiences and
ideological divisions.

The radicals object to loans from outside, but

Rafsanjani and the rest of the pragmatists are looking for a jum p
start to the failing economy.

Some argue that the problem is not the

borrowing from abroad, but the management of the funds once they
2 1 International Iran

Times, Vol. XXI, no. 11, 31 May 1991, 1.

22 International Iran

Times, Vol. XXI, no. 11, 31 May 1991, 1.
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make it into Iran.

The Iranian government has been criticized for

excessive waste and some believe that a sound adm inistrative
system is needed to correctly utilize the money and channel it in the
proper direction.
Thus far, the adm inistration has borrowed only a partial
amount of that approved by the Majlis.

The W orld Bank approved

$250 million loan for Iran for repairing

the damage done to the Gilan

and Zanjan provinces by the June 1990 earthquake.23

a

In addition,

according to central bank Governor Mohammad Hossain Adeli, Iran
has borrowed more than $12 billion in foreign loans to finance the
five-year developm ent plan which began March 1991.

Adeli stated

that Iran is seeking the $17.5 billion in foreign loans authorized by
the M ajlis and another $10 billion in trade credits.

Despite Adeli's

assurances that Iran has nailed down 70 percent of the loans, news
reports suggest that foreign bankers are not attracted to Iran, and
that the loans may be slow in coming.

The money Iran has received

so far has been borrowed from banks in France, Germany, Italy,
Sw itzerland, Austria, Sweden, Canada, Japan and Luxem bourg.24
Borrowing could very well mean
particularly in the short run.

However,

increased dependency,
if the funds are used

appropriately, which includes sound adm inistration and elim ination
of the excessive waste of which the regime has been accused, Iran
may be able to change the nature of its dependency and lessen it.
Iran's Gross National Product (GNP) increased by 4 percent in 1989
23 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 37, 16 Nov 1990, 1.
24 International Iran Times, Vol. XXI, no. 11, 31 May 1991, 1.
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and by another 8 percent in 1990.25

This is a positive sign.

If Iran

diversifies its economic foundation and moves to m anufacture those
goods which it now imports whenever feasible, Iran would increase
its self-sufficiency (and become more self-reliant).

It appears that

the Rafsanjani adm inistration is working to realize econom ic growth
and that developm ent projects are on the agenda.
The adm inistration proposed an 18.79 trillion rial budget for
this fiscal year (March 1991- March 1992).

This is a 43 percent

increase over the previous year, which at the official exchange rate
of 70 rials to the US dollar means a $268 billion budget for this
y e a r.26

In proposing this budget increase, the Rafsanjani

adm inistration argued that the "market oriented" policies have
turned the economy around and that the budget reflects the
economic progress of the past year.

The budget is based on projected

increases in oil revenues and plans to sell many of the state owned
enterprises.

The proposed increase has been delegated to a number

of areas, including current expenditures, such as wages and
equipm ent of the bureaucracy, health and education, developm ent
projects, reconstruction, and defense and security.27

W hile progress

has been made over the past year, and the proposed increase is
probably necessary for further developm ent, there are still
num erous economic problems that this country is facing.
26 New York Times, 9 April 1991, sec. A, 10.
26 At an unofficial exchange rate o f 1000 rials to the US dollar, which is oess
than the black market rate, the budget would be only $18.8 billion.
International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 42, 21 Dec 1990, 2.
27 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 42, 21 Dec 1990, 2.
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There are various indicators of productivity and the state of
the economy.

The output of factories is one im portant indicator.

The

factories operated by the Heavy Industries M inistry m easured at
only 30 percent of capacity for 1989/90, and were as low as 26
percent the previous year.

Finance M inister Mohsen Nurbakhsh told

officials that the first three months of fiscal year 1990-91 showed
marked increases by a number of factories, but gave no figure for
the overall economy.

However, even with 100 percent increases the

overall capacity would only be brought up to 60 percent, which is
still considered a low figure.

Some factories have shown exceptional

increases, such as those producing autom obile tires, refrigerators and
freezers, and glass, but continued increases are needed.28
Apart from production figures there are also indicators of
overall economic standing of the population.

The Iran Statistics

Center reported that the average urban fam ily spent approxim ately
49 percent of its income on housing and 35 percent on food, leaving
only 16 percent for clothing, transport, entertainm ent, health,
savings and all other expenses.29

The adm inistration has reported

that there has been progress over the past year, as indicated by the
rise in GNP, but this growth must continue if Iran is going to realize
its reconstruction and development goals.

One variable that impacts

Iran's economic growth is its relations with other countries,
particularly trade relations.

28 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 26, 31 Aug 1990, 2.
29 International Iran Times, Vol. XX, no. 26, 31 Aug 1990, 2.

148

Due to the high degree of economic interaction between the
domestic and international level, trade relations are im portant for
practically all states, especially if they intend to experience economic
growth.

In order for Iran to recover econom ically the adm inistration

must pursue increased trade relations and foreign aid/loans.

The

pragmatic faction is currently fighting the isolationist tendency of the
past decade and attem pting to broaden its economic relations in
order to put the country on the road to reconstruction.

F oreign

R elation s

Iran's foreign relations since the revolution have been shaped
by a contest between ideology and pragm atism .

Ideology has meant

international isolation and a continuance of the war with Iraq,
whereas pragm atism has meant a concerted effort on the part of the
governm ent in latter years to improve relations with the outside
world, to end the war and to begin postwar reconstruction.

As

indicated previously, the pragmatic faction has been dom inant in the
past few years, but the radicals still hold some important positions
and cannot be discounted.

Improved foreign relations are seen by

the pragm atists as a necessity for reconstruction.

Iran does not have

the necessary capital to begin vast reconstruction and improved
trade relations and foreign loans are seen by the pragm atists as the
only way to find this capital.

Supreme jurisprudent Khamenei has

stated that Iran "should use foreign resources ... we cannot prolong
the issue of reconstruction for 100 years."30

As a result of the

30 R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations," M id dle
J o u r n a l 43 (Spring 19489) 213.
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governm ent's efforts, relations with many states have been
im p ro v e d .
Since the early years of the republic, Iran has sought to expand
its relations with developing nations.

In particular, relations with

Turkey and Pakistan have been expanded.

In 1985 these three

countries formed the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO); the
ECO was formed to encourage trade, technology transfer, and other
econom ic exchanges among the three countries.31

In addition, Iran

and Turkey have plans to build a pipeline through Turkey to Europe
for Iranian natural gas.
Im proved relations with the advanced countries are also being
actively pursued, with the notable exception of the United States.

In

November 1989, Iran made a deal with Germany and France in
which the National Iranian Oil Company agreed to sell 300,000
barrels of oil per day for 18 months to a consortium of W est German
and French companies and banks in exchange for $800 m illion in
cash to be provided immediately.

At $15 a barrel the deal was

worth approxim ately $2.6 billion.32

In addition, Germany and Iran

have signed a dozen development project plans recently, which are
expected to inject more than a billion dollars of capital into the
Iranian economy.

Germany and Iran have announced differing

versions of these plans, but it appears that improving port facilities
and building transport facilities are two of the major projects.

31 R.K. Ramazani, "Iran: Burying the Hatchet," F oreign
6 5 -6 6 .
32 Hiro, 46.
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has also improved relations with Japan, which has form ally
announced that it will resum e economic aid to Iran for the first time
since the revolution.33

Iran is now actively pursuing better relations

with advanced states in hopes of realizing more econom ic growth.
No m atter how virulent much of their rhetoric still is, the
Iranian leaders finally have come to believe that the very
survival of the revolution is at stake and that m ounting
dom estic problem s can be eased only by breaking down
the walls of Iran's international isolation.34
Years of international isolation did not see a break in the
dependency of Iran, nor increased self-sufficiency.

The large

modern industries in Iran rem ained dependent on the world market
for 65 percent of their input and the regime experienced foreign
exchange shortages because of its isolation.35 People lived under an
often repressive regime much as before the revolution and for many
their econom ic situation worsened.
The leaders of the Islam ic Republic were, of course, still
claim ing that they were defending the oppressed people of
Iran, but at the sam e time, the m easures these people
d e m an d ed for the a m e lio ra tio n o f th e ir eco n o m ic
co n d itio n s w ere fo rg o tte n .
As far as the ex istin g
d istrib u tio n of econom ic resources was concerned, one
co uld find few d ifferen c e s betw een pre- and p o s t
revolutionary Iran .36

33 International Iran Times, Vol. XXI, no. 12, 7 Jun 1991, 1.
34 Ramazani, "Iran: Burying the Hatchet," 69.
35 Amirahmadi, 87.
36 M ansoor M oadel, "Class Struggle in Post-Revolutionary
Journal o f Middle E ast Studies 23 (1991) 328.
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Not only were economic conditions quite sim ilar to the pre
revolutionary period, but often political circum stances for the
population were also similar.

As before, mass m obilization was

relied upon and interest articulation was severely limited.

Currently,

the regime is focusing on economic growth, but eventually political
developm ent will have to be addressed, especially if the pragm atists
intend to remain in power.

This will mean delivering what the

population demands; in particular, political participation will be
demanded, and the administration will have to find a way to allow
for this participation.

Prospects

for

the

Future

This final section analyzes the future prospects for Iran's
political economy and development.

Nearly three decades have been

exam ined in order to understand the interaction between the
economic and political spheres in Iran.

This historical analysis is

necessary because it provides a basis for com prehending Iran's
current political economy and level of development.

With this basis

practical economic and political suggestions can be made for future
developm ent in Iran.

Understanding the consequences of decisions

in the past will allow the current leadership to make more informed
decisions.

Obviously environmental factors will not be the same as

before, but nevertheless a historical basis provides some foundation
from which to begin.
Since Khom eini's death, probably the m ost im portant event
influencing Iran's political economy has been the war between the
Allied Forces, led by the United States, and Iraq.

Iraq's invasion of
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Kuwait increased oil prices which allowed Iran to increase its oil
revenues and pull itself out of a budget deficit.

Following the

invasion, Iran's neutral position in this war brought it benefits that
otherwise probably would have been long in coming.

First, the war

weakened Iran's most powerful com petitor for regional dominance.
After the eight year war Iran was hardly strong enough to prevent
Iraq from increasing its power in the region.

However, with the

defeat of Iraq at the hands of the allied forces, Iraq cannot establish
regional hegemony any time soon while Iran is placed in a much
better position to dominate the Gulf region.

In addition, Iran's

neutral position in the war was rewarded with renewed relations
with W estern countries and economic agreements.

Had Iran joined

Iraq in its fight against the allied forces, which the radicals called for,
the war would have been much different.

Many in the W est realized

this and chose to encourage Iran's neutrality.

President Rafsanjani

maintained a neutral role in the buildup and the war because of his
concerns for reconstruction.

Reconstruction depends on assistance

from the advanced countries, particularly Japan and W estern Europe,
and econom ic assistance would not have been forthcom ing had Iran
joined Iraq.

The European Community lifted all economic sanctions

against Iran and many of the W estern nations renewed their
relations with Iran.

Currently, the government is trying to encourage

W estern investm ent in Iran.
The political strength of the pragm atists, especially Rafsanjani,
has increased since the war and economic benefits are in evidence.
W ithin the past few months, several individuals and newspapers
have vocalized support for President Rafsanjani.

In a speech against
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the United States, Supreme Guide Khamenei did not attack Rafsanjani
for any rapproachm ent with the US, but instead ordered the
President's critics to shut up and stated:
It is the duty of all to support the respected President ...
and the governm ent, which, with God's blessing, is being
run today by one of the m ost b rilliant figures of the
revolution and one of the most efficient brains and arms of
the country.37
This overwhelm ing endorsem ent for the president by Khamenei, was
followed by statem ent from the Islamic Republic's Supreme Court in
which Chief Justice Hossain Moqtadai stated that those threatening
the regime can and will be punished.

In addition to the statements

from these two powerful men there was also "orchestrated praise" of
Rafsanjani and the adm inistration from various publications.

The

tim ing suggests that these incidents were not coincidental, but were
organized by the moderates as a major offensive against the
ra d ic a ls .38

The moderates are in a strong position and are currently

trying to build upon their strength.

If they are able to address the

economic needs of the population quickly, the chances of the radicals
usurping power will decrease substantially.

However, in the long

term the governm ent, whether run by m oderates or radicals, must
solve a number of problems if Iran is to develop economically and
politically.

37 This quote o f Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei was taken from the
International Iran Times, Vol. XXI, no. 12, 7 Jun 1991, 1.
38 International Iran Times, Vol. XXI, no. 12, 7 Jun 1991, 1.
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As in the beginning of the Republic, there is still disagreement
regarding the degree of state control of the economy as opposed to
private enterprise.

Under the m oderates, many of the state owned

com panies are being released for private ownership and the
governm ent is seeking new ways to encourage the private sector.
According to Hooshang Amirahmadi, a combination of state
intervention and private sector encouragem ent is needed.
C learly the situation calls for increased public intervention
and investm ent, particularly in R&D, infrastructures, and
industries.
However, the success of such intervention and
investm ent policy would depend on how efficiently it is
im plem ented.
This is why effective investm ent planning
has becom e indispensable to the country.
To redirect
investm ent tow ard industries, the governm ent m ust also
introduce incentives for the private sector and im plem ent
it with vigor and rigid discipline.39
The governm ent hopes that providing incentives for the private
sector will allow for economic growth.

This in conjunction with

effective planning could lead to the reconstruction and m odernization
goals of Iran.
According to Homa Katouzian, for long-term peace, stability and
progress, the Iranian political economy is in need of numerous
changes.

Katouzian provides a list of long-term politico-econom ic

requirem ents and strategies for Iran.

The requirem ents include:

1) creation of an alternative export sector to reduce
dependence on oil,
2) prom otion and diversification of dom estic output,
reducing the country's dependence on im ports of

39

A m irahm adi,

162.
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consum er goods, interm ediate products and capital
m a c h in e ry ,
3) sustained growth rate of national income and living
standards consistent with the country's politicoeconomic capacity to absorb, and
4) a direct and indirect redistribution of income, education,
health and other social goods to the poorer classes of the
c o m m u n ity .40
To accomplish these goals, Katouzian gives a list of strategies, some of
which are m ore com prehensive than others.
Katouzian suggests that there must be investm ent in many of
the local, labour-intensive industries and attem pts at their
renovation and m odernization.

In addition, there must be

investm ent in basic consum er products, old and new, which are
objects of consumption of the masses, such as textiles, appliances,
education, health services, and housing.

Investm ent in industries in

which the country can reasonably compete in the regional, as well as
world m arket, is also suggested.

W hile the author proposes

increased investm ent in many areas (some of which will produce
more capital), she does not discuss where the initial capital is to come
from.

Is an oil-led industrialization strategy, such as the moderates

propose, the proper strategy or is something different needed?

In

addition to the above strategies, Katouzian also argues that a
com plete redistribution of land among the peasantry with the
provision of financial, technical and other extension services is
necessary.

W hile this proposal would aid in the redistribution of

wealth in the country which is vital to long-term stability and
progress, land distribution has been a very controversial issue for
40 Katouzian, 370.
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many years and it is unlikely that the powerful landowners that
have defeated previous attem pts at redistribution will turn over
their property any time soon.

In particular, if Iran rem ains a

republic governed by Islam, which recognizes private property,
redistribution w ill be difficult; even if the governm ent changes,
Islam will still remain an important factor in Iran and thus will
com plicate redistribution.

Katouzian also suggests strategies

including investm ent in universal free education and health facilities,
developm ent of the country's existing technology and skills, and
rational and realistic attempts at the extension of the heavy
industrial and engineering base.41

Katouzian’s list of requirements

and strategies for Iran is valuable for long-term planning, but there
are areas that need more specifics if they are to be used by the
a d m in istra tio n .
Over the past decade the administration has used quick fixes to
econom ic problem s, rather than long-term planning.

Practical

dom estic economic planning is needed for reconstruction and
economic growth.

An overall evaluation of the resources of the

country and the goals must be made.

Once these are determined,

strategies can be adopted to move towards these goals.
economic growth is obviously one goal.

For example,

Some of the most plentiful

resources in Iran include natural gas and minerals.

One growth

strategy would be to invest in developing these resources, focusing
on labour-intensive methods of development, which would also aid
economic growth by lowering the unemployment rate.
41

Katouzian, 3 7 0 -7 1 .
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R afsanjani adm inistration has started long-term planning and has
tried to develop strategies that are conducive to this planning.
However, policy decisions must be continually evaluated as the
environm ent changes.

A brief examination of Iran's resources will

allow for strategy suggestions that may move the country towards its
goals.
Iran has numerous resources, many of which have not been
used.

The most obvious natural resource is oil.

Iran has large oil

reserves, and now that the war with Iraq is over, the damaged oil
production and transport facilities are being repaired so that Iran
may increase its oil revenues.

The invasion of Kuwait boosted oil

sales, and during the crisis the United States lifted its ban on USbased oil companies buying Iranian oil.

The pragm atists intend to

realize economic growth through oil-led industrialization and have
partially based budget increases on projected oil revenue increases.
However, there are drawbacks to Iran's oil resource.
First, for more than two decades Iran has depended on oil sales
for the majority of its state revenues and for most of its foreign
exchange.

The decline in oil prices in the late 1970's and the oil glut

on the m arket in the m id-1980's severely damaged Iran's economy.
In addition, OPEC can and has manipulated the oil markets to Iran’s
disadvantage.

Certain members have ignored their quotas and

flooded the market, thus driving prices down, and Iran's calls for
reduced quotas for all members have been ignored.

Separate from

these problems, Iran is also at a disadvantage because while it
exports crude oil it has to import refined oil, which is a drain on
revenues.

The Abadan refinery is scheduled to reopen soon, but it
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will not be able to provide the quantity necessary for domestic use,
so im ports will continue.42

If the oil resources are used wisely and if

the world market is favorable over the next few years, Iran may be
able to use the revenues to expand its oil production (including
building refineries to provide enough refined oil for both domestic
use and exports), and to develop other industries that will lessen
Iran's dependence on the oil market.
One of the industries that is being developed is petrochemicals.
Iran plans to produce 9 million tons of petrochem icals in 1993, which
will allow the country to begin exporting these resources for the first
time.

Currently, Iran is importing as much as $2 billion worth of

petrochem icals each year, but by 1993 Iran's dom estic needs will be
covered by 80 percent of its production and the rem ainder will be
e x p o rte d .43

Petrochemicals

for development.

are a resource that holds vast potential

However, Iran has to develop more

petrochem ical resources.

than its oil and

A diverse economic foundation is necessary

for sustained economic growth.
Another resource that has great potential and has not been
developed is natural gas.
reserves in the world.

Iran has the second largest natural gas
Some quantities are being exported, especially

to Eastern Europe, but there are vast reserves that could be
developed.

Iran and Turkey have signed an economic pact in which

they agreed to construct a natural gas pipeline from Iran across
Anatolia, which may eventually supply parts of Europe with gas.
42 International Iran

Times, Vol. XXI, no. 4, 12 Apr 1991, 1.

43 International Iran

Times, Vol. XXI, no. 13, 14 Jun 1991, 2.
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addition to natural gas, Iran also has various m ineral resources that
could be mined and used for domestic purposes or could be exported.
Among these, copper is the primary mineral reserve.

Little effort

has been made to develop copper or any other m inerals in Iran,
although their production could provide Iran with m aterials that are
currently im ported and their export could bring needed foreign
exchange

reserv es.44

Long-term planning and proper investm ent in

the production of these various resources would aid Iran in
safeguarding its economic growth.
There should also be increased investment in many of the local
labour-intensive industries.

These industries, such as carpet-

weaving and shoe-making, have a basis in Iranian culture and if
expanded could provide increased employm ent.
Apart from these resources, Iran also needs to exam ine its
agricultural sector.
agrarian society.

Up until the 1960's Iran was prim arily an
By the 1970's, due to population growth and

unsuitable land reform s, Iran had become an im porter of agricultural
products.

An ambitious program of reform should now be

considered, in which technology appropriate for Iran’s agricultural
lands could be adopted and methods of improving crops analyzed.
Land redistribution among the peasants and provision of financial,
technical and other extension services, as suggested by Katouzian,

44 The capital and skilled labor required to begin m ining and production o f
various m inerals can be quite high, w hich may the reason that these
resources have not been developed.
H ow ever, investm ent in this area would
provide jo b s, would increase productive activity and could provide long-term
s e c u r it y .

160

should be a long-term goal.

The controversy over land redistribution

will obviously surface, but this does not mean that the other
strategies for improving Iran's agricultural sector should not be
p u rs u e d .45

The current administration must focus on moving away

from the service industry, towards a production-oriented economy
for sustained econom ic growth and development.
Intelligent economic planning requires goal setting, both shortand long-term , resource analysis, and the adoption of adequate
strategies.

Even with these, both the domestic and the external

environm ent can change w ithout notice, and planning m ust adjust.
The goals of the current adm inistration are numerous.

Primary

among these goals is securing the basic needs of the population,
providing food and housing in particular.

Lowering the

unem ploym ent rate and the inflation rate is necessary to ensure that
basic needs can be met and sustained.

Reducing the high population

growth rate would allow these needs to be met with a greater degree
of ease in the future.

Reconstruction is also a goal.

The damage from

the war with Iraq and from the earthquake that shook the northern
provinces in June 1990, is extensive.

Reconstruction includes

repairing infrastructures as well as rebuilding num erous industries.
Factories, oil drilling rigs, and transport facilities are areas that the
adm inistration is currently focusing on rebuilding.

Once progress

45
Land redistribution could be approached in an increm ental manner, in
w hich the redistribution spanned a number o f years.
During this period,
peasants could be trained to understand the best uses for their land so that
once the transfer was com plete, there would not be a span in which lack o f
technical skill w ould mean reduced output.
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towards these goals is made, the administration can focus on
m o d e rn iz a tio n .
The current adm inistration must avoid the W esternization that
characterized the m odernization program of the Shah.46
M odernization, recall from chapter one, is defined as man increasing
control over his natural and societal environment.

It involves

technological and organizational changes.
M odernization must be based on what is appropriate for Iran if
it is to be sustained.

The technological dimension will focus on

industrialization and technology transfer.

Industrialization should

focus on goods consumed by the masses and products which Iran can
sell com petitively on both the regional and the world markets.
Consum er products might include housing, textiles, and agricultural
products.

Products for external markets that could be developed

include natural gas, petrochem icals, copper and other minerals.
Current exports should also be expanded.

The organizational aspect

of m odernization in Iran will involve specialization of structures and
functions.

As knowledge and control over the environm ent

increases, it is necessary to create roles/functions and structures that
specialize in particular areas.
bureaucratization.

This generally translates into increased

M odernization allows man to increase his control

46 G iven the hatred o f the W est, particularly the US, that has been prevalent
since the revolution, it is not likely that ex cessiv e W estern cultural traits will
be adopted.
H owever, the technology that Iran may eventually import should
be exam ined in terms o f its appropriateness for that country, rather than its
use in other countries (recall this was a problem in the land reforms under
the Shah).
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over the environment, but it also brings with it demands and
expectations that often race beyond the ability to satisfy them.
In order to gain control over the natural and societal
environm ent increased education and training are necessary.
Education and training must be pursued to realize increased
technology and higher level organization.

For example, to modernize

the industrial sector, engineers and trained workers are im perative.
Iran will have to expand its training to produce skilled workers and
will have to further develop its educational standards.

Free

education to expand literacy must be accompanied by an expansion
of college level educational opportunities in diverse areas.

However,

while education helps increase control over the environm ent, it also
produces econom ic, social and political expectations and demands
which are difficult to meet.
James Bill and Robert Hardgrave wrote that "development is
most usefully understood in terms of a system's response capacity in
relationship to dem ands."47

M odernization means increased

demands on the system, but even without a planned program of
m odernization, demands will be made.

D evelopm ent understood in

terms of response capacity, or the ability to satisfy these demands, is
an ambiguous concept.

It is easier to point out when demands are

not being met than it is to deliver on demands.

Under the Shah,

m odernization was pursued without regard to the social and political
demands of the population.

Economic concessions were made in

47 James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., C om parative P o litics: The Quest
f o r Theory (Lanham MD and London: University Press o f America, Inc., 1981)
67.
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hopes that this would be enough to satisfy the population.
revolution of 1979 indicated, this was not enough.

As the

During the

revolution, in which there was a coalition of groups, each of which
had its own ideas on how the system should run, numerous promises
were made to satisfy the demands of the population.

In particular,

Khom eini prom ised the m o sta za fin , or disinherited, that their
condition would improve.

The Islamic Republic was designed to

produce the rule of Islam in Iran, which Khomeini argued would
satisfy the needs of the faithful.

However, with the revolution, the

war with Iraq, and the decline in oil revenues, the Islamic Republic
has not been able to meet many of the needs or demands of the
people.

Rather, the economic conditions of many have worsened and

repressive tactics have often been employed to quiet any elements
critical of the regime.

Since Khomeini's death, the regim e has focused

on im proving the economy and thus meeting the economic needs and
demands of the population.

However, the adm inistration must keep

in mind that once economic headway is made, political demands will
be made.

Satisfying demands for increased participation in the

political process will eventually be necessary.
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CONCLUSIONS

The central issue addressed by this thesis has been the effect
of the political economy on development in Iran.

Development has

been defined in terms of response capacity or the ability to satisfy
the needs/demands of the population.

Developm ent in terms of

delivering includes fulfilling economic and political requirem ents.
Economic demands include basic needs, such as food and shelter, and
relative needs.

Relative economic demands generally increase as

m odernization takes place.

For example, as the population becomes

more aware of what technology is capable of, demands increase
(som e exam ples of relative luxury demands include appliances,
autom obiles, and other goods that are designed to make life easier).
Political demands are also part of development.

Once basic needs are

met, the population begins to demand avenues for social mobility
and for political participation.

Political participation need not come

in one specific form, but a developing society must provide methods
for the population to at least articulate its interests if that society is
going to progress.
Developm ent is not solely affected by the interrelationships
between economics and politics; there are social and cultural factors
that obviously play a role in development also.

The scope of this

paper however, has been lim ited to the relationship between
developm ent and the political economy in Iran.

The dependent

variable of developm ent has been examined in term s the interaction
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of econom ic conditions, political decisions, and global and domestic
facto rs.
This thesis has traced the political economy of Iran from the
1960's through the present.

The political economy is a product of the

interaction of the decisions and the environm ent within which the
political and economic systems function.

The econom ic and political

systems of a society are determined by a number of factors.

Three

of the most important factors in these systems are the decisions of
the leadership within society, the domestic environm ent and the
international environm ent.

These three factors interact and produce

changes, both negative and positive, in the political economy.

This

political economy in turn, helps determine the degree of
developm ent which society attains.

If environm ental circum stances

are favorable and practical economic policies are adopted, economic
growth is the result.

Similarly, political development can be made if

favorable economic conditions are m aintained and the leadership of
society responds to the economic and political demands of the
p o p u la tio n .
This paper has focused on the environm ental conditions and
decisions that have inhibited development in Iran.

By pointing out

the factors that contributed to a lack of development for this society,
it was possible to suggest alternatives that may im prove prospects
for development.

W hile economic growth was strong in the early

1970's, the Shah's regim e did not direct revenues toward long-term
econom ic development, and the upward trend did not last long.
N either did the Shah respond to increasing demands for cooptation
into the political process, especially by the middle class.

Largely as a
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result of these economic and political factors the Shah's regim e was
overthrown in the 1979 revolution.
A sim ilar analysis was made of the post-revolutionary period
in Iran, in which environm ental conditions, including the war with
Iraq and the soft oil market, largely prohibited econom ic growth.

In

addition, the adm inistration often em ployed repressive tactics to
control the political process.

Mass m obilization rather than

participation was the focus.

Finally, the past two years were

exam ined and an analysis of prospects for future developm ent was
offered.

Practical use of domestic resources combined with a

willingness to politically coopt a larger share of the population are
im portant steps towards econom ic growth and political developm ent.
Further political development, in all likelihood, will involve
providing channels for individuals and groups to articulate their
interests.

Demands will most likely include increasing social mobility

and providing for increased political participation.
proven models of political developm ent.

There are no

W estern dem ocratic-

pluralism is often viewed as the final product, but numerous
arguments have been brought against this viewpoint.

Iran will have

to find a balance between ideology and pragm atism if the revolution
is to survive and the country is to progress.

Iran holds a great deal

of potential that make its long-term prospects good if proper
planning and resource m anagem ent are em ployed.
This case study of the interrelationships of political economy
and developm ent obviously does not address a num ber of questions:
1) W hat are the social and cultural (including religious) factors in
development?

2) Is the same relationship applicable to countries
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other than Iran?

3) Is there a specific approach to political economy

that would guarantee economic growth and political developm ent?
W hile this is not a conclusive list of the questions that could be
addressed in conjunction with this thesis, it suggests directions for
fu rth er

research.

The goal of this study was to gain insight into the
interrelationships of politics and economics and their effect on
political development, specifically within Iran.

It has been argued

that the economic and political systems in society are products of the
interaction of decisions and environm ental conditions.

Hopefully,

what has been presented is an unbiased examination of Iran's
political economy, followed by practical suggestions for future
d e v e lo p m e n t.
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